Pub Date : 2021-11-10DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13812
Tamar Frankel
{"title":"Securitizing Notes of Small Businesses and Needy Workers","authors":"Tamar Frankel","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13812","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"159-162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42203188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-06DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13622
E. Rashwan
Transitional Justice [hereinafter T.J.] in the post-revolution phase refers to the policies that aim to deal with the autocratic past-regime violations against its people to achieve accountability and democracy and promote human rights and the rule of law. To achieve these goals, the United Nations, within its Rule of Law Initiative, issued in 2010, a set of five mechanisms that work as guidelines for nations recovering from conflicts. I argue that whatever the mechanism or combination selected by a society transforming from an autocracy into democracy is, the nature of these mechanisms requires a trade-off between multiple considerations. To explain this inevitable trade-off, I go through each mechanism in detail, analyze it from both legal and economic perspectives, and then provide a basic cost-benefit analysis. I suggest that transitional justice as a constitutional arrangement requires a holistic approach in its adoption and application because this initial cost-benefit analysis cannot be standardized for all cases. I also suggest that transitional justice policies that take into account proportionality, a combination of different mechanisms, customization of the mechanisms upon the relevant case, and adopting these policies in the formality of basic or organic laws may be expected to have the most effective outcomes achieving the goals of T.J. with the least legal complications.
革命后阶段的过渡司法(Transitional Justice，以下简称T.J.)是指旨在处理过去独裁政权对其人民的侵犯行为，以实现问责制和民主，促进人权和法治的政策。为了实现这些目标，联合国在2010年发布的《法治倡议》(Rule of Law Initiative)中提出了一套五项机制，作为冲突后恢复国家的指导方针。我认为，无论一个社会从专制向民主转变所选择的机制或组合是什么，这些机制的本质都需要在多种考虑之间进行权衡。为了解释这种不可避免的权衡，我详细介绍了每种机制，从法律和经济角度对其进行了分析，然后进行了基本的成本效益分析。我建议，过渡时期司法作为一项宪法安排，在其采用和应用方面需要采取全面的办法，因为这种最初的成本效益分析不可能对所有情况进行标准化。我还建议，考虑到比例性、不同机制的组合、根据相关案件定制机制以及在基本或组织法的形式中采用这些政策的过渡司法政策，可能会以最少的法律复杂性产生最有效的结果，以实现司法目标。
{"title":"The Price of Transitional Justice: A Cost‐Benefit Analysis of its Mechanisms in Post‐Revolution Phase","authors":"E. Rashwan","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13622","url":null,"abstract":"Transitional Justice [hereinafter T.J.] in the post-revolution phase refers to the policies that aim to deal with the autocratic past-regime violations against its people to achieve accountability and democracy and promote human rights and the rule of law. To achieve these goals, the United Nations, within its Rule of Law Initiative, issued in 2010, a set of five mechanisms that work as guidelines for nations recovering from conflicts. I argue that whatever the mechanism or combination selected by a society transforming from an autocracy into democracy is, the nature of these mechanisms requires a trade-off between multiple considerations. To explain this inevitable trade-off, I go through each mechanism in detail, analyze it from both legal and economic perspectives, and then provide a basic cost-benefit analysis. I suggest that transitional justice as a constitutional arrangement requires a holistic approach in its adoption and application because this initial cost-benefit analysis cannot be standardized for all cases. I also suggest that transitional justice policies that take into account proportionality, a combination of different mechanisms, customization of the mechanisms upon the relevant case, and adopting these policies in the formality of basic or organic laws may be expected to have the most effective outcomes achieving the goals of T.J. with the least legal complications.","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"95-142"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42230251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-04DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13410
Steve G. Parsons
Two of the most important categories of government intervention in response to COVID-19 are business closures and mask mandates. The scientific literature supports the efficacy of mask-wearing to reduce the transmission of respiratory viruses (including COVID-19). However, the efficacy is greater in stopping outbound transmission (meaning that my mask protects you) than inbound transmission (meaning that my mask protects me). Evidence suggests that the full benefits to society of wearing masks are far greater than the full costs to society of wearing masks. The author argues that mask-wearing is far more cost effective than business closures in controlling the spread of COVID-19. Moreover, the author argues that highly infectious diseases have an externality dimension. The person infected with COVID-19 makes a decision regarding whether to wear a mask based on their own perceived costs and benefits of mask-wearing, but that decision has consequences for those they come in contact with: the infected person’s decision not to wear a mask imposes costs on others that are external to the infected person’s decision process not to do so. The author further argues that some possible methods by which to deal with such an external cost (individual negotiations, a tax on spreading COVID-19, or as subsidy for wearing masks) are impractical. This makes a mask-wearing government mandate economically valid.
