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Utilizing a Virtual Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor Digital Twin to Aid in Diversion Pathway Analysis for International Safeguards Applications 利用虚拟 "钠冷快堆数字孪生体 "协助国际保障应用中的转用途径分析
IF 0.7 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2024-02-02 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2299560
Ryan Stewart, Ashley Shields, Shaw Wen, Frederick Gleicher, Samuel Bays, Mark Schanfein, Jeren Browning, Katherine Jesse, Christopher Ritter
Digital twin technology can improve the effectiveness of international safeguards inspectors by providing a tool that can perform an accurate acquisition pathway analysis, identify pathway indicato...
数字孪生技术可以提高国际保障监督员的工作效率,因为它提供了一种工具,可以进行准确的获取途径分析,识别途径指示器,从而提高国际保障监督员的工作效率。
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引用次数: 0
Editors’ Note 编辑注释
IF 0.7 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-12-28 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2298580
Published in Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives (Ahead of Print, 2023)
发表于《科学与全球安全》:军备控制、裁军和防扩散倡议的技术基础》(2023 年提前出版)
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引用次数: 0
Plutonium Production under Uranium Constraint 铀制约下的钚生产
IF 0.7 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-12-23 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2293531
Erik Branger, Peter Andersson, Vitaly Fedchenko, Sophie Grape, Cecilia Gustavsson, Robert Kelley, Débora Trombetta
Production rates of fissile materials are often used to independently assess the number of nuclear warheads a state may possess. One key constraint of a plutonium-based nuclear weapons program is t...
裂变材料的生产率通常被用来独立评估一个国家可能拥有的核弹头数量。以钚为基础的核武器计划的一个关键制约因素是...
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引用次数: 0
Hypersonic Weapons: Vulnerability to Missile Defenses and Comparison to MaRVs 高超声速武器:对导弹防御的脆弱性及其与marv的比较
Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-10-24 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2270292
David Wright, Cameron L. Tracy
AbstractAssessing the utility of hypersonic boost glide vehicles (BGVs) requires comparing their capabilities to alternative systems that could carry out the same missions, particularly given the technical difficulties and additional costs of developing BGVs compared to more established technologies. This paper discusses the primary motivations given for BGVs—most notably countering missile defenses—and summarizes current hypersonic development programs. It finds that evading the most capable current endo-atmospheric defenses requires that BGVs maintain speeds significantly higher than Mach 5 throughout their glide phase, which has implications for their mass and range. The paper then compares BGVs to maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs) carried on ballistic missiles flown on depressed trajectories and shows that MaRVs can offer significant advantages over BGVs in a wide range of cases. Finally, the paper shows that BGV maneuvering during its glide phase can result in substantial costs in range and glide speed. AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank Steve Fetter and Paul Zarchan for useful comments on parts of this work.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The speed of sound in the atmosphere varies by about 10% over the range of altitudes of interest for BGVs (10–50 km). We assume a speed of 300 m/s, which is roughly consistent with a standard engineering approximation that uses 1000 ft/s as sound speed at these altitudes. See “1976 Standard Atmosphere Calculator,” DigitalDutch, https://www.digitaldutch.com/atmoscalc/table.htm.2 Richard H. Speier, George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee, and Richard M. Moore, Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 53–93, https://rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.3 MaRVs were developed and tested during the