Allocation Discretion, Information Sharing and Underwriter Syndication

Abstract

The competitiveness of the IPO underwriting market suffers from the concentration of restricted mandates in the hands of a limited number of underwriters with good reputations. Academic research has focused extensively on the relationship between underpricing and the influence of an individual underwriter. However, we have only scant research on the effect of IPO syndication on underpricing. Nevertheless, most IPOs are managed by underwriters operating as an IPO syndicate. Here, we contribute to an analysis of underwriting syndicates by examining 329 IPOs issued in the Indian IPO market in the period 2000-10 that were made subject to either a discretionary or a proportionate allocation regime. We find that the underwriting market in India is highly concentrated and is dominated by a few large and reputable underwriters who have ongoing relationships amongst themselves to manage IPOs. This highlights a potential entry barrier for new underwriters. We find that underwriters form large syndicates when the issue size is large. Also, we do not find any evidence that the motivation for underwriters to form a syndicate is due to market risk sharing or price manipulation. We conclude that underwriters syndicate to share the inventory risk of an IPO. When allocation discretion is regulated, and the risk of managing an IPO is high, we observe that the size of an underwriting syndicate is smaller. However, the results support the role of institutional subscription acting as a mediating factor for reputable underwriters to syndicate. Able to share the risk in this way, the syndicate partnership benefits the issuer with lower underpricing. Overall, we conclude that regulatory intervention is positive for market welfare due to lower underpricing. We also find that in the absence of allocation discretion, syndication by reputable underwriters acts as an effective medium of discretion for higher information and risk sharing.