Modeling and simulation in mission assurance

Colonel Eric D Trias
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Organizations must contend with threats from both physical and cyber means. A promising approach to assure operations resiliency in the face of this multi-domain threat lies in the concept of convergence of three security disciplines—physical, cyber, and continuity of operations (COOPs). Units can no longer depend on cybersecurity, nor can they rely entirely on guards, guns, and gates to protect critical missions, people, and infrastructure. Comprehensive risk-managed operational practices complemented by diverse, converged security protection programs are needed to meet these challenges. M&S has a significant role to play and must incorporate a more complex, holistic operational environment to address the resiliency of modern infrastructure. Network operators and cybersecurity providers must focus on assuring operational resilience and not merely on compliance with policies. Although policies provide a baseline to address common vulnerabilities, they are not sufficient in securing against complex threats, undiscovered vulnerabilities, or advanced adversaries. These adversaries continue to circumvent defenses whether from the inside, e.g., phishing and ransomware, or the outside through supply chain, vulnerable interfaces, or protocols. One way the Department of Defense (DoD) is addressing complex risks to its most strategic assets is to conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment utilizing a multidisciplinary approach called mission assurance (MA). MA, governed by DoD Instruction 3020.45, is the process to identify, protect, or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the execution of DoD mission-essential functions in any operating environment or condition. 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Abstract

Modeling and simulation (M&S) continue to play a significant role in military training and operations. With the growth of cyberspace in support of military operations, it is only appropriate for M&S to follow a similar trajectory. In cybersecurity in particular, M&S can provide invaluable training for the cyber workforce, both for defensive and offensive operations, testing of network defenses and to support operational resiliency. Threats to military operations increase in complexity as adversaries develop their multi-domain capabilities to exploit information networks and mission systems. Adversaries are looking to physically attack defense critical infrastructure through cyber means along with exploiting vulnerability of information systems to gain physical access. Organizations must contend with threats from both physical and cyber means. A promising approach to assure operations resiliency in the face of this multi-domain threat lies in the concept of convergence of three security disciplines—physical, cyber, and continuity of operations (COOPs). Units can no longer depend on cybersecurity, nor can they rely entirely on guards, guns, and gates to protect critical missions, people, and infrastructure. Comprehensive risk-managed operational practices complemented by diverse, converged security protection programs are needed to meet these challenges. M&S has a significant role to play and must incorporate a more complex, holistic operational environment to address the resiliency of modern infrastructure. Network operators and cybersecurity providers must focus on assuring operational resilience and not merely on compliance with policies. Although policies provide a baseline to address common vulnerabilities, they are not sufficient in securing against complex threats, undiscovered vulnerabilities, or advanced adversaries. These adversaries continue to circumvent defenses whether from the inside, e.g., phishing and ransomware, or the outside through supply chain, vulnerable interfaces, or protocols. One way the Department of Defense (DoD) is addressing complex risks to its most strategic assets is to conduct a comprehensive vulnerability assessment utilizing a multidisciplinary approach called mission assurance (MA). MA, governed by DoD Instruction 3020.45, is the process to identify, protect, or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets, including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains, critical to the execution of DoD mission-essential functions in any operating environment or condition. A major component of the MA concept is the on-site vulnerability assessment designed to discover gaps and weaknesses from multiple disciplines, i.e., physical security, general engineering, emergency management, and cyber operations. The framework provides a comprehensive risk assessment of critical assets that could prevent accomplishment of a unit, installation, or higher authority mission. No matter what program is levied on organizations to assure operational resiliency, situational awareness, monitoring, and adjustments are needed to compensate, react, and anticipate changes in the operational environment and adversary actions. Not only does the enemy gets a vote, but also we must assume that our systems are vulnerable, and in many cases, are already accessible and exploitable. Assuming the best, i.e., air-gapped networks are impenetrable, lowers operators’ guard and security diligence, which have yielded grave consequences. M&S can assist with modeling critical missions and mapping their mission relevant terrain to include supporting infrastructure. These models can be used for comparison and simulation of contingency events in support of training, exercises, COOP options, and concept of operations development. In the future, M&S can play a significant role in operational resiliency assessments to help pave the way for advancement in developing alternatives, redundancy, technical solutions, policies, and training. Incorporating
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任务保证中的建模和仿真
建模和仿真(M&S)继续在军事训练和作战中发挥重要作用。随着网络空间支持军事行动的发展,玛莎百货走上类似的道路是再合适不过的了。特别是在网络安全方面,M&S可以为网络工作人员提供宝贵的培训,包括防御和进攻操作、网络防御测试和支持操作弹性。随着对手发展其利用信息网络和任务系统的多领域能力,军事行动面临的威胁变得越来越复杂。攻击者正在寻求通过网络手段对防御关键基础设施进行物理攻击,同时利用信息系统的漏洞获得物理访问。组织必须应对来自物理和网络的威胁。面对这种多领域威胁,确保操作弹性的一种有希望的方法在于三个安全学科(物理、网络和操作连续性)的融合概念。单位不能再依赖网络安全,也不能完全依赖警卫、枪支和大门来保护关键任务、人员和基础设施。要应对这些挑战,需要全面的风险管理操作实践,并辅以多样化、融合的安全保护计划。玛莎百货将发挥重要作用,必须整合更复杂、更全面的运营环境,以解决现代基础设施的弹性问题。网络运营商和网络安全提供商必须专注于确保运营弹性,而不仅仅是遵守政策。尽管策略提供了处理常见漏洞的基线,但它们不足以防范复杂的威胁、未发现的漏洞或高级攻击者。这些攻击者继续规避防御,无论是从内部,例如网络钓鱼和勒索软件,还是通过供应链,易受攻击的接口或协议从外部绕过防御。美国国防部(DoD)解决其最具战略性资产的复杂风险的一种方法是利用一种称为任务保证(MA)的多学科方法进行全面的脆弱性评估。MA由国防部指令3020.45管理,是识别、保护或确保能力和资产的持续功能和弹性的过程,包括人员、设备、设施、网络、信息和信息系统、基础设施和供应链,对在任何操作环境或条件下执行国防部任务基本功能至关重要。MA概念的一个主要组成部分是现场脆弱性评估,旨在发现来自多个学科的差距和弱点,即物理安全、一般工程、应急管理和网络操作。该框架提供了对关键资产的全面风险评估,这些资产可能会阻碍一个单位、装置或更高的权威任务的完成。无论对组织征收什么计划来确保操作弹性,都需要态势感知、监控和调整来补偿、反应和预测操作环境和对手行动的变化。敌人不仅得到了投票,而且我们必须假设我们的系统是脆弱的,在许多情况下,已经可以访问和利用。假设最好的情况,例如,气隙网络是不可渗透的,降低了运营商的警惕和安全尽职,这已经产生了严重的后果。M&S可以协助对关键任务进行建模,并绘制与任务相关的地形,以包括支持基础设施。这些模型可用于比较和模拟突发事件,以支持培训、演习、合作方案和操作发展概念。未来,M&S可以在运营弹性评估中发挥重要作用,帮助为开发替代方案、冗余、技术解决方案、政策和培训铺平道路。合并
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.80
自引率
12.50%
发文量
40
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