On the Top-Down Argument for the Ability to Do Otherwise.

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-11-22 DOI:10.1007/s10670-022-00638-3
Leonhard Menges
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Abstract

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise in some sense. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work.

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自上而下论证 "不这样做的能力"。
自上而下论证 "做其他事情的能力 "的目的是,在与自由意志辩论相关的意义上,确定人类可以做其他事情。它包括两个前提:第一,我们总是需要通过查阅我们在相关领域的最佳科学理论来回答某种现象(比如 "做其他事情的能力")是否存在的问题。其次,我们关于人类行为的最佳科学理论的前提是人类能够以其他方式行事。本文认为,这不足以确立结论。自上而下论证支持人类在某种意义上可以不这么做。但它并没有证明人类在与自由意志辩论相关的意义上可以不这么做。本文随后指出,使论证成立的看似最好的方法并不奏效。
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来源期刊
ERKENNTNIS
ERKENNTNIS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
11.10%
发文量
116
期刊介绍: Erkenntnis is a philosophical journal publishing papers committed in one way or another to the philosophical attitude which is signified by the label ''scientific philosophy''. It concentrates on those philosophical fields which are particularly inspired by this attitude, although other topics are welcome as well. These fields are:- Epistemology - Philosophy of science, foundations and methodology of science in general and of natural and human sciences such as physics, biology, psychology, economics, social sciences in particular - Philosophy of mathematics - Logic, philosophy of logic, and all kinds of philosophical logics - Philosophy of language - Ontology, metaphysics, theory of modality - Philosophical psychology, philosophy of mind, neurophilosophy - Practical philosophy, i.e. ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of law, etc. One of the objectives of Erkenntnis is the provision of a suitable platform for the discussion of controversial issues; another is the provision of timely, competent reviews of important publications in an ever-growing field of research.In recent years, philosophers standing quite outside the pale of analytic philosophy have also paid careful, and indeed most welcome, attention to precision of concept and language, to arguments, and to well-grounded foundations. Erkenntnis provides for them, and for philosophers of all persuasions, a place of meeting, of discussion, and of disputation.Erkenntnis was originally founded in 1930 by Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, it was revived in 1975 by Carl G. Hempel, Wolfang Stegmüller, and Wilhelm K. Essler. You can find more information about this in the article “Hempel: The old and the new ‘Erkenntnis’” accessible in the tabs to the right.Today, Erkenntnis is one of the leading journals in philosophy worldwide and attracts first-class authors at all stages of career; from young philosophers at the PhD level up to established academic philosophers and highly renowned senior scholars. We pride ourselves on supplying our authors with substantial referee reports, subject to a turnaround time of about three months until the first decision. The acceptance rate for publications in the journal is presently slightly below 10%.
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