Cold War and in the 2000s. See Matthew Bunn, “Technology of Ballistic Missile Reentry Vehicles,” in Review of U.S. Military Research and Development: 1984, eds. Kosta Tsipis and Penny Janeway (Mclean, VA: Pergamon, 1984), 87–107, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bunn_tech_of_ballastic_missle_reentry_vehicles.pdf. See also National Research Council, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for 2008 and Beyond, Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability (2008), https://doi.org/10.17226/12061, and Amy Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41464.4 James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons,” Science and Global Security 23 (2015): 191–219, http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs23acton.pdf; David Wright, “Research Note to Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons by James M. Acton: Analysis of the Boost Phase of the HTV-2 Hypersonic Glider Tests,” Science and Global Security 23 (201
摘要评估高超声速助推滑翔飞行器(bgv)的效用需要将其能力与可以执行相同任务的替代系统进行比较,特别是考虑到与更成熟的技术相比,开发bgv的技术困难和额外成本。本文讨论了bgv的主要动机-最明显的是对抗导弹防御-并总结了当前的高超音速发展计划。研究发现,要避开目前最强大的大气层内防御系统,bgv在整个滑翔阶段必须保持明显高于5马赫的速度,这对它们的质量和射程都有影响。然后,本文将bgv与弹道导弹上的机动再入飞行器(marv)进行了比较,并表明在广泛的情况下,marv比bgv具有显著的优势。最后,分析了滑翔飞行器在滑翔阶段的机动会造成航程和速度上的巨大损失。作者要感谢Steve Fetter和Paul zachan对本书部分内容的有用评论。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1在bgv感兴趣的高度范围内(10-50公里),大气中的声速变化约为10%。我们假设声速为300米/秒,这与在这些高度使用1000英尺/秒作为声速的标准工程近似大致一致。参见“1976年标准大气计算器”,DigitalDutch, https://www.digitaldutch.com/atmoscalc/table.htm.2 Richard H. Speier, George Nacouzi, Carrie a . Lee和Richard M. Moore,高超音速导弹防扩散:阻碍新一类武器的扩散(加利福尼亚州圣莫莫妮卡:兰德公司,2017),53-93,https://rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html.3 marv是在冷战期间和2000年代开发和测试的。参见Matthew Bunn,“弹道导弹再入飞行器技术”,《美国军事研究与发展评论》,1984年版。Kosta Tsipis和Penny Janeway(弗吉尼亚州麦克莱恩:Pergamon, 1984), 87-107, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bunn_tech_of_ballastic_missle_reentry_vehicles.pdf。另见美国国家研究委员会,《美国常规快速全球打击:2008年及以后的问题》,《常规快速全球打击能力委员会》(2008年),https://doi.org/10.17226/12061,以及艾米·伍尔夫,《常规快速全球打击和远程弹道导弹:背景和问题》(华盛顿特区:詹姆斯·m·阿克顿,“高超音速助推滑翔武器”,科学与全球安全23 (2015):191-219,http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs23acton.pdf;David Wright,“James M. Acton对高超声速助推滑翔武器的研究笔记:hhtv -2高超声速滑翔机试验的助推阶段分析”,科学与全球安全23 (2015):220-9,http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs23wright.pdf.5 Cameron L. Tracy和David Wright,“高超声速助推滑翔导弹的性能建模”,科学与全球安全28 (2021):135-170,http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs28tracy.pdf。这篇论文使用了一种不同于许多论文中使用的运动方程的坐标系。该系统及其背后的原因见附录A.6“Avangard第一导弹团参加战斗任务”,塔斯社2019年12月27日,https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/7436431;“在东巴罗夫斯基继续部署Avangard”,俄罗斯战略核力量,2020年12月16日,https://russianforces.org/blog/2020/12/deployment_of_avangard_continu.shtml.7“Avangard”,战略与国际研究中心,2021年7月31日,https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/avangard/.8另一个动机似乎是希望与俄罗斯和中国在高超音速武器方面的工作相匹配。例如,奥伦·利伯曼,“美国正在加快高超音速武器的发展步伐,以追赶中国和俄罗斯,高级海军上将说,”CNN, 2022年11月20日,https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/20/politics/us-hypersonic-china-russia-competition/index.html.9 Ivett A. Leyva,“对高超音速飞行的不懈追求”,今日物理,70 (2017):30-6, https://doi.org/10.1063/PT.3.3762.10例如,参见约瑟夫·特雷维西克,“高超音速武器如何彻底改变战争面貌”,《战区》,2017年6月6日,https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/11177/heres-how-hypersonic-weapons-could-completely-change-the-face-of-warfare;本杰明·克努森,“美国高超音速武器系统的检查”,技术报告,乔治华盛顿大学,2017年6月,DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.14375.96164;“高超音速打击与防御:与迈克·怀特的对话”,战略与国际研究中心,2021年6月10日,https://www.csis。 org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense-conversation-mike-white。另一个可能的动机,通过避免被发现来减少攻击的警告,似乎不是那么重要。地面雷达在滑翔过程中不会看到BGV,直到它在大约500公里内,但这可能不是特别相关。这个射程应该还有时间发射短程拦截导弹。对于高价值目标,前沿雷达将提供额外的预警时间。此外,美国和俄罗斯的天基红外(IR)传感器(中国正在开发)可以提供携带bgv的助推器发射的早期预警,也可以探测以足够高的速度滑翔的bgv的红外发射,即使这些数据不足以指导拦截器,也可以提供警告和提示信息(见论文1)本文关注终端防御有几个原因,下面将详细讨论。bgv可以在中段(大气层外)防御下飞行,这似乎是俄罗斯发展Avangard HGV的动机,但本文主要关注用于常规冲突的短程bgv美国国会预算办公室(CBO)高超音速武器和替代方案,”2023年1月,https://www.cbo.gov/publication/58255.13见论文1和下面的分析美国国会预算办公室”,高超声速武器。15 Acton,高超音速助推滑翔武器。“最小能量轨迹”给出给定燃尽速度和高度下的最大射程Lisbeth Gronlund和David Wright“潜射弹道导弹:技术评估和军备控制的可能性”,《科学与全球安全》3 (1992):101-59,http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs03gronlund.pdf.18新闻报道也反映了