{"title":"Is a Requirement to Wear a Mask Economically Valid During COVID-19?","authors":"Steve G. Parsons","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13410","url":null,"abstract":"Two of the most important categories of government intervention in response to COVID-19 are business closures and mask mandates. The scientific literature supports the efficacy of mask-wearing to reduce the transmission of respiratory viruses (including COVID-19). However, the efficacy is greater in stopping outbound transmission (meaning that my mask protects you) than inbound transmission (meaning that my mask protects me). Evidence suggests that the full benefits to society of wearing masks are far greater than the full costs to society of wearing masks. The author argues that mask-wearing is far more cost effective than business closures in controlling the spread of COVID-19. Moreover, the author argues that highly infectious diseases have an externality dimension. The person infected with COVID-19 makes a decision regarding whether to wear a mask based on their own perceived costs and benefits of mask-wearing, but that decision has consequences for those they come in contact with: the infected person’s decision not to wear a mask imposes costs on others that are external to the infected person’s decision process not to do so. The author further argues that some possible methods by which to deal with such an external cost (individual negotiations, a tax on spreading COVID-19, or as subsidy for wearing masks) are impractical. This makes a mask-wearing government mandate economically valid.","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"76-94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49328802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-19DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13299
Carter Dillard
In philosophy, legal theory and law, the Grundnorm, or basic norm, is often assumed to be the constitution, or that which overrides other norms. That is incorrect. This paper argues that the grundnorm should be the norm which regulates human procreation. This norm must proceed from the theoretical absence of human power, or a zero baseline. This essay attempts to correct the grundnorm fallacy with what will be called the Zero-Baseline Model. The correction reorients our human rights regimes and family planning systems, in ways that lead to an inevitable list of specific policy reforms that largely invert current family planning models and policies in use at the United Nations, European Union, the United States, and elsewhere. Those reforms can all be described in a simple narrative of reorienting family planning laws and policies from what would-be parents desire, subjectively, towards what all future children need, objectively. And as the evidence shows, those reforms prove highly effective and much more efficient in promoting child welfare, reducing economic and other inequalities, mitigating the climate and other ecological crises, protecting non-humans, and building democracy, than their alternatives.
{"title":"Constituting Over Constitutions","authors":"Carter Dillard","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/13299","url":null,"abstract":"In philosophy, legal theory and law, the Grundnorm, or basic norm, is often assumed to be the constitution, or that which overrides other norms. That is incorrect. This paper argues that the grundnorm should be the norm which regulates human procreation. This norm must proceed from the theoretical absence of human power, or a zero baseline. This essay attempts to correct the grundnorm fallacy with what will be called the Zero-Baseline Model. The correction reorients our human rights regimes and family planning systems, in ways that lead to an inevitable list of specific policy reforms that largely invert current family planning models and policies in use at the United Nations, European Union, the United States, and elsewhere. Those reforms can all be described in a simple narrative of reorienting family planning laws and policies from what would-be parents desire, subjectively, towards what all future children need, objectively. And as the evidence shows, those reforms prove highly effective and much more efficient in promoting child welfare, reducing economic and other inequalities, mitigating the climate and other ecological crises, protecting non-humans, and building democracy, than their alternatives.","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"48-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42974244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-11DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12881
Ahmet Gelgeç
Loss of, or damage to goods is a frequent occurrence in the shipping industry, which may often occur as a result of improper cargo-handling operations during loading, discharging or even stowing. This highly concerns cargo interests, as they will seek to reimburse their loss from their carriers under bills of lading. Often, the bill of lading may well contain terms of a charterparty by way of incorporation that allow the carrier to contract out their cargo-related operations. Once this is the case, the cargo interest is unjustly left without a remedy for loss of, or damage to his goods vis-a-vis the carrier under English law. This paper, instead of challenging the correctness of the law firmly established concerning the transfer of these obligations via Free In and Out Stowed and Trimmed (FIOST) clauses, rather, aims to propose ideas to tackle the impact arising out of the status quo under English law. Finally, it offers some plausible suggestions for cargo interests to surmount this undesired outcome.
