Collaborating with Competitors: How Do Small Firm Accounting Associations and Networks Successfully Manage Coopetitive Tensions?

Kenneth L. Bills, Christie Hayne, Sarah E. Stein
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

The “coopetition�? paradox exists when two or more organizations are simultaneously involved in cooperative and competitive interactions. In the accounting industry, small firms encounter coopetition when they align themselves with other independent firms to form accounting associations and networks (“AANs�?). AANs are a type of interorganizational relationship (“IOR�?) that provide opportunities for member firms to collaborate by sharing important resources such as expertise, best practices, and manpower. However, member firms also compete in the marketplace for clients and human capital, which incentivizes uncooperative and opportunistic behavior. If managed inadequately, coopetitive tensions can significantly hamper AAN benefits and may lead to IOR failure. Given the considerable longevity of AANs, we interview 42 high-level accounting professionals to understand AANs’ apparent successful management of these tensions. Leveraging coopetition and IOR theory, our analysis suggests that transactional mechanisms (contractual agreements, organizational structure, selection/monitoring processes) and relational mechanisms (trust, social ties, reciprocity) play key roles in encouraging healthy cooperation and competition among member firms. One of our main conclusions is that these mechanisms contribute to AAN success because they are leveraged comprehensively across each IOR life cycle phase, and they are mutually reinforcing with transactional mechanisms providing the foundation to inspire confidence and encourage the development of relational mechanisms. Our research enriches existing accounting and coopetition literature, provides a new perspective for AANs, and responds to calls to understand key factors of IOR success.
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与竞争对手合作:小型会计师事务所协会和网络如何成功管理竞争紧张关系?
“coopetition�?当两个或两个以上的组织同时参与合作和竞争互动时,就会出现悖论。在会计行业,当小公司与其他独立公司结盟,形成会计协会和网络(“AANs”)时,它们会遇到合作。AANs是一种组织间关系(IOR),它为成员公司提供了通过共享重要资源(如专业知识、最佳实践和人力)进行合作的机会。然而,成员公司也在市场上争夺客户和人力资本,这激励了不合作和机会主义行为。如果管理不当,竞争紧张会严重阻碍AAN的益处,并可能导致IOR失败。鉴于AANs的相当长寿,我们采访了42位高级会计专业人士,以了解AANs对这些紧张关系的明显成功管理。利用合作和IOR理论,我们的分析表明,交易机制(合同协议、组织结构、选择/监督过程)和关系机制(信任、社会关系、互惠)在鼓励成员企业之间健康合作和竞争方面发挥了关键作用。我们的主要结论之一是,这些机制有助于AAN的成功,因为它们在每个IOR生命周期阶段都得到了全面的利用,并且它们与事务机制相互加强,为激发信心和鼓励关系机制的发展提供了基础。我们的研究丰富了现有的会计和合作文献,为AANs提供了一个新的视角,并响应了理解IOR成功的关键因素的呼吁。
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