{"title":"Large Customer-supplier Links and Syndicate Loan Structure","authors":"E. Croci, Marta Degl'Innocenti, Si Zhou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3353214","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Relationships between large customers and suppliers expose lenders to additional risks. These risks may force lead agents to retain a larger share of syndicated loans, reducing loan-level diversification, and, in turn, increasing the required interest rate spread. Consistent with this view, we find that borrowers' dependence on a few larger customers or suppliers positively affects the cost of the loans indirectly through the loan structure. Instead, we do not observe a direct cost associated with large customer-supplier links, suggesting that lead agents do not increase the interest rate spread as compensation for the additional risks of dealing with borrowers with large customer-supplier links per se. Finally, we document an inverted U-shaped relationship between the length of the large customer-supplier link and the loan share held by the lead agent.","PeriodicalId":11410,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Capital Markets - Risk eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"9","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometric Modeling: Capital Markets - Risk eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3353214","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
Abstract
Abstract Relationships between large customers and suppliers expose lenders to additional risks. These risks may force lead agents to retain a larger share of syndicated loans, reducing loan-level diversification, and, in turn, increasing the required interest rate spread. Consistent with this view, we find that borrowers' dependence on a few larger customers or suppliers positively affects the cost of the loans indirectly through the loan structure. Instead, we do not observe a direct cost associated with large customer-supplier links, suggesting that lead agents do not increase the interest rate spread as compensation for the additional risks of dealing with borrowers with large customer-supplier links per se. Finally, we document an inverted U-shaped relationship between the length of the large customer-supplier link and the loan share held by the lead agent.