{"title":"Challenging the Undesired Outcome of FIOST Clauses on Cargo Interests","authors":"Ahmet Gelgeç","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12881","url":null,"abstract":"Loss of, or damage to goods is a frequent occurrence in the shipping industry, which may often occur as a result of improper cargo-handling operations during loading, discharging or even stowing. This highly concerns cargo interests, as they will seek to reimburse their loss from their carriers under bills of lading. Often, the bill of lading may well contain terms of a charterparty by way of incorporation that allow the carrier to contract out their cargo-related operations. Once this is the case, the cargo interest is unjustly left without a remedy for loss of, or damage to his goods vis-a-vis the carrier under English law. This paper, instead of challenging the correctness of the law firmly established concerning the transfer of these obligations via Free In and Out Stowed and Trimmed (FIOST) clauses, rather, aims to propose ideas to tackle the impact arising out of the status quo under English law. Finally, it offers some plausible suggestions for cargo interests to surmount this undesired outcome.","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"29-47"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47879785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-05DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12880
A. Rana, Rishabha Meena
Data, much like other currencies, flows cross-border -from one jurisdiction to the other. However, it is hard to regulate the privacy aspects surrounding such free-flowing data by rules strictly based on jurisdiction. This article thereby begins by discussing the importance of data protection regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (G.D.P.R.), followed by a brief analysis of the General Agreement on Trade in Services’ pivotal role in regulating data flows and digital trade, and how it can be further used in checking the World Trade Organisation consistency of various data protection requirements resorted by the European Union (E.U.) so far under the G.D.P.R.. Lastly, the note examines how, post the Brexit transition period, the situation will change for the United Kingdom (U.K.) as it has become a third country for the E.U. data protection regime, with the authors critiquing the various models, including the recent Draft U.K.-E.U. Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, that may help the U.K. in attaining an “adequacy” status, which is requisite for the continuation of an unconstrained digital trade with the E.U. .
{"title":"What Is Next for Digital Trade in a Post‐Brexit Britain? – Examining the Regulation of Data Flows Under G.A.T.S. & Possible Implications of G.D.P.R. on Britain as a Third Country","authors":"A. Rana, Rishabha Meena","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12880","url":null,"abstract":"Data, much like other currencies, flows cross-border -from one jurisdiction to the other. However, it is hard to regulate the privacy aspects surrounding such free-flowing data by rules strictly based on jurisdiction. This article thereby begins by discussing the importance of data protection regulations like the General Data Protection Regulation (G.D.P.R.), followed by a brief analysis of the General Agreement on Trade in Services’ pivotal role in regulating data flows and digital trade, and how it can be further used in checking the World Trade Organisation consistency of various data protection requirements resorted by the European Union (E.U.) so far under the G.D.P.R.. Lastly, the note examines how, post the Brexit transition period, the situation will change for the United Kingdom (U.K.) as it has become a third country for the E.U. data protection regime, with the authors critiquing the various models, including the recent Draft U.K.-E.U. Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, that may help the U.K. in attaining an “adequacy” status, which is requisite for the continuation of an unconstrained digital trade with the E.U. .","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"6-28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41507954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-27DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12618
Matthias Klatt
{"title":"What COVID-19 does to our Universities","authors":"Matthias Klatt","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/12618","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"6 1","pages":"1-5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44260555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-05DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/10514
Veljko Turanjanin
The tension between safety and privacy has become an important issue in the modern world. Video surveillance systems are indeed powerful tools for fighting crime on the one hand, and for the protection of property from theft on the other. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has examined the issue of video surveillance in many of its decisions. In this work, the author analyses the issue of video surveillance over employees and its influence on fundamental human rights and freedoms. He elaborates upon the ECtHR’s case of Lopez Ribalda and Others v. Spain in order to identify the balance between the right to privacy and the right to property. This is a case from the civil law, but with elements that could may be used in the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, it is important to determine when exactly the video footage of employees may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. After the introductory remarks, the author briefly deals with the facts of the above case and explains the basic applicable international legal acts. He then observes the issue of video surveillance from two points of view – those of Article 8 and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Finally, he concludes that the ECHR took the right direction in establishing the balance between the protection of property and the right to privacy.
