{"title":"The fallacy of cookie cutter asset allocation: some evidence from “New York’s College Savings Program”","authors":"John J. Spitzer, Sandeep Singh","doi":"10.1016/S1057-0810(01)00079-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this paper, we establish why “prefabricated” asset allocation schemes mandated by some education savings programs might be suboptimal. Then, using the New York’s College Savings Program as an example, we simulate and then compare end of period wealth accumulated in both a tax preferred but regimented asset allocation plan, and in a nontax protected plan.</p><p>We find, first, that the longer the child participates in the plan, the greater the benefit. Second, participants in higher tax brackets derive greater benefits; adherence to prespecified asset allocation for low tax bracket investors often results in return loss that overshadows the tax benefit.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":100530,"journal":{"name":"Financial Services Review","volume":"10 1","pages":"Pages 101-116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2001-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/S1057-0810(01)00079-8","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Financial Services Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057081001000798","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
In this paper, we establish why “prefabricated” asset allocation schemes mandated by some education savings programs might be suboptimal. Then, using the New York’s College Savings Program as an example, we simulate and then compare end of period wealth accumulated in both a tax preferred but regimented asset allocation plan, and in a nontax protected plan.
We find, first, that the longer the child participates in the plan, the greater the benefit. Second, participants in higher tax brackets derive greater benefits; adherence to prespecified asset allocation for low tax bracket investors often results in return loss that overshadows the tax benefit.
在本文中,我们建立了为什么一些教育储蓄计划强制要求的“预制”资产配置方案可能是次优的。然后,以纽约大学储蓄计划(New York’s College Savings Program)为例,我们模拟并比较了在税收优惠但受到监管的资产配置计划和非税收保护计划中积累的期末财富。我们发现,首先,孩子参加计划的时间越长,受益越大。其次,税率越高的参与者获得的好处越大;对于低税率投资者来说,坚持预先规定的资产配置往往会导致回报损失,而这掩盖了税收利益。