A solution for on-line trust validation

M. Abramovici
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Summary form only given. We show that pre-deployment checks are unlikely to guarantee the detection of Trojans using a time-bomb mechanism for activation. We describe a new approach to on-line TRUST validation based on extensions to an existing technology for in-system silicon validation. The basis is a reconfigurable infrastructure platform added to the RTL model of the target SoC. The platform can be configured to implement design-for-enabling-security (DEFENSE) logic consisting of security monitors and logic to provide countermeasures to detected attacks.
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联机信任验证的解决方案
只提供摘要形式。我们表明,预部署检查不太可能保证使用定时炸弹激活机制检测木马。我们描述了一种基于扩展现有系统内硅验证技术的在线信任验证新方法。其基础是添加到目标SoC的RTL模型中的可重构基础架构平台。该平台可以配置为实现为启用安全而设计(DEFENSE)的逻辑,该逻辑由安全监视器和逻辑组成,为检测到的攻击提供对策。
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