Must strong emergence collapse?

Abstract

There have recently been complaints from various quarters that strong emergence doesn’t make sense, on grounds that any purportedly strongly emergent features or associated powers can be se en to ‘collapse’, one way or another, into the lower - level base features upon which they depend. On one version of this collapse objection, certain ways of individuating lower - level physical features entail that such features will have dispositions to prod uce any purportedly strongly emergent features, undermining the supposed metaphysical novelty of the emergent features and the physical acceptability of the base features (see Howell 2009 and Taylor 2015). On another, certain ways of assigning powers to fe atures entail that lower - level physical features will inherit any powers had by purportedly strongly emergent features (see Kim, 1998 and 2006, and others). Here we present and defend four different responses that might be given to the collapse objection a s directed against a ‘novel power’ approach to strong emergence: first, distinguishing between direct and indirect having of powers; second, distinguishing between lightweight and heavyweight dispositions; third, taking strong emergence to be relative to s ets of fundamental interactions; fourth, taking strongly emergent features to be ‘new object entailing’, in ways that block lower - level inheritance of powers.