Assessing Uranium Ore Processing Activities Using Satellite Imagery at Pyongsan in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

IF 0.7 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Science & Global Security Pub Date : 2021-09-02 DOI:10.1080/08929882.2021.1988258
Sulgiye Park, Terry McNulty, Allison Puccioni, R. Ewing
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Abstract

Abstract The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s only confirmed uranium mill is within the Pyongsan uranium mining complex. The ore processing pathway and the production capacity for uranium concentrate is analyzed, based on comprehensive satellite imagery analysis of this facility. This assessment of the Pyongsan facility indicates an ore processing capacity of ∼750–1,200 tonnes per day. One year of maximum production at Pyongsan would yield enough processed ore to fuel one load of the 5 MWe reactor in Yongbyon as well as ∼3,000 kg of LEU or ∼100 kg of HEU. The analysis suggests that the ore processing capacity at Pyongsan is not a constraint on the DPRK’s nuclear material production and that the available capacity at the Pyongsan milling facility strongly suggests that the DPRK has no need in another uranium milling facility of a comparable size. This report provides an improved understanding of the ore processing steps and production rates of the only confirmed uranium mill in the DPRK, enabling a more quantitative assessment of its nuclear materials production and inventories.
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利用卫星图像评估朝鲜民主主义人民共和国平山的铀矿石加工活动
朝鲜民主主义人民共和国(DPRK)唯一被确认的铀矿厂位于平山铀矿区内。在对该设施卫星图像进行综合分析的基础上,分析了该设施的选矿路径和铀精矿的生产能力。此次对平山设施的评价表明,该设施的矿石处理量为每天750 ~ 1200吨。如果在平山进行最大限度的生产,一年可以生产出足够宁边5mwe反应堆一次负荷和约3000公斤低浓铀(LEU)或约100公斤高浓铀(HEU)的矿石。分析表明,平山的矿石加工能力不会制约朝鲜的核材料生产,而且平山磨矿设施的可用能力强烈表明,朝鲜不需要另一个规模相当的铀磨矿设施。本报告使人们更好地了解朝鲜唯一已确认的铀矿厂的矿石加工步骤和生产率,从而能够对其核材料生产和库存进行更定量的评估。
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来源期刊
Science & Global Security
Science & Global Security INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
14.30%
发文量
8
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