{"title":"THE INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF MONETARY POLICY: A GAME-THEORETIC REFORMULATION","authors":"L. Lambertini","doi":"10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/5060","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where governments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This allows to shrink signi…cantly the set of equilibria.","PeriodicalId":85052,"journal":{"name":"Keio economic studies","volume":"36 1","pages":"39-49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1996-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Keio economic studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.6092/UNIBO/AMSACTA/5060","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Abstract
This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where governments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This allows to shrink signi…cantly the set of equilibria.
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