{"title":"Judicial decision making and biological fact: Roe v. Wade and the unresolved question of fetal viability.","authors":"R. Blank","doi":"10.2307/448475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2307/448475","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"37 4 1","pages":"584-602"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1984-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2307/448475","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68765861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500402
W. Welch
-M W fANY MEMBERS of the press and the public apparently believe that interest groups "buy" influence by contributing to political campaigns. This belief has been cited as reason for Congress either publicly to finance congressional campaigns or to place a limit on the amount of monies that a candidate may receive from political action committees. In spite of this public discussion, few scholars have investigated systematically whether campaign contributions directly affect public policy or, more specifically, whether the likelihood that a legislator will vote for a bill favored by an interest group increases upon receiving a contribution from the group. Empirical research on legislative voting can be categorized into two groups. The first group of studies has investigated the relationship between dimensions of voting (e.g. composites of votes on several issues) and measures of general district opinion such as referendum results (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Erickson, 1978; Kuklinski, 1977, 1978; Kuklinski and McCrone, 1980; and Markus, 1974). The second group has focused on the relationship between a congressman's vote on specific bills and the opinions (or self-interest) of sections of his constituency (Bernstein and Anthony, 1974; Danielson and Rubin, 1977; Kau and Rubin, 1978, 1979; and Abrams, 1977). Opinion is usually measured by socioeconomic characteristics. To elaborate on Kuklinski's (1979) criticism, the presumption is that legislative voting is influenced by constituents' opinions but socioeconomic characteristics are no more than proxy variables for such opinions. Most of those used are poor proxies because a priori it is not clear which of many characteristics will predict voting and because the ability of a characteristic to predict voting presumably varies over issues. To be an adequate proxy, a socioeconomic characteristic must be sufficiently refined so that it is related to opinion on a specific bill. In the case of a vote on a specific piece of legislation, the size of a group for whom the issue is salient may be a convincing measure of its influence; and the more precisely the group is defined, the better the variable as a proxy. For instance, in this study dairy industry characteristics arguably are better measures of opinion on dairy price supports than general district characteristics such as percentage of the population which is rural. Furthermore, dairy industry characteristics presumably are poor measures of the relevant dimensions of district opinion on issues such as civil rights. For issues involving specific subgroups of votes, the relationship between a proxy variable and voting is not necessarily a black box. However, district level measures of
新闻界和公众成员显然相信利益集团通过参与政治活动来“购买”影响力。这种信念被引用为国会公开资助国会竞选或限制候选人从政治行动委员会获得的资金数额的理由。尽管有这样的公开讨论，但很少有学者系统地调查竞选捐款是否直接影响公共政策，或者更具体地说，立法者在收到利益集团的捐款后，是否会增加投票支持利益集团支持的法案的可能性。立法机关投票的实证研究可以分为两类。第一组研究调查了投票的维度(例如，对几个问题的投票的组合)和一般地区意见的衡量，如公民投票结果之间的关系(Miller和Stokes, 1963;埃里克森,1978;库克林斯基，1977,1978;Kuklinski and McCrone, 1980;Markus, 1974)。第二组关注国会议员对特定法案的投票与其选区部分意见(或自身利益)之间的关系(Bernstein and Anthony, 1974;Danielson和Rubin, 1977;Kau and Rubin, 1978, 1979;艾布拉姆斯，1977)。舆论通常以社会经济特征来衡量。为了详细说明Kuklinski(1979)的批评，假设立法投票受到选民意见的影响，但社会经济特征只不过是这种意见的代理变量。所使用的大多数都是很差的代理，因为先验地不清楚许多特征中的哪一个可以预测投票，而且因为一个特征预测投票的能力可能会因问题而异。要成为一个适当的代理，社会经济特征必须充分细化，使其与对具体法案的意见相关。在对一项具体立法进行投票的情况下，对该问题具有重要意义的群体的规模可能是衡量其影响力的一个令人信服的指标;群体定义得越精确，这个变量就越适合作为代理。例如，在这项研究中，乳制品行业的特征可以说是更好的衡量乳品价格支持的意见比一般地区的特征，如农村人口的百分比。此外，乳制品行业的特征可能是对公民权利等问题的地区意见的相关维度的不良衡量。对于涉及特定投票子组的问题，代理变量和投票之间的关系不一定是黑盒。然而，地区层面的措施
{"title":"Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports","authors":"W. Welch","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500402","url":null,"abstract":"-M W fANY MEMBERS of the press and the public apparently believe that interest groups \"buy\" influence by contributing to political campaigns. This belief has been cited as reason for Congress either publicly to finance congressional campaigns or to place a limit on the amount of monies that a candidate may receive from political action committees. In spite of this public discussion, few scholars have investigated systematically whether campaign contributions directly affect public policy or, more specifically, whether the likelihood that a legislator will vote for a bill favored by an interest group increases upon receiving a contribution from the group. Empirical research on legislative voting can be categorized into two groups. The first group of studies has investigated the relationship between dimensions of voting (e.g. composites of votes on several issues) and measures of general district opinion such as referendum results (Miller and Stokes, 1963; Erickson, 1978; Kuklinski, 1977, 1978; Kuklinski and McCrone, 1980; and Markus, 1974). The second group has focused on the relationship between a congressman's vote on specific bills and the opinions (or self-interest) of sections of his constituency (Bernstein and Anthony, 1974; Danielson and Rubin, 1977; Kau and Rubin, 1978, 1979; and Abrams, 1977). Opinion is usually measured by socioeconomic characteristics. To elaborate on Kuklinski's (1979) criticism, the presumption is that legislative voting is influenced by constituents' opinions but socioeconomic characteristics are no more than proxy variables for such opinions. Most of those used are poor proxies because a priori it is not clear which of many characteristics will predict voting and because the ability of a characteristic to predict voting presumably varies over issues. To be an adequate proxy, a socioeconomic characteristic must be sufficiently refined so that it is related to opinion on a specific bill. In the case of a vote on a specific piece of legislation, the size of a group for whom the issue is salient may be a convincing measure of its influence; and the more precisely the group is defined, the better the variable as a proxy. For instance, in this study dairy industry characteristics arguably are better measures of opinion on dairy price supports than general district characteristics such as percentage of the population which is rural. Furthermore, dairy industry characteristics presumably are poor measures of the relevant dimensions of district opinion on issues such as civil rights. For issues involving specific subgroups of votes, the relationship between a proxy variable and voting is not necessarily a black box. However, district level measures of","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"13 1","pages":"478 - 495"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86853668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500405
