Albert on Universals

Abstract

To ask after Albert the Great's teaching on the problem of universais, seemingly a pedestrian question, leads one swiftly into a bewildering thicket, but one in which to thrash about is both historically interesting and philosophically worthwhile. Of course we want to know how Albert handled the three Porphyrian questions which constitute the traditional problem of universais, and we expect that his treatment of them will profit from his unparalleled knowledge of the Aristotelian corpus as well as of the Arabs. We are also provided with materials that must influence our judgment of the Platonism of Albert. At the same time, his conception of what logic is and of how it differs from other disciplines is everywhere at work in the passages that must be considered. Once we know Albert's views on the status of the concerns of the logician and the fact that he considers the discussion of universais to be the first task of the logician, we are likely to think that his resolution of the problem of universais is fated and predictable. As we shall see, this is far from being unequivocally or unambiguously so. On this matter, Albert is profound, prolix and unfailingly surprising. My procedure in this paper is quite straightforward. I shall first set forth Albert's discussion of why universais must interest the logician, in the course of which his view on the nature of logic and the status of its concerns will be sketched. With this in hand, I shall turn to three places in his writings where Albert considers the problem of universais, taking the texts in descending order of importance. The passages in question are ( i ) the Second Tractate of the work Albert devoted to the Isagoge