{"title":"Video Surveillance of the Employees Between the Right to Privacy and Right to Property After López Ribalda and Others v. Spain","authors":"Veljko Turanjanin","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/10514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/10514","url":null,"abstract":"The tension between safety and privacy has become an important issue in the modern world. Video surveillance systems are indeed powerful tools for fighting crime on the one hand, and for the protection of property from theft on the other. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has examined the issue of video surveillance in many of its decisions. In this work, the author analyses the issue of video surveillance over employees and its influence on fundamental human rights and freedoms. He elaborates upon the ECtHR’s case of Lopez Ribalda and Others v. Spain in order to identify the balance between the right to privacy and the right to property. This is a case from the civil law, but with elements that could may be used in the criminal proceedings. Furthermore, it is important to determine when exactly the video footage of employees may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. After the introductory remarks, the author briefly deals with the facts of the above case and explains the basic applicable international legal acts. He then observes the issue of video surveillance from two points of view – those of Article 8 and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Finally, he concludes that the ECHR took the right direction in establishing the balance between the protection of property and the right to privacy.","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"5 1","pages":"268-293"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44285441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-21DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/11542
Alina Veneziano
This article uses the research from Kal Raustiala’s book, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? : The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law, and the research from several of my articles on extraterritorial applications to explain how the United States has used the regulatory tool, extraterritoriality, since the time of the American Founding and how such use has differed as the United States gained power. The manner by which the United States has relied on extraterritoriality has differed depending on a particular era of history. For instance, this article articulates five eras that have characterized the U.S. decision-making process for extraterritoriality: cautionary, progressive, indiscriminate, withdrawal, and arbitrary. The United States within each era has embraced certain customary principles more than others such as sovereignty, territorialism, international comity, and global constitutionalism. Its reliance on these principles is volatile and changes in each era. What is remarkable is the extent to which the United States has and has not considered international issues as a part of its practice of utilizing extraterritoriality. As a young nation, the United States greatly clung to notions of sovereignty and territorialism and eschewed extraterritoriality because it was not strong enough to exert such power nor could it handle an invasion from another foreign power. Sovereignty and territorialism gave the United States the peace of mind and security against an uprising. International considerations were prominent and commonplace in the early eras. But as the nation grew in strength throughout each successive era, it no longer needed the bedrock of sovereignty and territorialism to safeguard it from other foreign powers. The United States instead sought to inject its laws extraterritorially and engage in global policing. Its rise in economic and political power gave it the strength to do so. Extraterritorial regulation was on the rise. However, the more its use of extraterritoriality rose, the more domestic struggles the United States encountered, which led to arbitrary judicial decisions and policy-making. Further, during the later eras, the United States relied less and less on international considerations and engaged in withdrawal tactics, causing some to view its behavior as hegemonic. There is a great imperative of examining history with the law. How U.S. history and politics can inform the future of the law is critical. The findings laid out within this article will serve a starting point for future research regarding potential future eras.
{"title":"The Eras of Extraterritoriality in the United States","authors":"Alina Veneziano","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/11542","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/11542","url":null,"abstract":"This article uses the research from Kal Raustiala’s book, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? : The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law, and the research from several of my articles on extraterritorial applications to explain how the United States has used the regulatory tool, extraterritoriality, since the time of the American Founding and how such use has differed as the United States gained power. The manner by which the United States has relied on extraterritoriality has differed depending on a particular era of history. For instance, this article articulates five eras that have characterized the U.S. decision-making process for extraterritoriality: cautionary, progressive, indiscriminate, withdrawal, and arbitrary. The United States within each era has embraced certain customary principles more than others such as sovereignty, territorialism, international comity, and global constitutionalism. Its reliance on these principles is volatile and changes in each era. What is remarkable is the extent to which the United States has and has not considered international issues as a part of its practice of utilizing extraterritoriality. As a young nation, the United States greatly clung to notions of sovereignty and territorialism and eschewed extraterritoriality because it was not strong enough to exert such power nor could it handle an invasion from another foreign power. Sovereignty and territorialism gave the United States the peace of mind and security against an uprising. International considerations were prominent and commonplace in the early eras. But as the nation grew in strength throughout each successive era, it no longer needed the bedrock of sovereignty and territorialism to safeguard it from other foreign powers. The United States instead sought to inject its laws extraterritorially and engage in global policing. Its rise in economic and political power gave it the strength to do so. Extraterritorial regulation was on the rise. However, the more its use of extraterritoriality rose, the more domestic struggles the United States encountered, which led to arbitrary judicial decisions and policy-making. Further, during the later eras, the United States relied less and less on international considerations and engaged in withdrawal tactics, causing some to view its behavior as hegemonic. There is a great imperative of examining history with the law. How U.S. history and politics can inform the future of the law is critical. The findings laid out within this article will serve a starting point for future research regarding potential future eras.","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"5 1","pages":"240-267"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46768810","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-19DOI: 10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/11543
P. Westerman
{"title":"Bowing to Authority: the COVID-19 Experience","authors":"P. Westerman","doi":"10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/11543","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.6092/ISSN.2531-6133/11543","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36563,"journal":{"name":"University of Bologna Law Review","volume":"5 1","pages":"234-239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47872063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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