W. Stone
HE PRESIDENTIAL nomination process in the United States underwent a decade of reform prior to the 1980 presidential election. JL Increased numbers of primaries, reforms of the caucus and convention rules, and extensive media coverage of nomination fights tended to draw into the process large numbers of participants who otherwise would not have been involved. Many analysts have suggested that the reforms have also
{"title":"Party, Ideology, and the Lure of Victory: Iowa Activists in the 1980 Prenomination Campaign","authors":"W. Stone","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500405","url":null,"abstract":"HE PRESIDENTIAL nomination process in the United States underwent a decade of reform prior to the 1980 presidential election. JL Increased numbers of primaries, reforms of the caucus and convention rules, and extensive media coverage of nomination fights tended to draw into the process large numbers of participants who otherwise would not have been involved. Many analysts have suggested that the reforms have also","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"7 1","pages":"527 - 538"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74615706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500412
Sherman Lewis
rather than in the military or economic considerations that sometimes motivate or justify arms sales. Accordingly, he gives detailed attention to the principal nations selling and buying arms and discusses the issue from a wide variety of individual national perspectives. What emerges from this presentation is a potentially very confusing story in which conventional arms transfers are related to East-West competition, to regional security concerns, to nonproliferation objectives, and to the demands of emerging nations for local and international prestige. Pierre puts all of these specific national policy considerations into a global perspective by beginning with a description of the dilemmas faced by all policymakers in any decision to buy or sell arms, and by concluding with a number of
{"title":"Book Reviews : Neighborhoods and Urban Development. By ANTHONY DOWNS. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981. Pp. 189. $22.95, $8.95 paper.) Representation and Urban Community. By ANDREW D. GLASSBERG. (London: Macmillan Press, 1981. Pp. 232. $19.50.)","authors":"Sherman Lewis","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500412","url":null,"abstract":"rather than in the military or economic considerations that sometimes motivate or justify arms sales. Accordingly, he gives detailed attention to the principal nations selling and buying arms and discusses the issue from a wide variety of individual national perspectives. What emerges from this presentation is a potentially very confusing story in which conventional arms transfers are related to East-West competition, to regional security concerns, to nonproliferation objectives, and to the demands of emerging nations for local and international prestige. Pierre puts all of these specific national policy considerations into a global perspective by beginning with a description of the dilemmas faced by all policymakers in any decision to buy or sell arms, and by concluding with a number of","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"64 1","pages":"614 - 617"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84585981","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500408
J. Ruhl
{"title":"Social Mobilization, Military Tradition and Current Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Testing Putnam's Major Conclusions","authors":"J. Ruhl","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500408","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"17 1","pages":"574 - 586"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82448900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500403
Stephen D. Shaffer
AN IMPORTANT concern in any polity is the extent to which citizens have a voice in public affairs. In representative democracies like America citizens have the opportunity to vote in free elections for public officials whom they most prefer for policy or other reasons. Yet many Americans do not exert the required initiative to register to vote. Barely half of the voting age population voted in the 1980 presidential election, and turnout for less important offices is even lower. Many have expressed the concern that certain types of individuals with specific policy preferences are less likely to vote, and that this may translate into the election of officials and the implementation of policies disapproved by these citizens or adverse to their interests. Pomper (1980: 179-205) after examining the history of race relations in the South especially argues that inability or failure to exercise the franchise can significantly harm the civil liberties and economic welfare of the uninvolved. Key (1961: 186) observes that the opinions of non-voters may have slight weight in the political process. Other studies also conclude that more politically active citizens influence public policy to be more consistent with their own policy preferences, which differ from the preferences of the inactive (Verba and Nie, 1972: 308). In this paper I examine the extent to which there are policy differences between voters and non-voters in presidential and midterm election years over a twenty-eight year time span.
