Behavioral Economics and Court Decision-Making

IF 0.4 Q3 LAW Review of Law & Economics Pub Date : 2021-07-01 DOI:10.1515/rle-2021-0058
D. Teichman, E. Zamir
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract The economic analysis of law assumes that court decisions are key to incentivizing people and maximizing social welfare. This article reviews the behavioral literature on court decision making, and highlights numerous heuristics and biases that impact judges and jurors and cause them to make decisions that diverge from the social optimum. In light of this review, the article analyzes some of the institutional features of the court system that may help minimize the costs of biased decisions in the courts.
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行为经济学与法院决策
法律的经济分析假设法院判决是激励人们和最大化社会福利的关键。本文回顾了有关法庭决策的行为学文献,并强调了影响法官和陪审员的许多启发式和偏见,并导致他们做出偏离社会最优的决定。根据这一审查,本文分析了法院系统的一些制度特征,这些特征可能有助于最大限度地减少法院有偏见的判决的成本。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
11
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