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引用次数: 0
Ceci N’est Pas Une Bombe: Lessons from a Field Experiment Using Neutron and Gamma Measurements to Confirm the Absence of Nuclear Weapons 塞西·奈斯特的《核弹》:利用中子和伽马测量证实不存在核武器的实地实验的经验教训
Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2252254
Eric Lepowsky, Manuel Kreutle, Christoph Wirz, Alexander Glaser
AbstractIn March 2023, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research held a verification experiment that included a mockup onsite inspection at a former military facility in the municipality of Menzingen, Switzerland. The experiment included a visit to the site by an inspection team, accompanied by the host team. Among other activities, radiation measurements were used to confirm the non-nuclear nature of selected items stored onsite. In this paper, we discuss the neutron and gamma measurement systems used during the experiment and the inspection protocols followed to confirm the absence of nuclear weapons. Results from the experiment and a laboratory reproduction are presented, before concluding with lessons learned for how absence-confirmation measurements can help support verification of future arms control agreements. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).AcknowledgementsThe experimental analog presented in this work would not have been possible without the support of numerous researchers, staff, and the Health Physics team from Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory. We also thank Gawoon Shim for assistance with the production of the ACX2. We acknowledge the Spiez Laboratory, UNIDIR, and the Swiss Armed Forces for their coordination in making these measurements possible. Special thanks go to David Chichester, Steve Fetter, Moritz Kütt, Pavel Podvig, and all other participants in the Menzingen Verification Experiment. The authors thank two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful feedback, which significantly improved the published version of this manuscript; two new endnotes are based on specific suggestions made by the reviewers. Eric Lepowsky’s contributions to this project have been supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship Program under Grant No. DGE-2039656. This work was partly supported by the Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification under the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration award number DE-NA0003920.Notes1 M. Göttsche and A. Glaser (eds.), Toward Nuclear Disarmament: Building Up Transparency and Verification (Berlin: German Federal Foreign Office, 2021); P. Podvig and J. Rodgers, Deferred Verification: Verifiable Declarations of Fissile Material Stocks (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2017).2 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (“New START”), April 2010; Radiation Detection Equipment: An Arms Control Verification Tool, Product No. 211P, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort Belvoir, VA, October 2011.3 S. Fetter, V. A. Frolov, A. Miller, R. Mozley, O. F. Prilutsky, S. N. Rodionov, and R. Z. Sagdeev, “Detecting Nuclear Warheads,” Science & Global Security 1, no. 3–4 (1990): 225–253.4 Deferred verification is a proposed arrangement, in which an initial declaration is verified only at the time when the materials or items that
