The relationship between corruption and income inequality has been widely studied, but there is no consensus on whether corruption increases or reduces inequality. We conduct an extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to test the robustness of the explanatory variables proposed in the literature. Using a sample of up to 150 countries, with data mostly going back to 1980, we find that corruption does not appear to have a clear positive effect on inequality or may even reduce it. Also, contrary to what is sometimes suggested in the literature, the results do not support an inverted U‐shaped effect of corruption on income distribution. A more important role in explaining income distribution seems to be played by the level of financial development, the old‐age dependency ratio, the unemployment rate, the capital stock to GDP ratio and the population growth rate. These are often found to be significant drivers of inequality, regardless of the set of control variables and the definition of corruption used.
腐败与收入不平等之间的关系已被广泛研究，但对于腐败究竟会增加还是减少不平等，目前尚无共识。我们进行了极端边界分析（EBA），以检验文献中提出的解释变量的稳健性。通过使用多达 150 个国家的样本（数据大多追溯到 1980 年），我们发现腐败似乎并没有对不平等产生明显的积极影响，甚至可能会减少不平等。此外，与文献中有时提出的观点相反，研究结果并不支持腐败对收入分配的倒 U 型影响。金融发展水平、老年抚养比、失业率、资本存量与国内生产总值之比以及人口增长率似乎在解释收入分配方面发挥着更重要的作用。无论采用何种控制变量和腐败定义，这些因素往往是不平等的重要驱动因素。
{"title":"Revisiting the impact of corruption on income inequality worldwide","authors":"Jochen Hartwig, Jan‐Egbert Sturm","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12415","url":null,"abstract":"The relationship between corruption and income inequality has been widely studied, but there is no consensus on whether corruption increases or reduces inequality. We conduct an extreme bounds analysis (EBA) to test the robustness of the explanatory variables proposed in the literature. Using a sample of up to 150 countries, with data mostly going back to 1980, we find that corruption does not appear to have a clear positive effect on inequality or may even reduce it. Also, contrary to what is sometimes suggested in the literature, the results do not support an inverted U‐shaped effect of corruption on income distribution. A more important role in explaining income distribution seems to be played by the level of financial development, the old‐age dependency ratio, the unemployment rate, the capital stock to GDP ratio and the population growth rate. These are often found to be significant drivers of inequality, regardless of the set of control variables and the definition of corruption used.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142251102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines how climate change has become a polarizing and politicized issue in the United States and assesses the relationship between regional exposure to the green economy and voting in US elections over the course of a decade. After measuring the share of employment related to the green economy at county level, I estimate the impact of county‐level exposure to this economy on the share of votes cast for Democrats in elections for the House of Representatives and the Presidency. I find that US counties that have been more exposed to the green economy have increased their share of votes cast for Democrats in Congressional elections since the 2016 elections, based on both county‐level and constructed district‐level data. This is because Democratic politicians are considerably more likely to adopt pro‐green positions, making them an attractive choice for voters seeking representatives who will promote green policies. This paper also finds that a shift toward Democratic candidates has mostly occurred in Republican incumbent districts with a high proportion of green‐intensive employment that did not receive any support for green investment from the government after 2016. The results imply that climate change has become an important determinant of voting decisions and that this change in motivation on the part of voters has come about primarily with the aim of punishing Republican incumbents rather than rewarding Democratic incumbents or challengers.
{"title":"The electoral consequences of the political divide on climate change","authors":"JunYun Kim","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12409","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines how climate change has become a polarizing and politicized issue in the United States and assesses the relationship between regional exposure to the green economy and voting in US elections over the course of a decade. After measuring the share of employment related to the green economy at county level, I estimate the impact of county‐level exposure to this economy on the share of votes cast for Democrats in elections for the House of Representatives and the Presidency. I find that US counties that have been more exposed to the green economy have increased their share of votes cast for Democrats in Congressional elections since the 2016 elections, based on both county‐level and constructed district‐level data. This is because Democratic politicians are considerably more likely to adopt pro‐green positions, making them an attractive choice for voters seeking representatives who will promote green policies. This paper also finds that a shift toward Democratic candidates has mostly occurred in Republican incumbent districts with a high proportion of green‐intensive employment that did not receive any support for green investment from the government after 2016. The results imply that climate change has become an important determinant of voting decisions and that this change in motivation on the part of voters has come about primarily with the aim of punishing Republican incumbents rather than rewarding Democratic incumbents or challengers.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142251103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many studies suggest that employees of social enterprises experience greater job satisfaction than employees of for‐profit organizations, although their pay and employment contracts are usually less favorable. Based on linked employer–employee data from a French survey on employment characteristics and industrial relations and using a decomposition method developed by Gelbach (2016), this paper aims to explain this somewhat paradoxical result. Focusing on work organization variables, we show that the specific work organization of social enterprises explains a large part of the observed job satisfaction differential both in general and more specifically, in terms of satisfaction with access to training and working conditions. By detailing the components of work organization, the higher job satisfaction reported by employees in social enterprises stems from their greater autonomy and better access to information. In contrast to earlier studies, however, our results show that these work organization variables do not have more value for social enterprise employees than for for‐profit organization employees in the case of overall job satisfaction. This result casts doubt on the widespread hypothesis that social enterprise employees attach more weight to the nonmonetary advantages of their work than their counterparts in for‐profit organizations.
