Mandatory Innovation Disclosure Increases Crash Risk: Evidence from the American Inventor’s Protection Act

Kose John, Xiaoran Ni, Chi Zhang
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Abstract

Employing the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) that mandates, all patent applications are to be published within 18 months after filing, as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that accelerated patent disclosure increases stock price crash risk. This effect is stronger when treated firms are technologically closer to their rival firms and more concerned about proprietary costs. Further analysis indicates that, following the AIPA, managers shift towards less timely and fewer bad news disclosures. Overall, we document that regulatory mandates of earlier disclosure of patents induce managers to strategically withhold negative information unrelated to patents, leading to increased crash risk in the stock market.
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强制性创新披露增加崩溃风险:来自美国发明家保护法的证据
采用美国发明人保护法(AIPA)规定,所有专利申请必须在提交后18个月内公布,作为准自然实验,我们发现加速的专利披露增加了股价崩溃的风险。当被治疗的公司在技术上与竞争对手更接近,并且更关心专利成本时,这种效应会更强。进一步的分析表明,在AIPA之后,管理者转向更不及时和更少的坏消息披露。总体而言,我们的研究证明,提前披露专利的监管要求促使管理者战略性地隐瞒与专利无关的负面信息,从而导致股市崩盘风险增加。
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