Contracts design for serial delivery with connecting time spot: From a perspective of fourth party logistics

IF 1.6 3区 工程技术 Q4 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations Pub Date : 2022-01-01 DOI:10.5267/j.ijiec.2022.7.003
Yang Dong, Xiaohu Qian, Min Huang, W. Ching
{"title":"Contracts design for serial delivery with connecting time spot: From a perspective of fourth party logistics","authors":"Yang Dong, Xiaohu Qian, Min Huang, W. Ching","doi":"10.5267/j.ijiec.2022.7.003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"For a serial delivery system, the latter 3PL needs to be prepared at the transshipment node in advance to reduce the total delivery time. In this paper, we propose the concept of Connecting Time Spot (CTS) to help 4PL schedule the latter 3PL when to wait at the transshipment node. We study a serial delivery system with a 4PL and two 3PLs, where 4PL designs optimal contracts with two types of CTS (GCTS is derived by system parameter and DCTS is determined by 4PL’s optimization) to induce 3PLs to exert the optimal effort levels. We analyze the effects of CTS on the system profit in the centralized system. For the decentralized system, we particularly investigate the optimal contracts in three penalty modes which are according to the occupancy of the warehouses. The results show that CTS can avoid 3PLs’ idle resources and enhance the system profit for serial delivery both in the centralized system and the decentralized system. Compared with GCTS, DCTS has a better performance in enhancing the system profits. Also, the optimal incentive contracts achieve Pareto improvement for system profits. Interestingly, one 3PL’s delivery penalty mode will not affect the other 3PL’s optimal contracts.","PeriodicalId":51356,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Industrial Engineering Computations","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5267/j.ijiec.2022.7.003","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

For a serial delivery system, the latter 3PL needs to be prepared at the transshipment node in advance to reduce the total delivery time. In this paper, we propose the concept of Connecting Time Spot (CTS) to help 4PL schedule the latter 3PL when to wait at the transshipment node. We study a serial delivery system with a 4PL and two 3PLs, where 4PL designs optimal contracts with two types of CTS (GCTS is derived by system parameter and DCTS is determined by 4PL’s optimization) to induce 3PLs to exert the optimal effort levels. We analyze the effects of CTS on the system profit in the centralized system. For the decentralized system, we particularly investigate the optimal contracts in three penalty modes which are according to the occupancy of the warehouses. The results show that CTS can avoid 3PLs’ idle resources and enhance the system profit for serial delivery both in the centralized system and the decentralized system. Compared with GCTS, DCTS has a better performance in enhancing the system profits. Also, the optimal incentive contracts achieve Pareto improvement for system profits. Interestingly, one 3PL’s delivery penalty mode will not affect the other 3PL’s optimal contracts.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
具有连接时间点的连续交付合同设计——基于第四方物流的视角
对于串行交付系统,后一个第三方物流需要在转运节点提前准备,以减少总交付时间。在本文中,我们提出了连接时间点(CTS)的概念,以帮助第四方物流安排后一个第三方物流在转运节点的等待时间。本文研究了一个有一个第四方物流和两个第三方物流的连续配送系统,其中第四方物流设计了两种类型的CTS (GCTS由系统参数推导,DCTS由第四方物流的优化决定)的最优契约,以诱导第三方物流发挥最优的努力水平。在集中式系统中,分析了CTS对系统利润的影响。对于分散系统,我们特别研究了三种基于仓库占用率的惩罚模式下的最优契约。结果表明,无论在集中式系统还是分散式系统中,CTS都可以避免第三方物流的闲置资源,提高系统利润。与GCTS相比,DCTS在提高系统效益方面具有更好的性能。最优激励契约实现了系统利润的帕累托改进。有趣的是,一个第三方物流的交付惩罚模式不会影响另一个第三方物流的最优合同。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
9.10%
发文量
35
审稿时长
20 weeks
期刊最新文献
A unifying framework and a mathematical model for the Slab Stack Shuffling Problem Heuristics and metaheuristics to minimize makespan for flowshop with peak power consumption constraints Minimizing operating expenditures for a manufacturing system featuring quality reassurances, probabilistic failures, overtime, and outsourcing Composite heuristics and water wave optimality algorithms for tri-criteria multiple job classes and customer order scheduling on a single machine Investigating the collective impact of postponement, scrap, and external suppliers on multiproduct replenishing decision
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1