Alex Edmans, X. Gabaix, Tomasz Sadzik, Yuliy Sannikov
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引用次数: 241
Abstract
We study optimal compensation in a fully dynamic framework where the CEO consumes in multiple periods, can undo the contract by privately saving, and can temporarily inflate earnings. We obtain a simple closed-form contract that yields clear predictions for how the level and performance-sensitivity of pay varies over time and across firms. The contract can be implemented by a "Dynamic Incentive Account": the CEO's expected pay is escrowed into an account that comprises cash and the firm's equity. The account features state-dependent rebalancing to ensure its equity proportion is always sufficient to induce effort, and time-dependent vesting to deter short-termism.
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