{"title":"The Economics of Personalization in Prevention and Public Health","authors":"D. Kenkel, Hua Wang","doi":"10.1515/fhep-2013-0011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Personalized prevention uses family history and predictive genetic testing to identify people at high risk of serious diseases. The availability of predictive genetic tests is a newer and still-developing phenomenon. Many observers see tremendous potential for personalized prevention to improve public health. At the same time, the emergence of these new markets raises familiar health policy concerns about costs, cost-effectiveness, and health disparities. This paper first discusses an economic framework for the analysis of personalized prevention. On the demand side, consumers use personalized prevention as a form of information that allows them to make better choices about prevention, including medical care and health behaviors like diet and exercise. On the supply side, an interplay of complex market forces and regulations will determine the prices, advertising, and insurance coverage of predictive genetic tests. Beyond the question of whether health insurance will cover the costs of predictive genetic tests, there is a great deal of concern about whether consumers’ use of genetic tests might place them at risk of genetic discrimination or might lead to adverse selection. The paper also reports descriptive analysis of data from the 2000, 2005, and 2010 National Health Interview Surveys on the use of predictive genetic tests. The empirical analysis documents large socioeconomic status-related disparities in consumers having heard of genetic tests: for example, consumers with less schooling, Blacks, and Hispanics were substantially less likely to have heard of genetic tests. Evidence from other empirical studies provides little evidence that genetic testing leads to genetic discrimination in insurance markets. There is more evidence suggesting adverse selection, where genetic testing leads consumers to purchase long-term care insurance. The paper concludes with some preliminary thoughts about important directions for future research. The goal of the paper is to review relevant research to help develop an economic approach and social science research agenda into the determinants and consequences of genetic tests for prevention.","PeriodicalId":38039,"journal":{"name":"Forum for Health Economics and Policy","volume":"75 1","pages":"S53 - S71"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Forum for Health Economics and Policy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/fhep-2013-0011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
Abstract Personalized prevention uses family history and predictive genetic testing to identify people at high risk of serious diseases. The availability of predictive genetic tests is a newer and still-developing phenomenon. Many observers see tremendous potential for personalized prevention to improve public health. At the same time, the emergence of these new markets raises familiar health policy concerns about costs, cost-effectiveness, and health disparities. This paper first discusses an economic framework for the analysis of personalized prevention. On the demand side, consumers use personalized prevention as a form of information that allows them to make better choices about prevention, including medical care and health behaviors like diet and exercise. On the supply side, an interplay of complex market forces and regulations will determine the prices, advertising, and insurance coverage of predictive genetic tests. Beyond the question of whether health insurance will cover the costs of predictive genetic tests, there is a great deal of concern about whether consumers’ use of genetic tests might place them at risk of genetic discrimination or might lead to adverse selection. The paper also reports descriptive analysis of data from the 2000, 2005, and 2010 National Health Interview Surveys on the use of predictive genetic tests. The empirical analysis documents large socioeconomic status-related disparities in consumers having heard of genetic tests: for example, consumers with less schooling, Blacks, and Hispanics were substantially less likely to have heard of genetic tests. Evidence from other empirical studies provides little evidence that genetic testing leads to genetic discrimination in insurance markets. There is more evidence suggesting adverse selection, where genetic testing leads consumers to purchase long-term care insurance. The paper concludes with some preliminary thoughts about important directions for future research. The goal of the paper is to review relevant research to help develop an economic approach and social science research agenda into the determinants and consequences of genetic tests for prevention.
期刊介绍:
Forum for Health Economics & Policy (FHEP) showcases articles in key substantive areas that lie at the intersection of health economics and health policy. The journal uses an innovative structure of forums to promote discourse on the most pressing and timely subjects in health economics and health policy, such as biomedical research and the economy, and aging and medical care costs. Forums are chosen by the Editorial Board to reflect topics where additional research is needed by economists and where the field is advancing rapidly. The journal is edited by Katherine Baicker, David Cutler and Alan Garber of Harvard University, Jay Bhattacharya of Stanford University, Dana Goldman of the University of Southern California and RAND Corporation, Neeraj Sood of the University of Southern California, Anup Malani and Tomas Philipson of University of Chicago, Pinar Karaca Mandic of the University of Minnesota, and John Romley of the University of Southern California. FHEP is sponsored by the Schaeffer Center for Health Policy and Economics at the University of Southern California. A subscription to the journal also includes the proceedings from the National Bureau of Economic Research''s annual Frontiers in Health Policy Research Conference. Topics: Economics, Political economics, Biomedical research and the economy, Aging and medical care costs, Nursing, Cancer studies, Medical treatment, Others related.