Trading On-Chain: How Feasible is Regulators’ Worst-Case Scenario?

Mahsa Moosavi, Jeremy Clark
{"title":"Trading On-Chain: How Feasible is Regulators’ Worst-Case Scenario?","authors":"Mahsa Moosavi, Jeremy Clark","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3769340","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When consumers trade financial products, they typically use well-identified service providers that operate under government regulation. In theory, decentralized platforms like Ethereum can offer trading services ‘on-chain’ without an obvious entry point for regulators. Fortunately for regulators, most trading volume in blockchain-based assets is still on centralized service providers for performance reasons. However this leaves the following research questions we address in this paper: (i) is secure trading (i.e., resistant to front-running and price manipulation) even feasible as a fully ‘on-chain’ service on a public blockchain, (ii) what is its performance benchmark, and (iii) what is the performance impact of novel techniques (e.g., ‘rollups’) in closing the performance gap? To answer these questions, we ‘learn by doing’ and custom design an Ethereum-based call market (or batch auction) exchange, Lissy, with favorable security properties. We conduct a variety of optimizations and experiments to demonstrate that this technology cannot expect to exceed a few hundred trade executions per block (i.e., 13s window of time). However this can be scaled dramatically with off-chain execution that is not consumer-facing. We also illustrate, with numerous examples throughout the paper, how blockchain deployment is full of nuances that make it quite different from developing in better understood domains (e.g., cloud-based web applications).","PeriodicalId":11797,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","volume":"81 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Regulation (IO) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3769340","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

When consumers trade financial products, they typically use well-identified service providers that operate under government regulation. In theory, decentralized platforms like Ethereum can offer trading services ‘on-chain’ without an obvious entry point for regulators. Fortunately for regulators, most trading volume in blockchain-based assets is still on centralized service providers for performance reasons. However this leaves the following research questions we address in this paper: (i) is secure trading (i.e., resistant to front-running and price manipulation) even feasible as a fully ‘on-chain’ service on a public blockchain, (ii) what is its performance benchmark, and (iii) what is the performance impact of novel techniques (e.g., ‘rollups’) in closing the performance gap? To answer these questions, we ‘learn by doing’ and custom design an Ethereum-based call market (or batch auction) exchange, Lissy, with favorable security properties. We conduct a variety of optimizations and experiments to demonstrate that this technology cannot expect to exceed a few hundred trade executions per block (i.e., 13s window of time). However this can be scaled dramatically with off-chain execution that is not consumer-facing. We also illustrate, with numerous examples throughout the paper, how blockchain deployment is full of nuances that make it quite different from developing in better understood domains (e.g., cloud-based web applications).
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
链上交易:监管机构的最坏情况有多可行?
当消费者交易金融产品时,他们通常会使用在政府监管下运作的识别良好的服务提供商。理论上,像以太坊这样的去中心化平台可以在没有监管机构明显入口的情况下提供“链上”交易服务。对于监管机构来说,幸运的是,出于性能原因,基于区块链的资产的大部分交易量仍然是集中的服务提供商。然而,这留下了我们在本文中解决的以下研究问题:(i)安全交易(即抵抗抢先运行和价格操纵)作为公共区块链上的完全“链上”服务是否可行,(ii)其性能基准是什么,以及(iii)新技术(例如“rollups”)在缩小性能差距方面的性能影响是什么?为了回答这些问题,我们“边做边学”并定制设计了一个基于以太坊的呼叫市场(或批量拍卖)交易所Lissy,具有良好的安全属性。我们进行了各种优化和实验,以证明该技术不能期望每个区块超过几百个交易执行(即13秒的时间窗口)。然而,这可以通过不面向消费者的链下执行来显着扩展。我们还通过本文中的许多示例说明了区块链部署如何充满细微差别,使其与在更好理解的领域(例如,基于云的web应用程序)中开发完全不同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Sound GUPPI Safe Harbor: A Calibrated Unilateral Effects Screen for Horizontal Mergers with Differentiated Products Consolidation on Aisle Five: Effects of Mergers in Consumer Packaged Goods Optimal Exit Policy with Uncertain Demand Friends in High Places: Demand Spillovers and Competition on Digital Platforms The Ambiguous Competitive Effects of Passive Partial Forward Integration
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1