{"title":"Work organization in social enterprises: A source of job satisfaction?","authors":"Xavier Joutard, Francesca Petrella, Nadine Richez‐Battesti","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12411","url":null,"abstract":"Many studies suggest that employees of social enterprises experience greater job satisfaction than employees of for‐profit organizations, although their pay and employment contracts are usually less favorable. Based on linked employer–employee data from a French survey on employment characteristics and industrial relations and using a decomposition method developed by Gelbach (2016), this paper aims to explain this somewhat paradoxical result. Focusing on work organization variables, we show that the specific work organization of social enterprises explains a large part of the observed job satisfaction differential both in general and more specifically, in terms of satisfaction with access to training and working conditions. By detailing the components of work organization, the higher job satisfaction reported by employees in social enterprises stems from their greater autonomy and better access to information. In contrast to earlier studies, however, our results show that these work organization variables do not have more value for social enterprise employees than for for‐profit organization employees in the case of overall job satisfaction. This result casts doubt on the widespread hypothesis that social enterprise employees attach more weight to the nonmonetary advantages of their work than their counterparts in for‐profit organizations.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142206025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper finds robust evidence that economic freedom improves the quality of education. This is probably mainly because economic freedom incentivizes parents to invest in high‐quality education for their children and helps them to do so. It also incentivizes and helps both governments and private providers to deliver high‐quality education. The paper uses two different indicators of educational quality: PISA scores and the World Bank's harmonized test scores. The magnitudes of the estimated effects of economic freedom on both indicators are substantial. They are even larger once the indirect impact of economic freedom via GDP per capita and, to a lesser extent, once the indirect impact via government education expenditure is taken into account. The paper uses data on up to 49 countries for PISA scores and up to 137 countries for World Bank scores. It accounts for the endogeneity of economic freedom and controls for all major determinants of educational quality.
{"title":"Economic freedom and the quality of education","authors":"Horst Feldmann","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12412","url":null,"abstract":"This paper finds robust evidence that economic freedom improves the quality of education. This is probably mainly because economic freedom incentivizes parents to invest in high‐quality education for their children and helps them to do so. It also incentivizes and helps both governments and private providers to deliver high‐quality education. The paper uses two different indicators of educational quality: PISA scores and the World Bank's harmonized test scores. The magnitudes of the estimated effects of economic freedom on both indicators are substantial. They are even larger once the indirect impact of economic freedom via GDP per capita and, to a lesser extent, once the indirect impact via government education expenditure is taken into account. The paper uses data on up to 49 countries for PISA scores and up to 137 countries for World Bank scores. It accounts for the endogeneity of economic freedom and controls for all major determinants of educational quality.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142206026","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The decoy effect is a well‐documented source of violation of elements of demand theory. We experimentally demonstrate that the decoy effect only works when the number of options is limited (specifically not more than five). This is because, with more and more options, it may get difficult for consumers to spot the decoy (against which a Pareto dominant option is made to look more attractive), rendering the decoy effect ineffective. Identifying that the decoy effect works because it facilitates easier choice‐making, we observe that the difficulty in choice‐making with or without the decoy is statistically the same when the number of options to choose from is six or more.