{"title":"Policy Differences Between Voters and Non-Voters in American Elections","authors":"Stephen D. Shaffer","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500403","url":null,"abstract":"AN IMPORTANT concern in any polity is the extent to which citizens have a voice in public affairs. In representative democracies like America citizens have the opportunity to vote in free elections for public officials whom they most prefer for policy or other reasons. Yet many Americans do not exert the required initiative to register to vote. Barely half of the voting age population voted in the 1980 presidential election, and turnout for less important offices is even lower. Many have expressed the concern that certain types of individuals with specific policy preferences are less likely to vote, and that this may translate into the election of officials and the implementation of policies disapproved by these citizens or adverse to their interests. Pomper (1980: 179-205) after examining the history of race relations in the South especially argues that inability or failure to exercise the franchise can significantly harm the civil liberties and economic welfare of the uninvolved. Key (1961: 186) observes that the opinions of non-voters may have slight weight in the political process. Other studies also conclude that more politically active citizens influence public policy to be more consistent with their own policy preferences, which differ from the preferences of the inactive (Verba and Nie, 1972: 308). In this paper I examine the extent to which there are policy differences between voters and non-voters in presidential and midterm election years over a twenty-eight year time span.","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"33 1","pages":"496 - 510"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79035697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500407
Robert H. Dix
5Y rEARS of scholarly concern with the conditions of democracy have been followed rather belatedly by recent attention on the part of students of comparative politics to the clearly related, though hardly identical, question of the breakdown of democratic regimes. Similarly, most students of military governments, and of authoritarian regimes generally, have been far more interested in the reasons for military intervention in politics than in the causes or process of the demise of authoritarianism. Only lately has this begun to change. In recent years, for example, there have been a spate of scholarly analyses of Latin America's latest version of authoritarianism, the bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) regime.2 In the earlier writings concerning such regimes it was often at least implicitly treated as the new paradigm of Latin America's political future, following upon those earlier, failed paradigms of democracy and socialist revolution. That is, B-A regimes were presumed to be both the wave of the future and a semi-permanent condition, related as they were to Latin America's situation of international dependency and the supposed end of the import-substitution phase of economic development. More recent scholarship, however, has begun to question or qualify some of those formulations and to address such questions as the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of such regimes, as well as the causes and conditions of their possible demise.3 Nonetheless, there still has been remarkably little comparative attention paid to how and why authoritarian governments break down4 (apart, that is, from studies of certain particular cases). Can some general patterns be dis-
{"title":"The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes","authors":"Robert H. Dix","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500407","url":null,"abstract":"5Y rEARS of scholarly concern with the conditions of democracy have been followed rather belatedly by recent attention on the part of students of comparative politics to the clearly related, though hardly identical, question of the breakdown of democratic regimes. Similarly, most students of military governments, and of authoritarian regimes generally, have been far more interested in the reasons for military intervention in politics than in the causes or process of the demise of authoritarianism. Only lately has this begun to change. In recent years, for example, there have been a spate of scholarly analyses of Latin America's latest version of authoritarianism, the bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) regime.2 In the earlier writings concerning such regimes it was often at least implicitly treated as the new paradigm of Latin America's political future, following upon those earlier, failed paradigms of democracy and socialist revolution. That is, B-A regimes were presumed to be both the wave of the future and a semi-permanent condition, related as they were to Latin America's situation of international dependency and the supposed end of the import-substitution phase of economic development. More recent scholarship, however, has begun to question or qualify some of those formulations and to address such questions as the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of such regimes, as well as the causes and conditions of their possible demise.3 Nonetheless, there still has been remarkably little comparative attention paid to how and why authoritarian governments break down4 (apart, that is, from studies of certain particular cases). Can some general patterns be dis-","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"11 1","pages":"554 - 573"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90228787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500409
Richard Stoll
HE SECOND World War is often regarded as a watershed in world history. Observers have pointed to a number of changes in the global system that occurred after its conclusion: the emergence of bipolar system structure, along with new contenders for international leadership; the invention (and subsequent proliferation) of weapons of extreme power; and the explosion of new nation-states that has created a truly global system. But have these changes been accompanied by changes in behavior between nation states? This paper will investigate one aspect of interstate behaviormilitary conflict involving the major powers-and ascertain whether the time period 1946-1976 was marked by a sharp change in the amount of this conflict, as compared to the period 1816-1945.
