{"title":"The Effects of Transparency on OTC Market-Making","authors":"Ryan Lewis, Michael Schwert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3286731","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine the effects of post-trade transparency on intermediation in the over-the-counter corporate bond market using the staggered introduction of TRACE as a natural experiment. Post-trade transparency leads to increased trading volume and more connected dealer networks. Transparency reduces dealers' profitability but also their portfolio risk and adverse selection costs. In contrast to prior research suggesting that TRACE benefits customers at the expense of dealers, we show that the net effect on dealer welfare is ambiguous. Bond spreads are less predictive of default in a transparent market, consistent with reduced profitability of informed trade weakening incentives to produce information.","PeriodicalId":80976,"journal":{"name":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","volume":"73 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Comparative labor law journal : a publication of the U.S. National Branch of the International Society for Labor Law and Social Security [and] the Wharton School, and the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3286731","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
We examine the effects of post-trade transparency on intermediation in the over-the-counter corporate bond market using the staggered introduction of TRACE as a natural experiment. Post-trade transparency leads to increased trading volume and more connected dealer networks. Transparency reduces dealers' profitability but also their portfolio risk and adverse selection costs. In contrast to prior research suggesting that TRACE benefits customers at the expense of dealers, we show that the net effect on dealer welfare is ambiguous. Bond spreads are less predictive of default in a transparent market, consistent with reduced profitability of informed trade weakening incentives to produce information.