{"title":"Impact of the Ukrainian War on South Korea’s diplomacy in Central Asia","authors":"Eom Gu Ho","doi":"10.1177/18793665221124814","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have political and economic impacts in Central Asia. Politically, first, Central Asian countries will strengthen cooperation with neighbouring regional powers such as India, Turkey and Iran to hedge their political and economic security. Second, while China’s influence in Central Asia will increase, SCO will be more economic cooperation organisation. Third, the future direction of Central Asian regionalism will be uncertain. Although it is unlikely, if Uzbekistan shows anti-Russian behaviour, regionalism in Central Asia may weaken. Fourth, it is unlikely that the US role will be expanded again in Central Asia after the Ukraine War. Economically, first, it is highly likely that the status and centripetal force of the Eurasian Economic Union will be weakened. Second, if Europe’s anti-Russian energy policy is strengthened and green energy policies are accelerated, the renewable energy policies of Central Asian carbon-centered energy producing countries such as Kazakhstan in particular can be accelerated. Third, if the logistical obstacles of TSR persist, the bypass logistics infrastructure going to Central Asia through India, Iran, Pakistan, etc. instead of through Russia will be activated. It seems inevitable to shift Korea’s diplomacy toward Central Asia to a certain level to organically link value-based diplomacy and economic security strategies. In this context, first, the existing diplomatic strategies and economic cooperation policies toward Central Asia must be freed from the tendency to view Central Asian countries only as a sphere of influence from Russia. Second, in a situation in which economic cooperation between Korea and Russia is inevitably severely curtailed due to western sanctions against Russia and geopolitical conflicts, it is necessary to strengthen economic cooperation with Central Asian countries as a means of circumventing economic cooperation with Russia. Third, there is a possibility that the northern policy of new governments may be weakened due to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thus the cooperation with Central Asian countries may also shrink. It will be necessary to maintain and develop the previous government’s cooperation platform with Central Asian countries.","PeriodicalId":39195,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","volume":"36 1","pages":"172 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Eurasian Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/18793665221124814","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have political and economic impacts in Central Asia. Politically, first, Central Asian countries will strengthen cooperation with neighbouring regional powers such as India, Turkey and Iran to hedge their political and economic security. Second, while China’s influence in Central Asia will increase, SCO will be more economic cooperation organisation. Third, the future direction of Central Asian regionalism will be uncertain. Although it is unlikely, if Uzbekistan shows anti-Russian behaviour, regionalism in Central Asia may weaken. Fourth, it is unlikely that the US role will be expanded again in Central Asia after the Ukraine War. Economically, first, it is highly likely that the status and centripetal force of the Eurasian Economic Union will be weakened. Second, if Europe’s anti-Russian energy policy is strengthened and green energy policies are accelerated, the renewable energy policies of Central Asian carbon-centered energy producing countries such as Kazakhstan in particular can be accelerated. Third, if the logistical obstacles of TSR persist, the bypass logistics infrastructure going to Central Asia through India, Iran, Pakistan, etc. instead of through Russia will be activated. It seems inevitable to shift Korea’s diplomacy toward Central Asia to a certain level to organically link value-based diplomacy and economic security strategies. In this context, first, the existing diplomatic strategies and economic cooperation policies toward Central Asia must be freed from the tendency to view Central Asian countries only as a sphere of influence from Russia. Second, in a situation in which economic cooperation between Korea and Russia is inevitably severely curtailed due to western sanctions against Russia and geopolitical conflicts, it is necessary to strengthen economic cooperation with Central Asian countries as a means of circumventing economic cooperation with Russia. Third, there is a possibility that the northern policy of new governments may be weakened due to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thus the cooperation with Central Asian countries may also shrink. It will be necessary to maintain and develop the previous government’s cooperation platform with Central Asian countries.