Politically influenced bank lending

IF 3.6 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Banking & Finance Pub Date : 2023-10-13 DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.107020

Yifan Zhou

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Borrowers from the same state as the chairman of the US Senate Banking Committee (“connected borrowers”) are able to borrow at spreads 19 bps lower than other borrowers. Banks that provide connected loans enjoy regulatory relief in the form of fewer future investigations. Connected borrowers' contributions toward the chairman are influenced by their cost of loans, but the same is not true for nonconnected borrowers. Findings suggest the chairman is incentivized by re-election to help connected borrowers obtain cheaper loans. Results are largely consistent with the existence of an indirect triangular quid pro quo relationship between firms, banks, and politicians.

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受政治影响的银行贷款

与美国参议院银行委员会主席来自同一州的借款人（“关联借款人”）能够以比其他借款人低19个基点的息差借款。提供关联贷款的银行可以通过减少未来调查的形式享受监管减免。关联借款人对董事长的贡献受其贷款成本的影响，但非关联借款人的情况并非如此。调查结果表明，董事长被连任激励，帮助关联借款人获得更便宜的贷款。结果在很大程度上与企业、银行和政客之间存在的间接三角交换关系一致。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Banking & Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

6.40

自引率

5.40%

发文量

262

期刊介绍： The Journal of Banking and Finance (JBF) publishes theoretical and empirical research papers spanning all the major research fields in finance and banking. The aim of the Journal of Banking and Finance is to provide an outlet for the increasing flow of scholarly research concerning financial institutions and the money and capital markets within which they function. The Journal''s emphasis is on theoretical developments and their implementation, empirical, applied, and policy-oriented research in banking and other domestic and international financial institutions and markets. The Journal''s purpose is to improve communications between, and within, the academic and other research communities and policymakers and operational decision makers at financial institutions - private and public, national and international, and their regulators. The Journal is one of the largest Finance journals, with approximately 1500 new submissions per year, mainly in the following areas: Asset Management; Asset Pricing; Banking (Efficiency, Regulation, Risk Management, Solvency); Behavioural Finance; Capital Structure; Corporate Finance; Corporate Governance; Derivative Pricing and Hedging; Distribution Forecasting with Financial Applications; Entrepreneurial Finance; Empirical Finance; Financial Economics; Financial Markets (Alternative, Bonds, Currency, Commodity, Derivatives, Equity, Energy, Real Estate); FinTech; Fund Management; General Equilibrium Models; High-Frequency Trading; Intermediation; International Finance; Hedge Funds; Investments; Liquidity; Market Efficiency; Market Microstructure; Mergers and Acquisitions; Networks; Performance Analysis; Political Risk; Portfolio Optimization; Regulation of Financial Markets and Institutions; Risk Management and Analysis; Systemic Risk; Term Structure Models; Venture Capital.

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