Analyst Forecast Bundling

Michael S. Drake, P. Joos, Joseph Pacelli, Brady J. Twedt
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引用次数: 19

Abstract

Changing economic conditions over the past two decades have created incentives for sell-side analysts to both provide their institutional clients tiered services and to streamline their written research process. One manifestation of these changes is an increased likelihood of analysts’ issuing earnings forecasts for multiple firms on the same day. We identify this bundling property and show that bundling has increased steadily over time. We provide field evidence that the practice is a cost-saving measure, a natural by-product of analysts focusing on thematic research, and a reflection of forecast updating that occurs in advance of important events. Our empirical analyses show that bundled forecasts are less accurate, less bold, and less informative to investors than nonbundled forecasts. We also find that analysts who produce bundled forecasts provide valuable specialized services to their institutional clients. Our findings ultimately demonstrate that forecast bundling has important implications for the properties of analysts’ forecasts.This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.
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分析师预测捆绑销售
过去20年不断变化的经济状况,促使卖方分析师为机构客户提供分层服务,并简化书面研究流程。这些变化的一个表现是,分析师在同一天发布多家公司盈利预测的可能性越来越大。我们确定了这种捆绑特性,并表明捆绑随着时间的推移而稳步增加。我们提供的现场证据表明,这种做法是一种节省成本的措施,是分析师专注于专题研究的自然副产品,也是重要事件发生之前预测更新的反映。我们的实证分析表明,与非捆绑预测相比,捆绑预测更不准确、更不大胆、对投资者的信息量也更少。我们还发现,提供捆绑预测的分析师为其机构客户提供了有价值的专业服务。我们的研究结果最终表明,预测捆绑对分析师预测的性质有重要的影响。这篇论文被会计Shiva Rajgopal接受。
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