This paper discusses sustainability accounting. Sustainability accounting is the contribution of accounting to sustainable development. Sustainability accounting has grown in importance in many countries. This paper highlights the motivation for sustainability accounting, the definition of sustainability accounting, the objectives of sustainability accounting and the tools of sustainability accounting. Some directions for further research are offered.
{"title":"Sustainability Accounting","authors":"Peterson K. Ozili","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3803384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3803384","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses sustainability accounting. Sustainability accounting is the contribution of accounting to sustainable development. Sustainability accounting has grown in importance in many countries. This paper highlights the motivation for sustainability accounting, the definition of sustainability accounting, the objectives of sustainability accounting and the tools of sustainability accounting. Some directions for further research are offered.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83008618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peer restatements are an ambiguous signal for investors following non-restating firms in the same industry. The literature, however, consistently documents that non-restating firms experience negative returns when a peer restates, on average. Based on a simple single agent model, we predict that prior insider trading activity provides information that investors use to condition their response to a peer-firm restatement. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the negative returns for non-restating firms are mitigated when insiders have been buying and amplified when insiders have been selling. The effect varies cross-sectionally with more weight being placed on prior insider trading activities when non-restating firms have higher information uncertainty, lower costs of biased reporting, or operate in less-concentrated industries. Finally, we report evidence that recent insider trades prior to a peer restatement help investors correctly interpret implications of the peer restatement for future outcomes of the non-restating firm.
{"title":"Does Insider Trading Activity Separate Winners and Losers when a Peer Firm Restates?","authors":"Terrence Blackburne, Asher Curtis, Anna Rossi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2846132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2846132","url":null,"abstract":"Peer restatements are an ambiguous signal for investors following non-restating firms in the same industry. The literature, however, consistently documents that non-restating firms experience negative returns when a peer restates, on average. Based on a simple single agent model, we predict that prior insider trading activity provides information that investors use to condition their response to a peer-firm restatement. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the negative returns for non-restating firms are mitigated when insiders have been buying and amplified when insiders have been selling. The effect varies cross-sectionally with more weight being placed on prior insider trading activities when non-restating firms have higher information uncertainty, lower costs of biased reporting, or operate in less-concentrated industries. Finally, we report evidence that recent insider trades prior to a peer restatement help investors correctly interpret implications of the peer restatement for future outcomes of the non-restating firm.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"71 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82672180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vincent J. Intintoli, Kathleen M. Kahle, Wanli Zhao
We explore the effect of director connectedness on firms’ investment and financing activities. Evidence suggests that well-connected directors are more effective advisors, with outside and inside directors often playing different roles. Outside directors have better information regarding external factors such as industry trends, which are important when evaluating investment decisions. During competition shocks, well-connected outside directors have greater influence on investment decisions than inside directors. Outside director connectedness also has a more pronounced effect on a firm’s R&D outcome than inside director connectedness. Connected inside and outside directors have similar positive impacts on the market reaction to acquisition activity, indicating that all well-connected directors are associated with mergers that are perceived to be more valuable. However, well-connected inside directors play a larger role in lowering financing costs when information asymmetry is high.
{"title":"Director Connectedness and Advising Quality: The Role of Inside and Outside Directors","authors":"Vincent J. Intintoli, Kathleen M. Kahle, Wanli Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3270299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3270299","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the effect of director connectedness on firms’ investment and financing activities. Evidence suggests that well-connected directors are more effective advisors, with outside and inside directors often playing different roles. Outside directors have better information regarding external factors such as industry trends, which are important when evaluating investment decisions. During competition shocks, well-connected outside directors have greater influence on investment decisions than inside directors. Outside director connectedness also has a more pronounced effect on a firm’s R&D outcome than inside director connectedness. Connected inside and outside directors have similar positive impacts on the market reaction to acquisition activity, indicating that all well-connected directors are associated with mergers that are perceived to be more valuable. However, well-connected inside directors play a larger role in lowering financing costs when information asymmetry is high.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78500339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate whether managers choose the tone of non-financial information disclosure strategically based on performance, and what their motivations are. We use 14,400 firm-year MD&As of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2019. The results show that there is tone asymmetry in the Chinese capital market and Chinese managers prefer to highlight good news and downplay bad news. We also find that such tone asymmetry is more pronounced when firm performance successively increases or decreases. Our evidence suggests that neglecting bad news is due to managers’ opportunistic decisions for reputation management. Also, different from prior studies, our findings suggest that in the Chinese capital market the asymmetric tone management is not related to managerial overconfidence.
