On the Macroeconomic Effect of Extortion: An Agent-Based Approach

Alejandro Platas-López, A. Guerra-Hernández, F. Grimaldo
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

: This work proposes an agent-based approach to study the effect of extortion on macroeconomic aggregates, despite the scarce data about this criminal activity resulting from its hidden nature. The main idea is to simulate both a healthy economy without extortion and the same economy under the influence of extortion, comparing then the macroeconomic signals produced in both cases. For this, the Bottom-up Adaptive Macroeconomics (BAM) model was implemented and validated in order to simulate an economy with healthy macroeconomic signals, i.e., moderate inflation, as well as a reasonable unemployment rate. The BAM model defines the usual interactions among workers, firms, and banks in labor, goods and credit markets. Then, crime is introduced by defining the propensity of the poorest workers to become extortionists, as well the efficiency of the police in terms of the probability of capturing them. The definition of the BAM under Extortion Racket Systems (BAMERS) model is completed with a threshold for the firms rejecting the extortion. These parameters are explored exhaustively and independently. Results show that even low levels of propensity towards extortion are enough to notice considerable negative effects as a marked contraction of the Gross Domestic Product and an increase of the unemployment rate, consistent with the few data known about the macroeconomic effect of extortion. Effects on consume, Gini index, inflation, and wealth distribution are also reported. Interestingly, our results suggest that it is more convenient to prevent extortion, rather than combat it once deployed, i.e., there is no police efficiency level that achieves the healthy macroeconomic signals observed in the absence of extortion.
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敲诈勒索的宏观经济效应:一个基于主体的方法
这项工作提出了一种基于主体的方法来研究敲诈勒索对宏观经济总量的影响,尽管由于其隐蔽性,关于这种犯罪活动的数据很少。主要思想是模拟没有敲诈勒索的健康经济和受到敲诈勒索影响的同一经济,比较两种情况下产生的宏观经济信号。为此,实施并验证了自下而上自适应宏观经济学(BAM)模型,以模拟具有健康宏观经济信号的经济,即适度的通货膨胀和合理的失业率。BAM模型定义了劳动力、商品和信贷市场中工人、企业和银行之间通常的相互作用。然后,通过定义最贫穷的工人成为勒索者的倾向,以及警察在捕获他们的概率方面的效率,引入了犯罪。在敲诈勒索诈骗系统(BAMERS)模型下,给出了企业拒绝敲诈勒索的阈值,从而完成了BAM的定义。这些参数被详尽而独立地探讨。结果表明,即使敲诈倾向的程度很低,也足以注意到相当大的负面影响,如国内生产总值的明显收缩和失业率的增加,这与关于敲诈的宏观经济影响的少数已知数据相一致。对消费、基尼指数、通货膨胀和财富分配的影响也被报告。有趣的是,我们的研究结果表明,预防敲诈勒索比打击敲诈勒索更方便,也就是说,在没有敲诈勒索的情况下,警察效率水平无法达到健康的宏观经济信号。
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