Partnership or Predation? How Rising States Contend with Declining Great Powers

IF 4.8 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS International Security Pub Date : 2020-07-20 DOI:10.1162/ISEC_A_00384
Joshua R. Shifrinson
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract:International relations scholarship overwhelmingly expects that relatively rising states will threaten and challenge declining great powers. In practice, however, rising states can also cooperate with and support declining powers. What explains the rising state's choice of policy? When do rising states support or prey on declining great powers, and why do such strategies vary across time and space? The answer depends on the rising state's broader strategic calculations. All things being equal, a rising state will generally support a declining power when the latter can be used to offset threats from other great powers that can harm the rising state's security. Conversely, when using a declining state to offset such challenges is not a plausible option, the rising state is likely to pursue a predation strategy. The level of assertiveness of support or predation, meanwhile, depends on the declining power's military posture: the stronger the declining state is militarily, the less assertive the rising state tends to be. A review of the strategies adopted by two relatively rising powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, toward a declining Great Britain after 1945, and of a rising United States vis-à-vis a declining Soviet Union in the late Cold War, illustrates how this argument outperforms explanations that focus instead on the importance of economic interdependence and ideology.
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合作还是掠夺?崛起的国家如何与衰落的大国竞争
摘要:国际关系学界普遍认为,相对崛起的国家将对衰落的大国构成威胁和挑战。然而,在实践中,崛起的国家也可以与衰落的大国合作并给予支持。如何解释这个崛起国家的政策选择?什么时候崛起的国家会支持或掠夺衰落的大国?为什么这些战略会随着时间和空间的变化而变化?答案取决于这个崛起国家更广泛的战略考量。在其他条件相同的情况下,一个崛起的国家通常会支持一个衰落的大国,因为后者可以用来抵消其他大国对崛起国家安全的威胁。相反,当使用一个衰落的国家来抵消这些挑战不是一个合理的选择时,崛起的国家可能会采取捕食策略。与此同时,支持或掠夺的自信程度取决于衰落大国的军事姿态:衰落国家的军事实力越强,崛起国家的自信程度往往越低。回顾一下1945年后美国和苏联这两个相对崛起的大国对衰落的英国采取的战略,以及冷战后期崛起的美国对衰落的苏联采取的战略,就会发现,这种观点如何胜过那些把重点放在经济相互依存和意识形态重要性上的解释。
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来源期刊
International Security
International Security Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
7.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: International Security publishes lucid, well-documented essays on the full range of contemporary security issues. Its articles address traditional topics of war and peace, as well as more recent dimensions of security, including environmental, demographic, and humanitarian issues, transnational networks, and emerging technologies. International Security has defined the debate on US national security policy and set the agenda for scholarship on international security affairs for more than forty years. The journal values scholarship that challenges the conventional wisdom, examines policy, engages theory, illuminates history, and discovers new trends. Readers of IS discover new developments in: The causes and prevention of war U.S.-China relations Great power politics Ethnic conflict and intra-state war Terrorism and insurgency Regional security in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America U.S. foreign and defense policy International relations theory Diplomatic and military history Cybersecurity and defense technology Political economy, business, and security Nuclear proliferation.
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