Stanisław Ehrlich’s Critique of Legal Dogmatics: Then and Now

Abstract

The main aim of this paper is to reconstruct Stanisław Ehrlich’s critique of legal dogmatics by which he understood a legal discipline that explains in a systematic manner the normative material which consists of description, classification and systematization of norms. As an additional aim of this article is to remind about Ehrlich’s achievements and contribution to the regional legal theory, this is preceded by the author’s biographical note. The reconstruction of Ehrlich’s critique of legal dogmatics consists of three elements. Firstly, I discuss the author’s understanding of legal dogmatics and attitude towards it in the context of the domestic legal theory. Secondly, I consider the theoretical background of Ehrlich’s critique of legal dogmatics and I argue that it might be seen as a part of three broader threads in the author’s writings: realism, decision-focused concept of law and pluralism. Finally, I reconstruct Ehrlich’s critique of legal dogmatics formulated in the 1950s and in the 1960s. This is followed by a brief summary and consideration of Ehrlich’s possible application in the broadly understood legal theory. I shall argue that Ehrlich’s critique of legal dogmatics and his realistic concept of law might be interesting for all who examine the law in its broader social context, looking at it from the external point of view, adopting critical as well as post-analytical attitudes towards the law. As possible fields of Ehrlich’s application, I identify ongoing discussions on rule of law, legal education, adjudication and judicial formalism. I shall also argue that Ehrlich’s realistic concept of the law remains an interesting piece of Central Eastern European critical thought.