{"title":"Major Power Interstate Conflict in the Post-World War II Era: an Increase, a Decrease, or No Change?","authors":"Richard Stoll","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500409","url":null,"abstract":"HE SECOND World War is often regarded as a watershed in world history. Observers have pointed to a number of changes in the global system that occurred after its conclusion: the emergence of bipolar system structure, along with new contenders for international leadership; the invention (and subsequent proliferation) of weapons of extreme power; and the explosion of new nation-states that has created a truly global system. But have these changes been accompanied by changes in behavior between nation states? This paper will investigate one aspect of interstate behaviormilitary conflict involving the major powers-and ascertain whether the time period 1946-1976 was marked by a sharp change in the amount of this conflict, as compared to the period 1816-1945.","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"57 1","pages":"587 - 605"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88194216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500404
Donald R. Gross
P 5 RACTITIONERS and political scientists alike have long recognized that legislative decisions are often determined by the strategic behavior of legislators and the procedures of a legislature. Almost every text on the American legislative process discusses how the voting order, the voting procedures, and other legislative procedures can affect the final nature of legislation. While offering insight into the importance of the voting process and the process of strategic behavior, much of the early writing on these topics was primarily descriptive. In recent years a new body of literature on voting processes and strategic behavior in legislatures has developed which is based upon social choice theory.' This literature has addressed a number of topics: coalition formation and stability, vote trading, and legislative procedures such as the voting process. That portion which deals with voting procedures primarily derives from the work of Black (1971) and Farquharson (1969). Black examined how any voting body would select a single proposal out of a series of alternatives for a given voting procedure. Farquharson demonstrated how, for the threevoter three-alternative case, the selection of one final alternative would depend upon the voting process, the voting order, and whether voters were employing sincere or sophisticated strategies. In a recent work, Miller (1977) used a graph-theoretic approach to extend Farquharson's analysis to the general case in which a voting decision must be reached out of a set of n proposals. While a number of legislative voting procedures have been discussed in the literature, such analyses have not taken into account one central characteristic of the American legislative process: bicameralism. The literature has emphasized that the so-called amendment procedure most closely approximates the voting procedure in American legislatures. Under the amendment procedure two proposals are paired for a majority vote, the defeated proposal is eliminated with the winning proposal now being paired against a third proposal. This process continues until one proposal remains. Since the votes are being taken in one chamber, the sincere and sophisticated outcomes as determined by Farquharson and Miller are dependent upon the legislators' preferences among the alternatives presented in the one chamber, the voting order, and the willingness of voters to vote strategically. Actions or anticipated actions outside of the chamber are assumed to have no impact upon the votes or outcome within the chamber.
