Administrative Severability Clauses

IF 5.2 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Yale Law Journal Pub Date : 2015-03-17 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2362452
J. Mashaw
{"title":"Administrative Severability Clauses","authors":"J. Mashaw","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2362452","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Severability clauses can help administrative agencies minimize the damage caused by judicial review and can make the regulatory environment more efficient, participatory, and predictable. Yet agencies rarely include these clauses in their rules because courts tend to treat administrative rules with severability clauses the same as those without. Courts have treated administrative severability clauses in this way largely because they have mistakenly analogized them to severability clauses contained in statutes. While Congress routinely includes severability clauses in statutes that are drafted in distinct iterations, by different committees with legislative staff who often lack the time and expertise to consider the clauses’ potential ramifications, administrative agencies use these clauses with more care. This Article proposes a Chevron-style deference framework for administrative severability clauses. Under this framework, after a reviewing court has set aside a challenged regulatory provision, the court should defer to a promulgating agency’s opinion on severability as expressed through a severability clause, unless the remainder of the rule itself would suffer from legal defects resulting from the court’s invalidation of the challenged provisions. This framework would better promote the overarching goals of administrative law than do current judicial doctrine and agency practice.","PeriodicalId":48293,"journal":{"name":"Yale Law Journal","volume":"43 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":5.2000,"publicationDate":"2015-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Yale Law Journal","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2362452","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Severability clauses can help administrative agencies minimize the damage caused by judicial review and can make the regulatory environment more efficient, participatory, and predictable. Yet agencies rarely include these clauses in their rules because courts tend to treat administrative rules with severability clauses the same as those without. Courts have treated administrative severability clauses in this way largely because they have mistakenly analogized them to severability clauses contained in statutes. While Congress routinely includes severability clauses in statutes that are drafted in distinct iterations, by different committees with legislative staff who often lack the time and expertise to consider the clauses’ potential ramifications, administrative agencies use these clauses with more care. This Article proposes a Chevron-style deference framework for administrative severability clauses. Under this framework, after a reviewing court has set aside a challenged regulatory provision, the court should defer to a promulgating agency’s opinion on severability as expressed through a severability clause, unless the remainder of the rule itself would suffer from legal defects resulting from the court’s invalidation of the challenged provisions. This framework would better promote the overarching goals of administrative law than do current judicial doctrine and agency practice.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
行政可分割条款
可分割性条款可以帮助行政机关最大限度地减少司法审查造成的损害,使监管环境更加高效、参与性和可预测性。然而,行政机关很少在其规章中包括这些条款,因为法院倾向于将带有可分割条款的行政规章与没有可分割条款的行政规章等同对待。法院以这种方式处理行政可分割性条款,主要是因为它们错误地将其类比为成文法中的可分割性条款。虽然国会经常在由不同委员会的立法人员反复起草的法规中包括可分割条款,这些委员会的立法人员往往缺乏时间和专业知识来考虑条款的潜在后果,但行政机构在使用这些条款时更为谨慎。本文提出了一个行政可分割性条款的雪佛龙式遵从框架。在这一框架下,在审查法院搁置了一项受到质疑的监管条款之后,法院应遵从颁布机构通过可分割条款所表达的关于可分割性的意见,除非该规则本身的其余部分将因法院宣布被质疑的条款无效而遭受法律缺陷。这一框架将比目前的司法理论和机构实践更好地促进行政法的总体目标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
4.50
自引率
6.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Yale Law Journal Online is the online companion to The Yale Law Journal. It replaces The Pocket Part, which was the first such companion to be published by a leading law review. YLJ Online will continue The Pocket Part"s mission of augmenting the scholarship printed in The Yale Law Journal by providing original Essays, legal commentaries, responses to articles printed in the Journal, podcast and iTunes University recordings of various pieces, and other works by both established and emerging academics and practitioners.
期刊最新文献
Abolitionist Prison Litigation How to Save the Supreme Court Prosecuting Corporate Crime When Firms Are Too Big to Jail: Investigation, Deterrence, and Judicial Review The Statutory Separation of Powers A Cooperative Federalism Approach to Shareholder Arbitration
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1