{"title":"The decoy effect only works when the number of options is less than six","authors":"Subrato Banerjee, Pragathi Kandregula","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12413","url":null,"abstract":"The decoy effect is a well‐documented source of violation of elements of demand theory. We experimentally demonstrate that the decoy effect only works when the number of options is limited (specifically not more than five). This is because, with more and more options, it may get difficult for consumers to spot the decoy (against which a Pareto dominant option is made to look more attractive), rendering the decoy effect ineffective. Identifying that the decoy effect works because it facilitates easier choice‐making, we observe that the difficulty in choice‐making with or without the decoy is statistically the same when the number of options to choose from is six or more.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142206027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The study explores the effects of data transparency on economic growth for developing economies over a unique time period ‐ at the onset of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis and thereafter. Data transparency is defined as the timely production of credible statistics as measured by the statistical capacity indicator. The paper finds that data transparency has a positive effect on real gross domestic product per capita during a period of considerable uncertainty. The estimates indicate an elasticity of the magnitude of 0.03 percent per year, which is much larger than the elasticity of trade openness and schooling in the estimation sample. The empirics employ a variety of econometric estimators, including dynamic panel and cross‐sectional instrumental variables estimators, with the latter approach yielding a higher estimated elasticity. The findings are robust to the inclusion of several factors in addition to political institutions and exogenous commodity‐price and external debt‐financing shocks.
{"title":"Data transparency and growth in developing economies during and after the global financial crisis","authors":"Asif Mohammed Islam, Daniel Lederman","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12404","url":null,"abstract":"The study explores the effects of data transparency on economic growth for developing economies over a unique time period ‐ at the onset of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis and thereafter. Data transparency is defined as the timely production of credible statistics as measured by the statistical capacity indicator. The paper finds that data transparency has a positive effect on real gross domestic product per capita during a period of considerable uncertainty. The estimates indicate an elasticity of the magnitude of 0.03 percent per year, which is much larger than the elasticity of trade openness and schooling in the estimation sample. The empirics employ a variety of econometric estimators, including dynamic panel and cross‐sectional instrumental variables estimators, with the latter approach yielding a higher estimated elasticity. The findings are robust to the inclusion of several factors in addition to political institutions and exogenous commodity‐price and external debt‐financing shocks.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141868166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hayek and Buchanan endorsed Böhm's “private law society” as expressive of the ideal of a government of laws, and not of men. But they also acknowledged that among the many, the enforceability of legal custom, adjudication, and legislation must be politically guaranteed by a state. Due to unavoidable state‐involvement, risks of excessive rent‐seeking and authoritarian arbitrary government loom large once “rules of rule change” enable sophisticated forms of ruling by law. Even if in WEIRDS (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic, Societies) legal rules are enacted, modified, and derogated exclusively according to legal “rules of rule change,” the prevalence of the key attributes of “generality, certainty, and equality of enforcement” of the Rule of Law is in no way guaranteed. — The paper addresses this and the role, nature, and significance of constraining ruling by law through practicing the “political ideal of the Rule of Law”.
{"title":"The nature and significance of the political ideal of the Rule of Law: Hayek, Buchanan, and beyond","authors":"Hartmut Kliemt","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12407","url":null,"abstract":"Hayek and Buchanan endorsed Böhm's “private law society” as expressive of the ideal of <jats:italic>a government of laws, and not of men</jats:italic>. But they also acknowledged that among the many, the enforceability of legal custom, adjudication, and legislation must be <jats:italic>politically</jats:italic> guaranteed by a state. Due to unavoidable state‐involvement, risks of excessive rent‐seeking and authoritarian arbitrary government loom large once “rules of rule change” enable sophisticated forms of ruling by law. Even if in WEIRDS (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic, Societies) legal rules are enacted, modified, and derogated exclusively according to legal “rules of rule change,” the prevalence of the key attributes of “generality, certainty, and equality of enforcement” of the Rule of Law is in no way guaranteed. — The paper addresses this and the role, nature, and significance of constraining ruling <jats:italic>by</jats:italic> law through practicing the “political ideal of the Rule of Law”.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141777789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Among the many studied determinants of voting, we predict that i) increased social capital will be positively associated with turnout, while increased heterogeneity will be negatively associated; ii) both factors will work through their influence on the costs of information gathering and on the social norms of voting; and iii) that heterogeneity will interact with social capital in its association with turnout. We test these predictions at the extremely fine “meshblock” level by regressing New Zealand voter turnout in its 2017 national election on its 2013 census characteristics. We use roughly 40,000 meshblock volunteering rates to measure social capital, and heterogeneity based primarily on ethnic fragmentation. We find social capital is positively associated with voter turnout, while heterogeneity is negatively associated. We find robust evidence consistent with ethnic heterogeneity working through information costs and social norms, but less so social capital. We also find a robust interaction between social capital and heterogeneity in their association with turnout, consistent with ethnic heterogeneity raising bridging social capital that has a stronger association with turnout than in‐group bonding social capital.