{"title":"Bicameralism and the Theory of Voting","authors":"Donald R. Gross","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500404","url":null,"abstract":"P 5 RACTITIONERS and political scientists alike have long recognized that legislative decisions are often determined by the strategic behavior of legislators and the procedures of a legislature. Almost every text on the American legislative process discusses how the voting order, the voting procedures, and other legislative procedures can affect the final nature of legislation. While offering insight into the importance of the voting process and the process of strategic behavior, much of the early writing on these topics was primarily descriptive. In recent years a new body of literature on voting processes and strategic behavior in legislatures has developed which is based upon social choice theory.' This literature has addressed a number of topics: coalition formation and stability, vote trading, and legislative procedures such as the voting process. That portion which deals with voting procedures primarily derives from the work of Black (1971) and Farquharson (1969). Black examined how any voting body would select a single proposal out of a series of alternatives for a given voting procedure. Farquharson demonstrated how, for the threevoter three-alternative case, the selection of one final alternative would depend upon the voting process, the voting order, and whether voters were employing sincere or sophisticated strategies. In a recent work, Miller (1977) used a graph-theoretic approach to extend Farquharson's analysis to the general case in which a voting decision must be reached out of a set of n proposals. While a number of legislative voting procedures have been discussed in the literature, such analyses have not taken into account one central characteristic of the American legislative process: bicameralism. The literature has emphasized that the so-called amendment procedure most closely approximates the voting procedure in American legislatures. Under the amendment procedure two proposals are paired for a majority vote, the defeated proposal is eliminated with the winning proposal now being paired against a third proposal. This process continues until one proposal remains. Since the votes are being taken in one chamber, the sincere and sophisticated outcomes as determined by Farquharson and Miller are dependent upon the legislators' preferences among the alternatives presented in the one chamber, the voting order, and the willingness of voters to vote strategically. Actions or anticipated actions outside of the chamber are assumed to have no impact upon the votes or outcome within the chamber.","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"56 1","pages":"511 - 526"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73097955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1982-12-01DOI: 10.1177/106591298203500401
S. Patterson
HE AMERICAN governorship is a political prize of major importance. Governors are more salient to the citizens of their states than any other political figure save the President. Nominating battles occur more often for candidacies for governor than for other offices, even when incumbents are running for reelection. In general, gubernatorial elections are more competitive than other contests, and this has become increasingly true in the past two decades. In one way or another, governors are the principal leaders of their state political party. Moreover, governors face a wider array of public policy problems than ever before, as the governing role of the states has grown. Commensurately, the national standing of governors has magnified, witnessed by the 1980 presidential contest between former governors Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.l Yet gubernatorial nominations, campaigns, and elections have not been investigated very extensively. Accordingly, the outcomes of gubernatorial elections appear as an alloy of the routine and the idiosyncratic. Systematic investigation of state election outcomes at the aggregate level has centered around three major influences-the effect of partisan strength, the incumbency effect, and the impact of the campaign. Measures of partisan strength aim to capture the baseline support which candidates can expect to receive because of the predisposition of voters to confirm their partisan attachments in the choices they make in the polling booth. Estimates of the "normal vote" for a party indicate what its proportion of the vote would be if the long-term effect of party identification were the only influence on the electoral outcome.2 Aggregate indicators of partisan strength serve as approximations of the normal party vote. Incumbent candidates in an election have an advantage over their challengers both because incumbent status may give them greater visibility to voters, and because the political resources at their command may allow them to conduct more extensive campaigns.3 Thus, incumbency may serve as a positive cue which voters use to make their electoral choices. Moreover, incumbents may be able to amass disproportionately large campaign war chests in order to widen and deepen their reelection efforts. Nevertheless, the
{"title":"Campaign Spending in Contests for Governor","authors":"S. Patterson","doi":"10.1177/106591298203500401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298203500401","url":null,"abstract":"HE AMERICAN governorship is a political prize of major importance. Governors are more salient to the citizens of their states than any other political figure save the President. Nominating battles occur more often for candidacies for governor than for other offices, even when incumbents are running for reelection. In general, gubernatorial elections are more competitive than other contests, and this has become increasingly true in the past two decades. In one way or another, governors are the principal leaders of their state political party. Moreover, governors face a wider array of public policy problems than ever before, as the governing role of the states has grown. Commensurately, the national standing of governors has magnified, witnessed by the 1980 presidential contest between former governors Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.l Yet gubernatorial nominations, campaigns, and elections have not been investigated very extensively. Accordingly, the outcomes of gubernatorial elections appear as an alloy of the routine and the idiosyncratic. Systematic investigation of state election outcomes at the aggregate level has centered around three major influences-the effect of partisan strength, the incumbency effect, and the impact of the campaign. Measures of partisan strength aim to capture the baseline support which candidates can expect to receive because of the predisposition of voters to confirm their partisan attachments in the choices they make in the polling booth. Estimates of the \"normal vote\" for a party indicate what its proportion of the vote would be if the long-term effect of party identification were the only influence on the electoral outcome.2 Aggregate indicators of partisan strength serve as approximations of the normal party vote. Incumbent candidates in an election have an advantage over their challengers both because incumbent status may give them greater visibility to voters, and because the political resources at their command may allow them to conduct more extensive campaigns.3 Thus, incumbency may serve as a positive cue which voters use to make their electoral choices. Moreover, incumbents may be able to amass disproportionately large campaign war chests in order to widen and deepen their reelection efforts. Nevertheless, the","PeriodicalId":83314,"journal":{"name":"The Western political quarterly","volume":"337 1","pages":"457 - 477"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1982-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75932025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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