The limits of awards for anti-corruption: Experimental and ethnographic evidence from Uganda

Abstract

Conventional anti-corruption approaches focus on detecting and punishing the misuse of public office. These approaches are often ineffective in settings where social norms do not support reporting and punishing corruption. Attempting to build anti-corruption norms, we conducted a field experiment in Uganda that offered elected, local leaders the chance to earn awards for overseeing development projects according to legal guidelines. We then conducted a second field experiment that informed other leaders and the public about the award winners. Offering leaders the chance to earn recognition did not improve the management of projects or change leaders’ norms about corruption. Informing other leaders and residents about the award winners also did not change behaviors or attitudes related to corruption. A paired ethnographic study shows that the possibility for recognition generated excitement but was not able to overcome resignation by local leaders. Our study provides some of the first experimental evidence about using awards to motivate public officials to act with integrity and to build anti-corruption norms among both leaders and the public. The results imply that awards have limited effects for anti-corruption in settings with endemic corruption and where they cannot be used instrumentally by awardees.