Political embeddedness and firms' growth

Abstract

This study examines whether and when political embeddedness affects firms' growth. Using a dataset of Chinese A-share firms from 2008 to 2017, we find that both organizational and individual political embeddedness in firms draws negative effects on corporate growth. Such effects mainly come from political embeddedness created by current and local political actors, compared with former and central ones. Moreover, the “grabbing effects” of political embeddedness vary contingent on focal firms' financial situation, political uncertainty, and regional economic and legal environment. That is, the “grabbing effects” are stronger for financially healthy firms than for financially distressed firms. Political uncertainty created by government official replacement refrains political actors from tunneling benefits from affiliated firms and mitigates the negative effects of political embeddedness. Both economic development and legal completeness are conducive to alleviating the “grabbing effects” of political embeddedness. Overall, our findings enrich and extend the “grabbing hand” theory.