2023年3月,联合国裁军研究所在瑞士门津根市的一个前军事设施进行了一次验证实验,其中包括实地检查模型。实验包括由一个视察小组在东道国小组的陪同下到现场视察。除其他活动外,辐射测量用于确认现场储存的选定物品的非核性质。在本文中,我们讨论了实验中使用的中子和伽马测量系统以及为确认没有核武器而遵循的检查方案。介绍了实验和实验室再现的结果,最后总结了关于缺席确认测量如何有助于支持未来军备控制协定核查的经验教训。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。致谢:如果没有普林斯顿等离子体物理实验室众多研究人员、工作人员和健康物理团队的支持,本研究中提出的实验模拟是不可能实现的。我们还要感谢沈国文在ACX2的生产方面所提供的协助。我们感谢施皮茨实验室、裁军研究所和瑞士武装部队的协调,使这些测量成为可能。特别感谢David Chichester, Steve Fetter, Moritz k<e:1>, Pavel Podvig,以及所有参与Menzingen验证实验的参与者。作者感谢两位匿名审稿人的周到反馈,他们极大地改进了本文的出版版本;根据审稿人提出的具体建议,新增了两个尾注。Eric Lepowsky对这个项目的贡献得到了美国国家科学基金会研究生研究奖学金项目的资助。dge - 2039656。这项工作得到了能源部国家核安全管理局监测、技术和验证联盟的部分支持,该联盟的奖励号为DE-NA0003920。注1 M. Göttsche和A. Glaser(编),走向核裁军:建立透明度和核查(柏林:德国联邦外交部,2021年);2 . P. povig和J. Rodgers,推迟核查:可核查的裂变材料库存申报(日内瓦:裁军研究所,2017)2010年4月《美利坚合众国和俄罗斯联邦关于进一步削减和限制进攻性战略武器措施的条约》(“新削减战略武器条约”);S. Fetter, V. A. Frolov, A. Miller, R. Mozley, O. F. Prilutsky, S. N. Rodionov和R. Z. Sagdeev,“探测核弹头”,《科学与全球安全》第1期,第211P号,国防威胁减少局,2011年10月。3-4(1990): 225-253.4推迟核查是一项拟议的安排,其中只有在最初含有这些材料的材料或物品被销毁时才对初步申报进行核查。参见P. Podvig和J. Rodgers, 2017, op. cit5该基地一直运行到1999年,现在有一个博物馆,www.mhsz.ch/bloodhound.6铀-235只发射低能伽马辐射。尽管铀-238含量很少,但高浓缩铀和武器级铀(超过90%的U-235)最好使用铀-238的伽马射线探测,即通过1.001兆电子伏特的显著伽马线。因此,经过适当的比例计算,贫铀可以用作武器级材料的替代品李建军,张建军,“利用被动伽玛射线测量来确定核弹头的不存在”,核物理仪器与方法,2009 (8)Mirion Technologies, 802闪烁探测器,Datasheet, 2017;Mirion Technologies, Osprey: Universal Digital MCA Tube Base for闪烁光谱仪,Datasheet, 2017.9实验过程中,假设参考源的传输测量与被测物体的中心对齐。在实践中,为了使测量对定位更加可靠,最好是进行多次测量,并且应允许检查员选择这些测量的位置E. Lepowsky等人,2021,同上详细描述了感兴趣区域的选择。由于来自铀-235的低能伽马很容易被屏蔽,武器级铀(90%铀-235及以上)的伽马辐射仍以与铀-238.11衰变相关的1.01 - mev线为主。另一种解决方案(由审查员建议)是一个弯曲的屏蔽,其跨度为180°,测量容器时可以在探测器后面旋转,收集背景时可以在探测器前面旋转;这将使探测器在两次测量中都保持静止。
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引用次数: 0
Regional approach to strengthening biosafety and biosecurity systems in Africa 加强非洲生物安全和生物保障系统的区域办法
Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-09-13 DOI: 10.1080/23779497.2023.2257766
Talkmore Maruta, Jaures Arnaud Noumedem Kenfack, Yenew Kebede Tebeje, Donewell Bangure, Ahmed E Ogwell Ouma
The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention Biosafety and Biosecurity Initiative being implemented across the 55 African Union Member States is presented. Based on consultations with Member States between 2019 and 2021, national-level capacity gaps were identified which informed the biosafety and biosecurity 5-year (2021–2025) strategic plan. The process of identifying national gaps, development, implementation and monitoring of the 5-year strategic plan is described. Notable achievements include development of a regional biosafety and biosecurity legislative framework now approved by African Union structures and process of domestication that has started in some countries; establishment and operationalisation of multi-sectoral regional biosafety and biosecurity technical working groups tasked with coordinating and monitoring implementation of the initiative, development and implementation of an accessible and regionally endorsed Regional Training and Certification Program for Biosafety and Biosecurity Professionals; establishment of a Regional Centre of Excellence for biosafety and biosecurity from where two cohorts of students in the two areas of biorisk management (16 students from 8 countries) and biological waste management (19 students from 10 countries) have been trained and development of a Regulatory and Certification Framework for Institutions Handling High-Risk Pathogens with three components of minimum standards of biosafety and biosecurity for high-containment facilities, a standard evaluation checklist for checking compliance and a certification framework for authorising performance of tasks related to dangerous pathogens. A guidance document with step-by-step process on how to translate regional successes to national implementation was developed and published. Based on notable regional successes of the initiative, Africa CDC co-chaired the Global Health Security Agenda Action Package 3 on Prevention and the Africa Signature Initiative Biosafety and Biosecurity Working Group. Challenges of delayed implementation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, limited resources to implement all planned activities and limited staff dedicated to biosafety and biosecuruty at Africa CDC.
