The Impact of Juror Knowledge of Deductibility and Defendants’ Tax Rates on Punitive Damages Awards: Experimental Evidence

Bryan K. Church, Karie Davis-Nozemack, L. Dhooge, Shankar Venkataraman
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Abstract

The US Tax Code allows defendants to treat punitive damages as an ordinary and necessary business expense, thereby reducing their taxable income. Legal scholars posit that jurors are unaware that punitive damages are tax-deductible. Consequently, they claim that there is an under-punishment problem because defendants are penalized at lower damages amounts than they would be if jurors were instructed about tax-deductibility. We conduct an experiment to test this claim. We provide mock jurors with information about tax-deductibility as well as information about the defendant’s (historical) effective tax rate (ETR) to provide some context to jurors to adjust their awards, if they choose to. We find that jurors who are explicitly instructed that punitive damages are tax-deductible award higher damages, but only when the defendant’s ETR is low. When the defendant’s ETR is high, instructing jurors about tax-deductibility does not result in significantly higher punitive damages awards. This result is surprising because defendants with a high ETR are likely to benefit more from tax-deductibility compared to defendants with a low ETR. Our results suggests that jurors evaluate tax-deductibility jointly with other elements of a defendant’s tax situation when that information is provided. Therefore, jury instructions about tax-deductibility of punitive damages should carefully consider the implications of providing additional information about the defendant’s tax situation. Our result should be of interest to regulators and scholars in law, accounting, and public policy.
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陪审员对可扣除额和被告税率的了解对惩罚性损害赔偿裁决的影响:实验证据
美国税法允许被告将惩罚性损害赔偿视为普通和必要的业务费用,从而减少他们的应税收入。法律学者认为陪审员不知道惩罚性损害赔偿是可以免税的。因此,他们声称存在惩罚不足的问题,因为被告受到的损害赔偿金额低于陪审员被告知可免税的情况。我们进行了一项实验来验证这一说法。我们为模拟陪审员提供了有关税收减免的信息以及被告(历史)有效税率(ETR)的信息,以便为陪审员提供一些背景,以调整他们的裁决,如果他们选择的话。我们发现,被明确告知惩罚性损害赔偿是可免税的陪审员,只有在被告的ETR较低的情况下,才会判给较高的损害赔偿。当被告的ETR很高时,指导陪审员关于税收减免并不会导致惩罚性损害赔偿的显著增加。这一结果令人惊讶,因为与低ETR的被告相比,具有高ETR的被告可能从减税中获益更多。我们的研究结果表明,陪审员评估税收减免与被告的税务情况的其他要素时,该信息被提供。因此,陪审团关于惩罚性损害赔偿的可抵税性的指示应仔细考虑提供有关被告税务情况的额外信息的含义。我们的研究结果应该引起法律、会计和公共政策领域的监管者和学者的兴趣。
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