Risk Informed Work Selection

F. A. Corsiglia, H. Haidar, Andrew Duncan Frost
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Abstract

Asset integrity management is a life cycle concept typically initiated in the conceptual and detailed design phase of projects. Parallel with the development of equipment and system lists, the process of building maintenance job plans starts. Tools, such as criticality assessment, are used to identify the type of engineering deliverable from which the maintenance job plan is built. For a large majority of equipment and systems, original equipment manufacturer (OEM) recommended or fleet inspection, maintenance and testing (IMT) plans are adequate. For a smaller subset, more detailed plans leveraging risk-based inspection (RBI) and reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) concepts are developed building a regime of preventative maintenance focused on data collection in the commissioning and early operation of the facility. For an extremely limited subset of equipment, mostly machinery, but could include pipelines, electrical and product analyzers, the most detailed plans are developed which are highly specific to a particular equipment tag. Criticality assessment is commonly cited as a core process for prioritization of RBI/RCM plan development initially with spare parts inventories and work management later in the life cycle. International standards such as ISO 14224, Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries — Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment, provide a framework for asset hierarchy and taxonomy which will prove to be important during the operating phase of the life cycle where surveillance and corrective maintenance data will be leverage to optimize maintenance job plans. ISO 14224 refers to IEC 60812, Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA and FMECA), for treatment of Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Assessment (FMECA). To a large extent, ISO 60812 leaves determination of the variables to drive criticality assessment up to the operator saying only that two or more variables should be used. Variables used commonly include consequence of failure, but also maintainability and complexity. Benchmarks for criticality assessment suggest about 10% of equipment merits identification as critical (reference needed). Criticality is important as a foundation to integrity management as work linked to primary function carries an inherited technical characteristic of the equipment and systems. Over time, additional equipment and systems will be added (or removed) from critical equipment lists through continuous improvement processes such as root cause failure analysis (RCFA). With the prioritization of developing maintenance plans through fleet and RBI/RCM processes and their resultant deliverables defined, the detailed plans are identified through collaboration of technical, maintenance and operations staff specialists. Fundamentally, the process involves identification of hazards which can result in impaired primary and secondary functionality, estimation of unmitigated risk, identification of work to mitigate risk, estimation of mitigated risk, calculation of benefit-to-cost and documenting the analysis into the system of record. Consistency in the processes can be assured through application of procedures and references that typically reference a risk matrix. As each hazard is reviewed, there may be multiple failures modes (e.g. hole, crack, rupture) which needs to be considered independently. Consequence assessment is performed for a range of Safety Health Environmental and Security (SHES) scenarios associated with the failure mode. Probability assessment for the scenarios is performed using the available design parameters. The combined consequence and probability form the initial unmitigated risk basis for the scenario. Inspection, maintenance and testing activities are selected by the collaborating specialists with focus of input from technical on probability mitigation, maintenance on cost and operations on benefit. The scenarios is then revisited to document the mitigated risk.
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基于风险的工作选择
资产完整性管理是一个生命周期概念,通常在项目的概念和详细设计阶段启动。随着设备和系统清单的制定,建筑维修工作计划的过程开始了。诸如临界性评估之类的工具用于确定构建维护工作计划的工程交付类型。对于大多数设备和系统,原始设备制造商(OEM)推荐或车队检查,维护和测试(IMT)计划就足够了。对于一个较小的子集,利用基于风险的检查(RBI)和以可靠性为中心的维护(RCM)概念制定了更详细的计划,建立了一个预防性维护制度,重点关注设施调试和早期运行中的数据收集。对于非常有限的设备子集,主要是机械,但可能包括管道,电气和产品分析仪,制定最详细的计划,这些计划高度特定于特定的设备标签。关键性评估通常被认为是RBI/RCM计划开发优先级的核心过程,最初是备件库存和生命周期后期的工作管理。ISO 14224等国际标准,石油、石化和天然气行业-设备可靠性和维护数据的收集和交换,为资产层次结构和分类提供了一个框架,这将在生命周期的操作阶段证明是重要的,其中监控和纠正维护数据将用于优化维护工作计划。ISO 14224参考了IEC 60812,失效模式和影响分析(FMEA和FMECA),用于处理失效模式影响和临界性评估(FMECA)。在很大程度上,ISO 60812将驱动临界性评估的变量的确定留给了操作员,只说应该使用两个或更多的变量。通常使用的变量包括故障的结果,但也包括可维护性和复杂性。临界性评估的基准表明,大约10%的设备值得确定为临界(需要参考)。关键性是完整性管理的重要基础,因为与主要功能相关的工作带有设备和系统的继承技术特征。随着时间的推移,通过诸如根本原因失效分析(RCFA)等持续改进过程,将其他设备和系统从关键设备列表中添加(或移除)。通过车队和RBI/RCM流程制定维护计划的优先级,并定义其最终可交付成果,通过技术,维护和运营人员专家的协作确定详细计划。从根本上说,该过程包括识别可能导致主要和次要功能受损的危害,估计未减轻的风险,确定减轻风险的工作,估计减轻的风险,计算效益-成本,并将分析记录到记录系统中。可以通过应用通常引用风险矩阵的程序和参考来确保过程中的一致性。在审查每个危害时,可能会有多种失效模式(如孔洞、裂纹、破裂)需要单独考虑。对与故障模式相关的一系列安全、健康、环境和安全(SHES)场景进行后果评估。使用可用的设计参数执行场景的概率评估。综合结果和概率构成了情景的初始未减轻风险基础。检查、维护和测试活动由合作专家选择,重点关注技术方面的投入,降低可能性,维护方面的投入,以及效益方面的投入。然后重新访问场景以记录已减轻的风险。
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