Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal Foundations

Q2 Arts and Humanities Journal of Information Ethics Pub Date : 2012-04-01 DOI:10.5860/choice.48-4145
T. Lipinski
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Abstract

Privacy Rights: Moral and Legal FoundationsAdam D. Moore. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. 248 pp. $65.00.Moore has written extensively on the topic of privacy from its moral and legal underpinnings to its value both inherent and in practice. This body of work is reflected in this offering. The book is not a mere recounting of the threat to privacy in present society. Rather, the author presents a series of arguments in favor of privacy protection ("my goal is to provide a philosophically rigorous defense of privacy rights" p. 4), its moral foundation, and its legal shortcomings as well as possibilities. Thus a normative approach is his goal; i.e., one based upon "moral claims" (p. 16) as opposed to one based on the condition of privacy, tending to be descriptive. Elements from many chapters have appeared in Moore's previous writings and presentations. True to the philosopher in Moore, there are numerous and variable cases or thought-exercises (most involving two actors, Fred and Ginger) and prove to be to some the most useful content presented. Moore knows his law too, a feature missing in many works on this and inter-related topics such as free speech and copyright. Discussion of these legal concepts is both fluid and informed.After a short introductory chapter, the author spends some time attempting to define privacy and its value. The remaining seven chapters develop the argument for privacy rights in bodies (self ) and locations (space), information (about self and space, including decisional privacy), legal privacy rights, conflicts between speech and privacy, workplace privacy, the conflict between intellectual property and privacy rights, and state (security) versus the individual (and his or her privacy).In chapter 2 Moore argues for a normative view in defense of privacy with the benefit that his conception is broad enough to encompass more singular conceptualizations, those based on personality ("grow personally") or autonomy, for example (p. 17). Control rather than liberty is key to Moore's conception, with "access to" and "use of" distinguishable. In addition, the privacy right extends to "use of bodies, locations, and personal information" (p. 25).Chapter 3 (The Value of Privacy), the most philosophically oriented of the book, discusses Rawls, Hume, et al., and while recognizing privacy as culturally variable also argues that privacy is somewhat inherent or universal in all but a few cases. Of course, exceptions are the bane of the philosopher and Moore's argument is no exception. While the chapter presents a number of important considerations, it remains in the reviewer's mind a less convincing articulation of the value of privacy.Chapter 4 and those that follow proceed quickly into specifics. Here Moore argues for privacy rights in bodies and more important, locations. This is one clear example where Moore and much legal thinking part company. He introduces a basic rule for evaluating privacy claims: A so-called "no harm, no foul" rule (p. 62), somewhat related to economic Pareto optimum efficiency that he believes may be a "foundational moral principle" (p. 79) and he also discusses positions forwarded by others such as Gauthier and Nozick, then applies his concepts to the various case studies or scenarios posted earlier.Chapter 5 tackles informational privacy in our technological age and argues for differences in invasions of privacy not just in degree but in kind. Moore discusses use and possession claims, access control rights, physical and intellectual property and freedom of contract; these "rights, claims, and liberties provide the foundation for informational privacy" (p. 95).Chapter 6 discusses the legal foundations of privacy protection (the approach is decidedly based on U.S. law), its gaps, and its potential. The chapter is mostly descriptive of common law privacy torts, constitutional protections and statutory approaches and does a fine job of discussing the relevant case law in terms a non-legal audience would appreciate. …
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隐私权:道德和法律基础
隐私权:道德和法律基础。大学公园:宾夕法尼亚州立大学出版社,2010。248页,65.00美元。摩尔写了大量关于隐私的文章,从其道德和法律基础到其内在和实践价值。这个主体的工作是反映在这个产品。这本书不仅仅讲述了当今社会对隐私的威胁。相反,作者提出了一系列支持隐私保护的论点(“我的目标是为隐私权提供一个哲学上严格的辩护”第4页),它的道德基础,它的法律缺陷以及可能性。因此,规范性的方法是他的目标;也就是说,一种基于“道德要求”(第16页),而另一种基于隐私条件,倾向于描述性。摩尔以前的著作和演讲中也出现过许多章节的内容。正如摩尔的哲学家一样,有许多不同的案例或思维练习(大多数涉及两个演员,弗雷德和金格),并被证明是一些最有用的内容。摩尔也知道他的定律,这是许多关于这个以及言论自由和版权等相互关联的话题的著作所缺少的一个特征。对这些法律概念的讨论既灵活又见多识广。在简短的介绍性章节之后,作者花了一些时间试图定义隐私及其价值。剩下的七章论述了主体(自我)和地点(空间)、信息(关于自我和空间,包括决策隐私)、法律隐私权、言论和隐私之间的冲突、工作场所隐私、知识产权和隐私权之间的冲突,以及国家(安全)与个人(及其隐私)之间的冲突。在第二章中,Moore提出了一种规范的观点来捍卫隐私,其好处是他的概念足够广泛,可以包含更单一的概念,例如那些基于个性(“个人成长”)或自主性的概念(第17页)。控制而不是自由是摩尔概念的关键,“获得”和“使用”是可区分的。此外,隐私权还延伸到"对尸体、地点和个人信息的使用"(第25页)。第3章(隐私的价值)是本书最具哲学导向的部分,讨论了罗尔斯、休谟等人,虽然承认隐私在文化上是可变的,但也认为隐私在除少数情况外的所有情况下都是固有的或普遍的。当然,例外是哲学家的祸根,摩尔的论点也不例外。虽然这一章提出了一些重要的考虑,但在审稿人的心目中,它仍然是对隐私价值的不那么令人信服的阐述。第4章和后面的章节会很快进入细节。在这里,摩尔主张身体的隐私权,更重要的是,地点的隐私权。这是一个明显的例子,说明摩尔与许多法律思想有分歧。他介绍了一个评估隐私要求的基本规则:所谓的“无伤害,无犯规”规则(第62页),在某种程度上与经济学上的帕累托最优效率有关,他认为这可能是一个“基本的道德原则”(第79页)。他还讨论了其他人的观点,如戈蒂尔和诺齐克,然后将他的概念应用到前面发布的各种案例研究或场景中。第五章讨论了我们这个技术时代的信息隐私,并论证了侵犯隐私的不同,不仅在程度上,而且在种类上。摩尔讨论了使用和占有主张、访问控制权、物理和知识产权以及合同自由;这些“权利、要求和自由为信息隐私提供了基础”(第95页)。第6章讨论了隐私保护的法律基础(该方法显然是基于美国法律),其差距和潜力。这一章主要描述了普通法上的隐私侵权、宪法保护和法定途径,并以非法律读者会欣赏的方式很好地讨论了相关的判例法。…
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Journal of Information Ethics
Journal of Information Ethics Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
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