{"title":"Why do Managers Manage the Tone? Evidence from China","authors":"Si-Bei Yan, Iny Hwang, Jun Wan, Hyung-Rok Jung","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3946241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3946241","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate whether managers choose the tone of non-financial information disclosure strategically based on performance, and what their motivations are. We use 14,400 firm-year MD&As of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2019. The results show that there is tone asymmetry in the Chinese capital market and Chinese managers prefer to highlight good news and downplay bad news. We also find that such tone asymmetry is more pronounced when firm performance successively increases or decreases. Our evidence suggests that neglecting bad news is due to managers’ opportunistic decisions for reputation management. Also, different from prior studies, our findings suggest that in the Chinese capital market the asymmetric tone management is not related to managerial overconfidence.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"132 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85741314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a highly influential analysis, Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011), LMZ henceforth, report that statistically significant relations between a firm’s choice of a Big N auditor and three audit quality metrics (discretionary accruals, cost equity capital, and analyst forecast accuracy) turn “insignificant” after application of matching (propensity score and size) designs. LMZ, however, in interpreting these outcomes mistakenly identify the difference between statistically significant and statistically insignificant as significant (Gelman and Stern, 2006). This analysis re-examines the LMZ evidence descriptively. It finds that little descriptive support exists in the LMZ evidence for conclusive assertions regarding the “insignificance” of audit quality proxy level differences between Big N and non-Big N auditors. Nor does its evidence provide a reliable basis for thinking that propensity score matching based assessment of these differences produces substantially closer to zero inferences about them relative to inferences obtained from existent (inclusive of LMZ provided estimates) conventional non-matching design based multiple regression assessments. Indeed, the LMZ evidence is most appropriately interpreted as providing broad robustness support for the insights provided by such models.
{"title":"The 'Big N' Audit Quality Kerfuffle","authors":"William M. Cready","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3511585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3511585","url":null,"abstract":"In a highly influential analysis, Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang (2011), LMZ henceforth, report that statistically significant relations between a firm’s choice of a Big N auditor and three audit quality metrics (discretionary accruals, cost equity capital, and analyst forecast accuracy) turn “insignificant” after application of matching (propensity score and size) designs. LMZ,<br>however, in interpreting these outcomes mistakenly identify the difference between statistically significant and statistically insignificant as significant (Gelman and Stern, 2006). This analysis re-examines the LMZ evidence descriptively. It finds that little descriptive support exists in the LMZ evidence for conclusive assertions regarding the “insignificance” of audit quality proxy level differences between Big N and non-Big N auditors. Nor does its evidence provide a reliable basis for thinking that propensity score matching based assessment of these differences produces substantially closer to zero inferences about them relative to inferences obtained from existent (inclusive of LMZ provided estimates) conventional non-matching design based multiple<br>regression assessments. Indeed, the LMZ evidence is most appropriately interpreted as providing broad robustness support for the insights provided by such models.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88579693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Open-book accounting is a practice to disclose the full cost structure of suppliers to customers to achieve cost efficiency in supply chains. However, the dominant market power of customers could interfere with this goal in practice. Using unique data on the suppliers of large Korean business groups, we find that open-book accounting is associated with profit rate regulation by customers. Suppliers’ price growth is capped despite the increase in supplied goods. Profit rates of suppliers significantly co-move in times of low average profitability. Using an exogenous regulatory reform that outlawed coercive open-book accounting, we find the tendencies significantly reversed post-reform.
{"title":"Control Beyond Ownership: Open-Book Accounting in Unbalanced Supply Chain Networks","authors":"Woojin Kim, Jongsub Lee, Yunxiao Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3939291","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3939291","url":null,"abstract":"Open-book accounting is a practice to disclose the full cost structure of suppliers to customers to achieve cost efficiency in supply chains. However, the dominant market power of customers could interfere with this goal in practice. Using unique data on the suppliers of large Korean business groups, we find that open-book accounting is associated with profit rate regulation by customers. Suppliers’ price growth is capped despite the increase in supplied goods. Profit rates of suppliers significantly co-move in times of low average profitability. Using an exogenous regulatory reform that outlawed coercive open-book accounting, we find the tendencies significantly reversed post-reform.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75808526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide evidence that the documented weakening of the accrual-cash flow association results not from a loss of accrual accounting usefulness per se, but from the deviation from accrual accounting as it relates to intangible investments. More specifically, the weakening of the negative association is driven by the combined effects of (1) increasing intangible investments, (2) the practice of expensing rather than capitalizing intangible investments, and (3) scaling accruals and cash flows by book value of assets, which are understated for intangible-intensive firms. Treating intangible expenditures as capitalized investments and scaling accruals and cash flows by market value of equity, which reflects the value of intangible investments, (1) substantially strengthens the negative association between accruals and cash flows and (2) practically eliminates the apparent weakening trend in the association.
