{"title":"Eschatological personalism: a theological response","authors":"Dominic Doyle","doi":"10.1080/2153599X.2022.2050794","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"cendence, which is found in all the personalists, is not distinctly eschatological. It is also true that M addresses various eschatological issues, as when he discusses the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar (89-91), but such an excursion into explicit eschatology does not seem to have the effect of imparting an eschatological character to M’s personalism as a whole. He says that “an eschatological personalism asserts that the essence of the self can only be grasped as a person’s whole history and ultimate end and purpose” (177). But this thought is already found among the Greeks: “count noman happy as long as he is alive.”Would any of the key concepts of M’s personalism—autarchy, agent intellect, subjectivity, temporality, group bias—be obscured if he did not call his personalism eschatological?","PeriodicalId":45959,"journal":{"name":"Religion Brain & Behavior","volume":"34 1","pages":"452 - 456"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Religion Brain & Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2022.2050794","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"RELIGION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
cendence, which is found in all the personalists, is not distinctly eschatological. It is also true that M addresses various eschatological issues, as when he discusses the work of Hans Urs von Balthasar (89-91), but such an excursion into explicit eschatology does not seem to have the effect of imparting an eschatological character to M’s personalism as a whole. He says that “an eschatological personalism asserts that the essence of the self can only be grasped as a person’s whole history and ultimate end and purpose” (177). But this thought is already found among the Greeks: “count noman happy as long as he is alive.”Would any of the key concepts of M’s personalism—autarchy, agent intellect, subjectivity, temporality, group bias—be obscured if he did not call his personalism eschatological?
在所有的人格论者中都能找到的优越感,并不是明显的末世论。同样,当M讨论汉斯·乌尔斯·冯·巴尔塔萨(Hans Urs von Balthasar, 89-91)的作品时,他谈到了各种末世论问题,但这种对明确末世论的短途旅行似乎并没有将末世论特征作为一个整体传授给M的人格。他说,“一个末世论的人格主义断言,自我的本质只能被理解为一个人的整个历史和最终目的”(177)。但是这种想法在希腊人中已经存在了:“只要一个人活着,他就是幸福的。”如果M不把他的个人主义称为末世论,那么他的个人主义的关键概念——专制、智能主体、主体性、时间性、群体偏见——是否会被模糊?