{"title":"Social capital, social heterogeneity, and electoral turnout","authors":"Jeremy Clark, Abel François, Olivier Gergaud","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12403","url":null,"abstract":"Among the many studied determinants of voting, we predict that i) increased social capital will be positively associated with turnout, while increased heterogeneity will be negatively associated; ii) both factors will work through their influence on the costs of information gathering and on the social norms of voting; and iii) that heterogeneity will interact with social capital in its association with turnout. We test these predictions at the extremely fine “meshblock” level by regressing New Zealand voter turnout in its 2017 national election on its 2013 census characteristics. We use roughly 40,000 meshblock volunteering rates to measure social capital, and heterogeneity based primarily on ethnic fragmentation. We find social capital is positively associated with voter turnout, while heterogeneity is negatively associated. We find robust evidence consistent with ethnic heterogeneity working through information costs and social norms, but less so social capital. We also find a robust interaction between social capital and heterogeneity in their association with turnout, consistent with ethnic heterogeneity raising bridging social capital that has a stronger association with turnout than in‐group bonding social capital.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141739836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the effects of economic policy uncertainty on local government debt issuance in China and identifies a transmission channel through the cost of capital. Our findings demonstrate that economic policy uncertainty raises the cost of external financing for local governments, leading to decreased levels of debt issuance. Specifically, a 1% increase in uncertainty related to economic policy variations leads to a reduction in government debt issuance of 0.0478%. In addition, our analysis reveals that local governments located in regions experiencing lower fiscal pressure, lower economic catch‐up pressure, and higher sensitivity to uncertainty are more responsive to economic policy uncertainty changes.
{"title":"Economic policy uncertainty and local government debt: Evidence from China","authors":"Han Gao, Minming Lan, Jie Li, Tianhang Zhou","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12402","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the effects of economic policy uncertainty on local government debt issuance in China and identifies a transmission channel through the cost of capital. Our findings demonstrate that economic policy uncertainty raises the cost of external financing for local governments, leading to decreased levels of debt issuance. Specifically, a 1% increase in uncertainty related to economic policy variations leads to a reduction in government debt issuance of 0.0478%. In addition, our analysis reveals that local governments located in regions experiencing lower fiscal pressure, lower economic catch‐up pressure, and higher sensitivity to uncertainty are more responsive to economic policy uncertainty changes.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141829358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper examines the theory of competitive federalism, focusing specifically on Hayek's and Buchanan's significant contributions to this theory. Looking at the rivalry between sub‐units in federal systems and drawing an analogy between market competition and intergovernmental competition, the theory of competitive federalism stresses the critical role viable exit options play as operating force in both arenas. The principal claim argued for in this paper is that by exclusively focusing on exit in its territorial dimension, the theory of competitive federalism obfuscates the fact that “exit” can mean two critically different things in federal systems. It can mean exiting from the territory over which a government exercises its assigned authority, and it can mean exiting from a polity in the sense of giving up one's membership status in the respective community. The paper discusses the nature, the significance, and the implications of the difference between these two kinds of exit.
{"title":"Competitive federalism, individual autonomy, and citizen sovereignty","authors":"Viktor J. Vanberg","doi":"10.1111/kykl.12405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/kykl.12405","url":null,"abstract":"The paper examines the <jats:italic>theory of competitive federalism</jats:italic>, focusing specifically on Hayek's and Buchanan's significant contributions to this theory. Looking at the rivalry between sub‐units in federal systems and drawing an analogy between <jats:italic>market competition</jats:italic> and <jats:italic>intergovernmental competition</jats:italic>, the theory of competitive federalism stresses the critical role viable exit options play as operating force in both arenas. The principal claim argued for in this paper is that by exclusively focusing on exit in its <jats:italic>territorial dimension</jats:italic>, the theory of competitive federalism obfuscates the fact that “exit” can mean two critically different things in federal systems. It can mean <jats:italic>exiting from the territory</jats:italic> over which a government exercises its assigned authority, and it can mean exiting from a polity in the sense of <jats:italic>giving up one's membership status</jats:italic> in the respective community. The paper discusses the nature, the significance, and the implications of the difference between these two kinds of exit.","PeriodicalId":47739,"journal":{"name":"Kyklos","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141739837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：