Explaining North Korean Nuclear Weapons Motivations: Constructivism, Liberalism, and Realism

Q1 Arts and Humanities North Korean Review Pub Date : 2013-04-01 DOI:10.3172/NKR.9.1.61
Liang Tuang Nah
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

IntroductionMass media coverage of nuclear weapons proliferation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-North Korea-produces security-centric perceptions. Typical news about North Korean saber-rattling highlights threats to engulf the South Korean Blue House (presidential residence) in a "sea of fire" in response to military drills.1 An identical threat was made during North-South talks about the North Korean nuclear weapons program in 1994, and the "sea of fire" rhetoric was interpreted as a nuclear strike. Because the mass media frames the DPRK as threatening, the idea is created that nuclear weapons are the only pillar of its militarycentric national survival strategy.A more discerning analysis of North Korean nuclear weapons motivations should involve not only factors concerning military security (realism), but also economic interdependence and development (liberalism) and international nuclear nonproliferation norms (constructivism). Neglecting other explanatory dimensions results in one-sided appraisals.Hence, as the North Korean nuclear arms conundrum can be better understood from a tripartite realist-liberalist-constructivist framework, it is proposed that only when North Korean national security concerns vis-a-vis the United States-South Korean alliance are adequately addressed, the weakness and isolation of the moribund DPRK economy ameliorated and due recognition given for denuclearization norms expressed by Pyongyang, can there be concrete progress on North Korean nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, the rest of this article will elaborate the contemporary historical relevance of each component of the tripartite framework for North Korea, explain U.S. nuclear disarmament failure due to one-dimensional policies or benign neglect and establish the relevance of the tripartite framework for concurrently addressing North Korean existential and reputational pressures to achieve nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula.Contemporary Research and Analytical ApproachCoverage of liberalism and realism is extensive in nuclear weapons scholarship. Regarding unitary theory studies applicable to North Korean nuclear decisions, some examples include the security-centric analysis of Scott Sagan and the politicaleconomic basis behind nuclear weapons policy in Etel Solingen, the former touching on proliferation as an attempt to restore the balance of power vis-a-vis nuclear armed rivals and the latter positing that nuclear armament/disarmament is determined by the relative strength of domestic factions promoting globalized trade and investment (hindered by nuclear pariah status) versus militant isolationists promoting nuclear arms as central to national strength.2In studies relevant to North Korea, single theory analysis is prevalent. For instance, Jaewoo Choo covers asymmetric economic dependence on China, with China as a principal supplier of crucial food, fuel, and fertilizer to North Korea. Here, China is an example of a senior partner state using incremental economic liberalization of North Korea to help normalize the DPRK economy as part of a holistic effort to encourage more responsible behavior by Pyongyang, including eventual nuclear disarmament.3 But however helpful Beijing might be, it is not in the interest of Pyongyang to be economically dependent, as China could easily pressure North Korea. Hence, Pyongyang should broaden its state economic relationships and integrate itself into the world economy, but, in order to do so, must conclusively address the problem of its nuclear arms proliferation.Regarding holistic scholarship, T. V. Paul holds that enduring rivalries fuel nuclear proliferation because of threatened national security. As long as international relations are conflictual and both alliances and military modernization are denied to the would-be proliferator, pro-nuclear arms policies are likely.4 This describes North Korea in that the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is seen as adversarial; China is its only ally, and funds for military modernization are insufficient. …
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解释朝鲜核武器的动机:建构主义、自由主义和现实主义
大众媒体对朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(DPRK)核武器扩散的报道产生了以安全为中心的观念。关于朝鲜武力恫吓的典型新闻强调,作为对军事演习的回应,朝鲜威胁要将韩国青瓦台(总统官邸)吞没在“火海”中1994年南北韩就朝鲜核武器计划举行会谈时也发出了同样的威胁,“火海”的言论被解读为核打击。由于大众媒体将朝鲜描绘成具有威胁性的国家,因此产生了核武器是其以军事为中心的国家生存战略的唯一支柱的想法。对北韩拥核动机的分析,不仅要考虑军事安全(现实主义)因素,还要考虑经济相互依存与发展(自由主义)和国际核不扩散准则(建构主义)因素。忽略其他解释维度会导致片面的评价。因此,在现实主义-自由主义-建构主义三方框架下,可以更好地理解朝鲜核武器难题,因此,我们建议,只有充分解决朝鲜对美韩同盟的国家安全担忧,改善朝鲜垂死的经济的弱点和孤立,并适当承认平壤所表达的无核化规范,才能在朝鲜核裁军方面取得具体进展。因此,本文的其余部分将详细阐述朝鲜三方框架中每个组成部分的当代历史相关性,解释由于一维政策或良性忽视而导致的美国核裁军失败,并建立三方框架的相关性,同时解决朝鲜在朝鲜半岛实现核裁军的存在和声誉压力。当代研究与分析方法自由主义与现实主义在核武器研究中占有广泛的地位。关于适用于朝鲜核决策的统一理论研究,一些例子包括斯科特·萨根的以安全为中心的分析和埃特尔·索林根的核武器政策背后的政治经济基础。前者认为核扩散是为了恢复与拥有核武器的对手之间的力量平衡,而后者则认为,核军备/裁军是由促进全球化贸易和投资(受到核贱民地位的阻碍)的国内派别与将核武器视为国家力量核心的激进孤立主义者的相对实力决定的。在与朝鲜相关的研究中,单一理论分析很普遍。例如,《在宇秋》讲述了朝鲜对中国的不对称经济依赖,中国是朝鲜重要食品、燃料和化肥的主要供应国。在这里,中国是一个高级伙伴国家的例子,利用朝鲜的经济自由化来帮助朝鲜经济正常化,作为鼓励平壤采取更负责任行为的整体努力的一部分,包括最终的核裁军但是,无论北京可能提供多大的帮助,在经济上依赖朝鲜并不符合平壤的利益,因为中国可以轻易地向朝鲜施压。因此,平壤应该扩大其国家经济关系,融入世界经济,但为了做到这一点,必须最终解决其核武器扩散问题。就整体学术而言,保罗认为持久的竞争加剧了核扩散,因为国家安全受到威胁。只要国际关系是冲突的,并且联盟和军事现代化都被拒绝给潜在的扩散者,支持核武器的政策就有可能这是对朝鲜的描述,因为美韩同盟被视为对抗性的;中国是其唯一的盟友,军事现代化的资金不足。…
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来源期刊
North Korean Review
North Korean Review Arts and Humanities-History
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Staying the course: Denuclearization and path dependence in the US's North Korea policy Editor-in-Chief's Comments Managing Editor's Comments Socio-Economic Change in the DPRK and Korean Security Dilemmas: The Implications for International Policy North Korea and Northeast Asian Regional Security
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