介绍了在55个非洲联盟成员国实施的非洲疾病控制和预防中心生物安全和生物安全倡议。根据2019年至2021年与会员国的磋商,确定了国家层面的能力差距,为生物安全和生物安保5年(2021 - 2025年)战略计划提供了信息。介绍了确定国家差距、制定、实施和监测五年战略计划的过程。值得注意的成就包括制定了一项区域生物安全和生物安全立法框架,目前已得到非洲联盟各机构的批准,并在一些国家开始了驯化进程;建立和运作多部门区域生物安全和生物安全技术工作组,负责协调和监测该倡议的实施,制定和实施可获取的区域认可的生物安全和生物安全专业人员区域培训和认证计划;建立生物安全和生物安全区域卓越中心,对生物风险管理两个领域的两批学生(来自8个国家的16名学生)和生物废物管理(来自10个国家的19名学生)进行培训,并制定了《处理高风险病原体机构的管理和认证框架》,其中包括高度封闭设施的生物安全和生物安全最低标准的三个组成部分;检查合规性的标准评估清单和授权执行与危险病原体有关的任务的认证框架。编写并出版了一份指导文件,逐步说明如何将区域成功转化为国家实施。在该倡议取得显著区域成功的基础上,非洲疾病预防控制中心共同主持了全球卫生安全议程第三项预防行动包和非洲签名倡议生物安全和生物安全工作组。由于2019冠状病毒病大流行导致实施延迟的挑战,实施所有计划活动的资源有限,非洲疾病预防控制中心致力于生物安全和生物安全的工作人员有限。
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引用次数: 0
Simulating the Passive Neutron and Gamma Signatures of Containerized Nuclear Warheads for Disarmament Verification 用于裁军核查的容器化核弹头的被动中子和伽马特征模拟
IF 0.7 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2223832
Svenja Sonder, Carina Prünte, Y. Fischer, Manuel Kreutle, Jan Scheunemann, G. Kirchner
Abstract For nuclear disarmament verification, measuring passive neutron and gamma signatures is discussed for confirming the presence of weapons-grade plutonium. Using the Geant4 code, the effects of neutron and photon interactions with the various materials of containerized items are explored for (i) notional fission and thermonuclear warheads waiting for dismantlement, (ii) intentionally shielded plutonium in a scrap container. Due to strong neutronic linking of the various warhead materials neutron multiplicity measurements can not be expected to give correct results. Gamma emissions of the plutonium may even be completely shielded by a tamper. Gamma spectrometry could verify the presence of explosives from (n,γ) activation of hydrogen and nitrogen as well as of fission processes from their prompt fission gamma emissions. Limiting diameters of scrap containers together with long-time gamma measurements of the absence of photons produced by (n,γ) activation of shielding materials will provide an effective approach for detecting an intentional diversion of plutonium.
