Forough Pourhossein, W. T. Huh, Steven M. Shechter
{"title":"Assortment Planning with Satisficing Customers","authors":"Forough Pourhossein, W. T. Huh, Steven M. Shechter","doi":"10.1287/deca.2022.0063","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Limited information, time, or capacity may prevent customers from acting as utility maximizers when making purchase decisions. Rather, they would settle for a good enough option; that is, they stop searching and make a purchase as soon as they find an acceptable alternative. We incorporate this behavior in an assortment-optimization problem. Whereas different approaches to modeling customer choice are adopted in assortment planning, all assume customers are utility maximizers. Our work bridges the research streams of assortment planning and bounded rationality, particularly satisficing behavior. In addition, we define a limit for the search budget of customers, in which customers leave without purchase after examining a certain number of items. This assumption brings a new perspective to the assortment-planning literature, enabling us to capture the choice-overload effect. We prove that the firm’s problem of finding the optimal assortment is NP-hard. We further establish certain structural properties of the optimal decision, which allows us to reformulate the model as a mixed-integer program. We analytically derive a tight upper bound on the percentage loss in the firm’s expected profit for small instances when it assumes incorrectly that customers are utility maximizers. For larger instances, we take a numerical approach to determine the loss. Our results indicate that firms offering low-involvement products, among those dealing with satisficing customers, are more likely to face substantial profit loss if they ignore this behavior. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2022.0063 .","PeriodicalId":46460,"journal":{"name":"Decision Analysis","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Decision Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2022.0063","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Limited information, time, or capacity may prevent customers from acting as utility maximizers when making purchase decisions. Rather, they would settle for a good enough option; that is, they stop searching and make a purchase as soon as they find an acceptable alternative. We incorporate this behavior in an assortment-optimization problem. Whereas different approaches to modeling customer choice are adopted in assortment planning, all assume customers are utility maximizers. Our work bridges the research streams of assortment planning and bounded rationality, particularly satisficing behavior. In addition, we define a limit for the search budget of customers, in which customers leave without purchase after examining a certain number of items. This assumption brings a new perspective to the assortment-planning literature, enabling us to capture the choice-overload effect. We prove that the firm’s problem of finding the optimal assortment is NP-hard. We further establish certain structural properties of the optimal decision, which allows us to reformulate the model as a mixed-integer program. We analytically derive a tight upper bound on the percentage loss in the firm’s expected profit for small instances when it assumes incorrectly that customers are utility maximizers. For larger instances, we take a numerical approach to determine the loss. Our results indicate that firms offering low-involvement products, among those dealing with satisficing customers, are more likely to face substantial profit loss if they ignore this behavior. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2022.0063 .