The Single Supervisory Mechanism: the Building Pillar of the European Banking Union

Luigi Chiarella
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

One of the lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis is that when a bank in Europe goes into trouble the ensuing effects can reach far beyond the immediate threat to its depositors and shareholders. In particular, the crisis has revealed the extent to which irresponsible behavior in the banking sector could undermine the foundations of the financial system and threaten the real economy, turning a banking crisis into a sovereign debt crisis as occurred in the eurozone in 2011. In response to this lesson, Member States first tried to address the systemic fragility of their banking systems through national policy tools, but countries that share a common currency and are more interdependent required more integrated responses. Therefore, at the euro area summit in June 2012, the European Council agreed to break the vicious circle between banks and sovereign debt and decided to create a banking union that would allow a centralized supervision for banks in the euro area through a newly established Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a centralized resolution scheme. The SSM became operational in November 2014 and represents the building pillar of the banking union. The purpose of this paper is then to provide, after a brief description of the background (Par. 1), an analysis of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, illustrating its functioning (Par. 2), then focusing on the position and the powers of the ECB within it (Par. 3) and finally pointing out some remarks on the potential weaknesses of the new regime (Par. 4).
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单一监管机制:欧洲银行业联盟的支柱
从2008年金融危机中吸取的教训之一是,当一家欧洲银行陷入困境时,随之而来的影响可能远远超出对其储户和股东的直接威胁。特别是,这次危机暴露了银行部门不负责任的行为可以破坏金融体系的基础,威胁实体经济的程度,将银行危机演变为2011年欧元区发生的主权债务危机。作为对这一教训的回应,会员国首先试图通过国家政策工具解决其银行体系的系统性脆弱性问题,但使用共同货币且相互依存程度更高的国家需要更综合的对策。因此,在2012年6月的欧元区峰会上,欧洲理事会同意打破银行与主权债务之间的恶性循环,并决定创建一个银行业联盟,通过新建立的单一监管机制(SSM)和集中处置方案,对欧元区的银行进行集中监管。SSM于2014年11月开始运作,代表着银行业联盟的建设支柱。本文的目的是在简要介绍背景(第1部分)之后,对单一监督机制进行分析,说明其功能(第2部分),然后关注欧洲央行在其中的地位和权力(第3部分),最后指出对新制度潜在弱点的一些评论(第4部分)。
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来源期刊
University of Bologna Law Review
University of Bologna Law Review Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
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0
审稿时长
22 weeks
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