摘要在核裁军核查中,讨论了测量被动中子和伽马特征来确认武器级钚的存在。使用Geant4代码,探索了中子和光子与容器物品的各种材料相互作用的影响(i)等待拆除的名义裂变和热核弹头,(ii)有意屏蔽在废料容器中的钚。由于各种弹头材料的强中子连接,不能期望中子多重性测量给出正确的结果。钚的伽马辐射甚至可以被一个篡改器完全屏蔽。伽马能谱法可以通过氢和氮的(n,γ)活化来验证炸药的存在,也可以通过它们的裂变伽马辐射来验证裂变过程的存在。限制废料容器的直径,加上对屏蔽材料(n,γ)活化产生的光子缺失的长时间伽马测量,将为探测钚的故意转移提供一种有效的方法。
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引用次数: 0
Radioactive Fallout and Potential Fatalities from Nuclear Attacks on China’s New Missile Silo Fields 中国新导弹发射井核攻击的放射性沉降物和潜在死亡人数
IF 0.7 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2215590
Sébastien Philippe, I. Stepanov
Abstract China is constructing three new nuclear ballistic missile silo fields near the cities of Yumen, Hami, and Ordos as part of a significant buildup of its nuclear weapon arsenal. Once operational, these missile silos will likely be included as targets in U.S. strategic counterforce war plans. Such plans call for using one or two nuclear warheads to strike each silo. Such attacks can generate large amounts of radioactive debris that are then transported by local winds and can deliver lethal doses of radiation to population hundreds of kilometers away. Here, we compute radioactive fallout from counterforce attacks on the three new alleged missile silo fields using the combination of a nuclear war simulator and modern atmospheric particle transport software and recent archived weather data. We find that the construction of these new silos will put tens of millions of Chinese civilians at risk of lethal fallout including in East China. In particular, the relatively short distance between the Ordos missile field and Beijing and the local winds patterns for the region, suggest that about half of the 21 million inhabitants of the Chinese capital could die following a counterforce strike, even if given advanced warning to shelter in place.
中国正在玉门、哈密和鄂尔多斯附近建设三个新的核弹道导弹发射井,作为其核武库重大建设的一部分。一旦投入使用,这些导弹发射井可能会被列入美国战略反作用力战争计划的目标。这种计划要求使用一到两枚核弹头打击每个发射井。这种攻击会产生大量的放射性碎片,这些碎片随后被当地的风吹走,并可能向数百公里外的人群输送致命剂量的辐射。在这里,我们使用核战争模拟器和现代大气粒子传输软件以及最近存档的天气数据,计算了三个新的所谓的导弹发射井场的反作用力攻击所产生的放射性沉降物。我们发现,这些新发射井的建设将使数千万中国平民面临致命辐射尘的风险,包括在华东地区。特别是,鄂尔多斯导弹场与北京之间的距离相对较短,加上该地区的风力模式,这表明,即使事先警告要在适当的地方躲避,中国首都2100万居民中约有一半可能会在反作用力打击后死亡。
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引用次数: 1
“Computational Fluid Dynamics Analysis of the Infrared Emission from a Generic Hypersonic Glide Vehicle”—A Response “通用高超声速滑翔飞行器红外发射的计算流体动力学分析”-响应
IF 0.7 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2215587
C. Tracy, David Wright
Abstract A recent paper by Candler and Leyva in Science & Global Security comments on our 2020 paper “Modelling the Performance of Hypersonic Boost-Glide Missiles” analyzing the capabilities of hypersonic boost-glide weapons. They provide useful new data on several previously uncertain aspects of glide vehicle aerodynamics and report results from computational fluid dynamics calculations of heating and infrared light emission from hypersonic vehicles during the glide phase. They report infrared emissions lower than those we reported but still above the minimum detection threshold of modern U.S. space sensors. We discuss how Candler and Leyva’s new data can be incorporated into our analytical model and identify significant, unresolved discrepancies between their results and those of a previously published computational fluid dynamics analysis of the same glide vehicle. Finally, we comment on the role of social processes in the construction of knowledge about hypersonic weapon performance.
Candler和Leyva最近在《科学与全球安全》上发表的一篇论文对我们2020年的论文《高超声速助推滑翔导弹的性能建模》进行了评论,该论文分析了高超声速助推滑翔武器的能力。他们为滑翔飞行器空气动力学的几个先前不确定的方面提供了有用的新数据,并报告了高超声速飞行器在滑翔阶段加热和红外光发射的计算流体动力学计算结果。他们报告的红外辐射比我们报告的要低,但仍高于现代美国空间传感器的最低探测阈值。我们讨论了如何将Candler和Leyva的新数据纳入我们的分析模型,并确定他们的结果与先前发表的相同滑翔飞行器的计算流体动力学分析之间的重大未解决的差异。最后,我们评论了社会过程在构建高超声速武器性能知识中的作用。
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引用次数: 0
Editors’ Note 编者注
Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Pub Date : 2023-05-04 DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2023.2228086
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Science & Global Security
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