{"title":"Intangible investments, scaling, and the trend in the accrual-cash flow association","authors":"Jeremiah Green, Henock Louis, J. Sani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3940735","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3940735","url":null,"abstract":"We provide evidence that the documented weakening of the accrual-cash flow association results not from a loss of accrual accounting usefulness per se, but from the deviation from accrual accounting as it relates to intangible investments. More specifically, the weakening of the negative association is driven by the combined effects of (1) increasing intangible investments, (2) the practice of expensing rather than capitalizing intangible investments, and (3) scaling accruals and cash flows by book value of assets, which are understated for intangible-intensive firms. Treating intangible expenditures as capitalized investments and scaling accruals and cash flows by market value of equity, which reflects the value of intangible investments, (1) substantially strengthens the negative association between accruals and cash flows and (2) practically eliminates the apparent weakening trend in the association.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"23 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72617040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Employing the SEC Tick Size Pilot Program that increases the minimum trading unit of a set of randomly selected small-capitalization stocks, we examine whether and how an exogenous change in stock liquidity affects corporate voluntary disclosure. Using difference-in-differences analyses with firm fixed effects, we find that treatment firms respond to the liquidity decline by issuing fewer management earnings forecasts, while in contrast, control firms do not exhibit a significant change. Next, we show that the effect is more pronounced when firms experience more severe liquidity decreases during the TSPP and rule out a set of alternative explanations. Further strengthening the identification, we find a consistent reversal effect after the end of the pilot program. To generalize our findings, we use voluntary 8-K filings and conference calls as alternative voluntary disclosure proxies and find similar effects. Overall, these findings show how an exogenous change in stock liquidity shapes the corporate information environment.
{"title":"Does Stock Liquidity Shape Voluntary Disclosure? Evidence from the SEC Tick Size Pilot Program","authors":"Ole‐Kristian Hope, Junhao Liu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3938232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3938232","url":null,"abstract":"Employing the SEC Tick Size Pilot Program that increases the minimum trading unit of a set of randomly selected small-capitalization stocks, we examine whether and how an exogenous change in stock liquidity affects corporate voluntary disclosure. Using difference-in-differences analyses with firm fixed effects, we find that treatment firms respond to the liquidity decline by issuing fewer management earnings forecasts, while in contrast, control firms do not exhibit a significant change. Next, we show that the effect is more pronounced when firms experience more severe liquidity decreases during the TSPP and rule out a set of alternative explanations. Further strengthening the identification, we find a consistent reversal effect after the end of the pilot program. To generalize our findings, we use voluntary 8-K filings and conference calls as alternative voluntary disclosure proxies and find similar effects. Overall, these findings show how an exogenous change in stock liquidity shapes the corporate information environment.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87735589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide a theoretical framework for reporting of firms' environmental and social impact (ESI). In our model the characteristics of a ESI report impact managerial efforts related to ESI, cash flows, stock prices, and greenwashing. In particular, we describe the implications of ESI report congruity, whether the report captures ESI inputs or outcomes, and the manager's tradeoffs regarding ESI efforts and reporting bias. Although stock price incentives tend to encourage ESI efforts and greenwashing simultaneously, ESI reports that capture ESI effects on cash flows tend to have a stronger price reactions than ESI reports that capture effects on ESI per se. ESI reports aligned with investors' aggregate preferences provide stronger incentives and lead to more positive outcomes than ESI reports that focus on either ESI or cash flow effects individually.
{"title":"A Theoretical Framework for Environmental and Social Impact Reporting","authors":"Henry L. Friedman, M. Heinle, Irina Maxime Luneva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3932689","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3932689","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a theoretical framework for reporting of firms' environmental and social impact (ESI). In our model the characteristics of a ESI report impact managerial efforts related to ESI, cash flows, stock prices, and greenwashing. In particular, we describe the implications of ESI report congruity, whether the report captures ESI inputs or outcomes, and the manager's tradeoffs regarding ESI efforts and reporting bias. Although stock price incentives tend to encourage ESI efforts and greenwashing simultaneously, ESI reports that capture ESI effects on cash flows tend to have a stronger price reactions than ESI reports that capture effects on ESI per se. ESI reports aligned with investors' aggregate preferences provide stronger incentives and lead to more positive outcomes than ESI reports that focus on either ESI or cash flow effects individually.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86784914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Employing the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) that mandates, all patent applications are to be published within 18 months after filing, as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that accelerated patent disclosure increases stock price crash risk. This effect is stronger when treated firms are technologically closer to their rival firms and more concerned about proprietary costs. Further analysis indicates that, following the AIPA, managers shift towards less timely and fewer bad news disclosures. Overall, we document that regulatory mandates of earlier disclosure of patents induce managers to strategically withhold negative information unrelated to patents, leading to increased crash risk in the stock market.
{"title":"Mandatory Innovation Disclosure Increases Crash Risk: Evidence from the American Inventor’s Protection Act","authors":"Kose John, Xiaoran Ni, Chi Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3813890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3813890","url":null,"abstract":"Employing the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) that mandates, all patent applications are to be published within 18 months after filing, as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that accelerated patent disclosure increases stock price crash risk. This effect is stronger when treated firms are technologically closer to their rival firms and more concerned about proprietary costs. Further analysis indicates that, following the AIPA, managers shift towards less timely and fewer bad news disclosures. Overall, we document that regulatory mandates of earlier disclosure of patents induce managers to strategically withhold negative information unrelated to patents, leading to increased crash risk in the stock market.","PeriodicalId":12319,"journal":{"name":"Financial Accounting eJournal","volume":"368 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80404633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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