{"title":"Leniency Programs and Cartel Organization of Multiproduct Firms","authors":"Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques","doi":"10.1515/rle-2018-0060","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.","PeriodicalId":44795,"journal":{"name":"Review of Law & Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Law & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2018-0060","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
Abstract When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, they may compartmentalize these agreements by having different individuals manage them so as to avoid the contagion of antitrust authority investigations. Leniency programs can overcome this strategy but may also lead to procollusive effects for centralized firms. The introduction of US amnesty plus programs can have different competitive effects, and leniency programs may modify firms’ choice of internal structure.
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