{"title":"The Role of British Backbenchers in the Modification of Government Policy","authors":"James J. Lynskey","doi":"10.1177/106591297002300208","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ARLIAMENT no longer exists.\"' This charge, angrily thrown forth in the House of Commons by Dame Irene Ward, exemplifies the concern of politicians and scholars alike in recent years over the role of the British legislature. The problem, by no means limited to Great Britain, is that if legislators fail to contribute meaningfully to the decision-making process in a representative democracy, if they are unable to check and modify the decisions of the executive, then the existing political arrangements are clearly inconsistent with the concept of representative government. The British have been especially sensitive to the issue. Many writers claim that Britain's representative chamber, the House of Commons, is involved in the rule-making process in only the most peripheral manner. Such critics argue that the development of a stable two-party system, capable of sending a well-disciplined majority to the House of Commons, has led to a system of government in which the cabinet rules with largely unchecked decision-making powers. The backbenchers, the individual members of Parliament who are part of neither the establishment nor the opposition's shadow government, have, in the view of such critics, lost their raison d'etre. Indeed, backbenchers have been likened to a flock of mindless sheep, ready to be driven routinely through the division lobbies whenever the House is asked to put some matter to a vote.2 The purpose of this paper is to suggest that although there may be some question about the effectiveness of opposition backbenchers in the House of Commons, government backbenchers have influenced government policy more than most observers seem willing to admit. By tradition members of the opposition are granted the role of government critic, but criticism and pressure from the opposition is routine, and the government accepts it as simply a necessary ingredient in the parliamentary game. This is particularly true since the opposition, no matter how intense their feelings on an issue, cannot change the fact that the government with rare exceptions remains secure behind its majority support in the House, and accordingly is little moved by criticism from across the aisle. When the government is confident that its policy is correct, it is indeed unlikely that threats or pleas from the opposition will cause the government to amend that policy. Criticism from backbenchers of the government party, on the other hand, commands special attention in spite of the much discussed party discipline in","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"41 1","pages":"333 - 347"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1970-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Western political quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591297002300208","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Abstract
ARLIAMENT no longer exists."' This charge, angrily thrown forth in the House of Commons by Dame Irene Ward, exemplifies the concern of politicians and scholars alike in recent years over the role of the British legislature. The problem, by no means limited to Great Britain, is that if legislators fail to contribute meaningfully to the decision-making process in a representative democracy, if they are unable to check and modify the decisions of the executive, then the existing political arrangements are clearly inconsistent with the concept of representative government. The British have been especially sensitive to the issue. Many writers claim that Britain's representative chamber, the House of Commons, is involved in the rule-making process in only the most peripheral manner. Such critics argue that the development of a stable two-party system, capable of sending a well-disciplined majority to the House of Commons, has led to a system of government in which the cabinet rules with largely unchecked decision-making powers. The backbenchers, the individual members of Parliament who are part of neither the establishment nor the opposition's shadow government, have, in the view of such critics, lost their raison d'etre. Indeed, backbenchers have been likened to a flock of mindless sheep, ready to be driven routinely through the division lobbies whenever the House is asked to put some matter to a vote.2 The purpose of this paper is to suggest that although there may be some question about the effectiveness of opposition backbenchers in the House of Commons, government backbenchers have influenced government policy more than most observers seem willing to admit. By tradition members of the opposition are granted the role of government critic, but criticism and pressure from the opposition is routine, and the government accepts it as simply a necessary ingredient in the parliamentary game. This is particularly true since the opposition, no matter how intense their feelings on an issue, cannot change the fact that the government with rare exceptions remains secure behind its majority support in the House, and accordingly is little moved by criticism from across the aisle. When the government is confident that its policy is correct, it is indeed unlikely that threats or pleas from the opposition will cause the government to amend that policy. Criticism from backbenchers of the government party, on the other hand, commands special attention in spite of the much discussed party discipline in
议会已不复存在。这一指控是艾琳·沃德夫人(Dame Irene Ward)在下议院愤怒地提出的,它体现了近年来政治家和学者对英国立法机构角色的担忧。这个问题绝不仅限于英国,如果立法者不能在代议制民主的决策过程中做出有意义的贡献,如果他们不能检查和修改行政部门的决定,那么现有的政治安排显然与代议制政府的概念不一致。英国人对这个问题尤其敏感。许多作家声称,英国的代表议院下院(House of Commons)只以最次要的方式参与了规则制定过程。这些批评人士认为,稳定的两党制的发展,能够使下议院获得纪律严明的多数席位,导致了一种内阁统治的政府体制,其决策权在很大程度上不受制约。在这些批评者看来,后座议员,即既不属于建制派也不属于反对派影子政府的国会成员,已经失去了存在的理由。事实上,后座议员们被比作一群没有头脑的绵羊,只要众议院要求对某些问题进行投票,他们就会被例行公事地赶着穿过各区的游说大厅本文的目的是表明,尽管在下议院反对党后座议员的有效性可能存在一些问题,但政府后座议员对政府政策的影响比大多数观察家似乎愿意承认的要大。按照传统,反对派成员被授予政府批评者的角色,但来自反对派的批评和压力是家常便饭,政府认为这只是议会游戏中的必要组成部分。这一点尤其正确,因为无论反对党在一个问题上的情绪多么强烈,都无法改变这样一个事实:除了极少数例外,政府在众议院的多数支持下仍然是安全的,因此对来自两党的批评几乎无动于衷。当政府确信其政策是正确的时候,反对派的威胁或请求确实不太可能导致政府修改该政策。另一方面,来自执政党后座议员的批评值得特别关注,尽管该党在党纪问题上讨论了很多