Kyklos最新文献

The study explores the effects of data transparency on economic growth for developing economies over a unique time period - at the onset of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis and thereafter. Data transparency is defined as the timely production of credible statistics as measured by the statistical capacity indicator. The paper finds that data transparency has a positive effect on real gross domestic product per capita during a period of considerable uncertainty. The estimates indicate an elasticity of the magnitude of 0.03 percent per year, which is much larger than the elasticity of trade openness and schooling in the estimation sample. The empirics employ a variety of econometric estimators, including dynamic panel and cross-sectional instrumental variables estimators, with the latter approach yielding a higher estimated elasticity. The findings are robust to the inclusion of several factors in addition to political institutions and exogenous commodity-price and external debt-financing shocks.

Hayek and Buchanan endorsed Böhm's “private law society” as expressive of the ideal of a government of laws, and not of men. But they also acknowledged that among the many, the enforceability of legal custom, adjudication, and legislation must be politically guaranteed by a state. Due to unavoidable state-involvement, risks of excessive rent-seeking and authoritarian arbitrary government loom large once “rules of rule change” enable sophisticated forms of ruling by law. Even if in WEIRDS (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic, Societies) legal rules are enacted, modified, and derogated exclusively according to legal “rules of rule change,” the prevalence of the key attributes of “generality, certainty, and equality of enforcement” of the Rule of Law is in no way guaranteed. — The paper addresses this and the role, nature, and significance of constraining ruling by law through practicing the “political ideal of the Rule of Law”.

This paper investigates the effects of economic policy uncertainty on local government debt issuance in China and identifies a transmission channel through the cost of capital. Our findings demonstrate that economic policy uncertainty raises the cost of external financing for local governments, leading to decreased levels of debt issuance. Specifically, a 1% increase in uncertainty related to economic policy variations leads to a reduction in government debt issuance of 0.0478%. In addition, our analysis reveals that local governments located in regions experiencing lower fiscal pressure, lower economic catch-up pressure, and higher sensitivity to uncertainty are more responsive to economic policy uncertainty changes.

Among the many studied determinants of voting, we predict that i) increased social capital will be positively associated with turnout, while increased heterogeneity will be negatively associated; ii) both factors will work through their influence on the costs of information gathering and on the social norms of voting; and iii) that heterogeneity will interact with social capital in its association with turnout. We test these predictions at the extremely fine “meshblock” level by regressing New Zealand voter turnout in its 2017 national election on its 2013 census characteristics. We use roughly 40,000 meshblock volunteering rates to measure social capital, and heterogeneity based primarily on ethnic fragmentation. We find social capital is positively associated with voter turnout, while heterogeneity is negatively associated. We find robust evidence consistent with ethnic heterogeneity working through information costs and social norms, but less so social capital. We also find a robust interaction between social capital and heterogeneity in their association with turnout, consistent with ethnic heterogeneity raising bridging social capital that has a stronger association with turnout than in-group bonding social capital.

The paper examines the theory of competitive federalism, focusing specifically on Hayek's and Buchanan's significant contributions to this theory. Looking at the rivalry between sub-units in federal systems and drawing an analogy between market competition and intergovernmental competition, the theory of competitive federalism stresses the critical role viable exit options play as operating force in both arenas. The principal claim argued for in this paper is that by exclusively focusing on exit in its territorial dimension, the theory of competitive federalism obfuscates the fact that “exit” can mean two critically different things in federal systems. It can mean exiting from the territory over which a government exercises its assigned authority, and it can mean exiting from a polity in the sense of giving up one's membership status in the respective community. The paper discusses the nature, the significance, and the implications of the difference between these two kinds of exit.