The concept of knowledge as a subjective element in the criminal offense of crimes against humanity

Abstract

The subject of this paper is the analysis of knowledge as a subjective element in terms of crimes against humanity in international criminal law. Starting from the fact that committing an act within a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population is a circumstance that turns a "common" crime into a crime against humanity, the paper seeks to answer the question of whether knowledge of committing an act within such an attack is an independent subjective element and whether there is a unified position regarding the necessary content of knowledge in international criminal law. The paper is based on a linguistic, normative, systematic and comparative legal analysis of relevant provisions of international criminal law sources, a documentary analysis of sample judgments of the three most important international courts, as well as a case study that analyzes this subjective element in the legislation and case law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The results of the research show that in terms of the independence of knowledge as a subjective element in crimes against humanity, there is a relatively consistent position in international criminal law, while in terms of the content of knowledge there is no such agreement.