Pricing equilibrium of transportation systems with behavioral commuters

IF 1.1 Q3 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS Journal of Dynamics and Games Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.3934/jdg.2020026
J. Lien, V. Mazalov, Jie Zheng
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

We study Wardrop equilibrium in a transportation system with profit-maximizing firms and heterogeneous commuters. Standard commuters minimize the sum of monetary costs and equilibrium travel time in their route choice, while "oblivious" commuters choose the route with minimal idle time. Three possible scenarios can arise in equilibrium: A pooling scenario where all commuters make the same transport choice; A separating scenario where different types of commuters make different transport choices; A partial pooling scenario where some standard commuters make the same transport choice as the oblivious commuters. We characterize the equilibrium existence condition, derive equilibrium flows, prices and firms' profits in each scenario, and conduct comparative analyses on parameters representing route conditions and heterogeneity of commuters, respectively. The framework nests the standard model in which all commuters are standard as a special case, and also allows for the case in which all commuters are oblivious as the other extreme. Our study shows how the presence of behavioral commuters under different route conditions affects equilibrium behavior of commuters and firms, as well a the equilibrium outcome of the transportation system.
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具有行为通勤者的交通系统定价均衡
研究了具有利润最大化企业和异质通勤者的运输系统中的Wardrop均衡。标准通勤者在选择路线时将货币成本和均衡出行时间的总和最小化,而“遗忘”通勤者则选择空闲时间最少的路线。均衡中可能出现三种情况:所有通勤者都选择相同的交通工具的合用情况;不同类型的通勤者选择不同的交通工具的分离场景;一个部分合用的场景,其中一些标准的通勤者与遗忘的通勤者做出相同的交通选择。我们描述了均衡存在条件,推导出了每种情景下的均衡流量、均衡价格和均衡企业利润,并分别对代表路线条件和通勤者异质性的参数进行了比较分析。该框架将所有通勤者都是标准的标准模型作为一种特殊情况,并允许所有通勤者都被遗忘作为另一种极端情况。研究揭示了不同路径条件下行为通勤者的存在如何影响通勤者和企业的均衡行为,以及交通系统的均衡结果。
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来源期刊
Journal of Dynamics and Games
Journal of Dynamics and Games MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
26
期刊介绍: The Journal of Dynamics and Games (JDG) is a pure and applied mathematical journal that publishes high quality peer-review and expository papers in all research areas of expertise of its editors. The main focus of JDG is in the interface of Dynamical Systems and Game Theory.
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