Cloning Physically Unclonable Functions

Clemens Helfmeier, C. Boit, Dmitry Nedospasov, Jean-Pierre Seifert
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引用次数: 261

Abstract

As system security demands continue to evolve, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising solution for secure storage on Integrated Circuits (ICs). SRAM PUFs are among the most popular types of PUFs, since they require no additional circuitry and can be implemented with on-die memories such as caches and data memory that are readily available on both ASICs and FPGAs. This work demonstrates that SRAM PUFs are not well suited as PUFs, as they do not meet several requirements that constitute an ideal PUF. The compact nature of SRAM, standard interconnects and resiliency to environmental effects make SRAM PUFs particularly easy to clone. We consider several ways in which SRAM PUFs can be characterized and demonstrate a Focused Ion Beam circuit edit with which we were able to produce a physical clone of our Proof-of-Concept SRAM PUF implementation. As a result of the circuit edit, when challenged, the physical clone produced an identical physical response to the original device. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work in which a physical clone of a Physically Unclonable Function was produced.
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克隆物理上不可克隆的功能
随着系统安全需求的不断发展,物理不可克隆功能(puf)是集成电路(ic)上安全存储的一个很有前途的解决方案。SRAM puf是最受欢迎的puf类型之一,因为它们不需要额外的电路,并且可以使用芯片上的存储器(如缓存和数据存储器)来实现,这些存储器在asic和fpga上都很容易获得。这项工作表明SRAM PUF不适合作为PUF,因为它们不满足构成理想PUF的几个要求。SRAM的紧凑性质,标准互连和对环境影响的弹性使SRAM puf特别容易克隆。我们考虑了几种可以表征SRAM PUF的方法,并演示了一个聚焦离子束电路编辑器,通过该编辑器,我们能够生成我们的概念验证SRAM PUF实现的物理克隆。作为电路编辑的结果,当受到挑战时,物理克隆产生与原始设备相同的物理响应。据我们所知,这是第一次对物理上不可克隆的功能进行物理克隆的工作。
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