Kareen E. Brown , Fayez A. Elayan , Jingyu Li , Emad Mohammad , Parunchana Pacharn , Zhefeng Frank Liu
{"title":"To exempt or not to exempt non-accelerated filers from compliance with the auditor attestation requirement of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act","authors":"Kareen E. Brown , Fayez A. Elayan , Jingyu Li , Emad Mohammad , Parunchana Pacharn , Zhefeng Frank Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.racreg.2016.09.005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine the stock market reaction to the SEC announcement to permanently exempt non-accelerated filers from compliance with Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Mandatory compliance with auditor attestation under Section 404(b) is highly controversial. Using a sample of non-accelerated issuers for 2006–2011, we find a negative market reaction to the November 4, 2009 exemption announcement. However, most of the negative returns accrue to non-accelerated filers that do not voluntarily comply with Section 404(b), suggesting that auditor attestation enhances firm value. The use of a Big 4 auditor, strong analyst following, and superior internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) are associated with positive/less negative market responses. Voluntary compliers with Section 404(b) are more likely to have a Big 4 auditor, stronger analyst coverage, effective ICFR, stronger firm performance and lower information asymmetry. Our results are consistent with firms using voluntary compliance with SOX 404(b) as a signal of superior operating performance and ICFR quality to overcome information asymmetry and therefore mitigate the negative valuation impact of the permanent exemption from auditor attestation.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101074,"journal":{"name":"Research in Accounting Regulation","volume":"28 2","pages":"Pages 86-95"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.racreg.2016.09.005","citationCount":"5","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Research in Accounting Regulation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1052045716300200","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 5
Abstract
We examine the stock market reaction to the SEC announcement to permanently exempt non-accelerated filers from compliance with Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Mandatory compliance with auditor attestation under Section 404(b) is highly controversial. Using a sample of non-accelerated issuers for 2006–2011, we find a negative market reaction to the November 4, 2009 exemption announcement. However, most of the negative returns accrue to non-accelerated filers that do not voluntarily comply with Section 404(b), suggesting that auditor attestation enhances firm value. The use of a Big 4 auditor, strong analyst following, and superior internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) are associated with positive/less negative market responses. Voluntary compliers with Section 404(b) are more likely to have a Big 4 auditor, stronger analyst coverage, effective ICFR, stronger firm performance and lower information asymmetry. Our results are consistent with firms using voluntary compliance with SOX 404(b) as a signal of superior operating performance and ICFR quality to overcome information asymmetry and therefore mitigate the negative valuation impact of the permanent exemption from auditor attestation.