{"title":"The politics of police accountability: Police expulsions in Buenos Aires, Argentina","authors":"Hernán Flom","doi":"10.1111/gove.12779","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Police accountability has long been deemed an essential component of democratizing reform. Reformist administrations in Latin America and other developing regions have consequently created oversight agencies to monitor police misconduct. However, the literature has not yet explored how these institutions operate and the politics that undergird them. This paper examines how police accountability institutions work in developing democracies. I focus on the police of the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, using an untapped database of more than 6400 expelled police officers. I find that the extent to which reformist ministers expel police officers and thus exercise greater control of the police peaks during their first year in office. Contrarily, it is not bolstered by mid-term electoral victories or factors such as scandals or violent crimes. The paper extends our knowledge of the politics of police accountability in developing democracies, outlining the incentives and obstacles for politicians to control the police.</p>","PeriodicalId":48056,"journal":{"name":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","volume":"37 2","pages":"453-473"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Governance-An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/gove.12779","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Police accountability has long been deemed an essential component of democratizing reform. Reformist administrations in Latin America and other developing regions have consequently created oversight agencies to monitor police misconduct. However, the literature has not yet explored how these institutions operate and the politics that undergird them. This paper examines how police accountability institutions work in developing democracies. I focus on the police of the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, using an untapped database of more than 6400 expelled police officers. I find that the extent to which reformist ministers expel police officers and thus exercise greater control of the police peaks during their first year in office. Contrarily, it is not bolstered by mid-term electoral victories or factors such as scandals or violent crimes. The paper extends our knowledge of the politics of police accountability in developing democracies, outlining the incentives and obstacles for politicians to control the police.
期刊介绍：
Governance provides a forum for the theoretical and practical discussion of executive politics, public policy, administration, and the organization of the state. Published in association with International Political Science Association''s Research Committee on the Structure & Organization of Government (SOG), it emphasizes peer-reviewed articles that take an international or comparative approach to public policy and administration. All papers, regardless of empirical focus, should have wider theoretical, comparative, or practical significance.
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