A compact energy-efficient pseudo-static camouflaged logic family

P. Mohan, N. E. C. Akkaya, B. Erbagci, K. Mai
{"title":"A compact energy-efficient pseudo-static camouflaged logic family","authors":"P. Mohan, N. E. C. Akkaya, B. Erbagci, K. Mai","doi":"10.1109/HST.2018.8383896","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Protecting hardware IP from reverse engineering threats is becoming increasingly challenging with advances in reverse engineering techniques. Different camouflaged logic families based on multi-Vt transistors have been recently proposed to combat reverse engineering threats. While multi-Vt based camouflaged logic gates offer cells that have an identical layout with multiple functionalities, they typically incur significant overheads in power, area, and delay. Moreover, amplifying the threshold voltage difference to logic levels while maintaining the noise margins needs careful analysis of PVT variations and mismatch. In this paper, a Pseudo-Static Camouflaged (PS-CAMO) logic family is proposed to improve the energy overheads of camouflaged logic gates while maintaining the reliability and yields of static CMOS logic gates. Post-layout simulations of a high-performance fully camouflaged S-box in a 65nm industrial CMOS process shows a 42% reduction in energy and a 26% reduction in area compared to a previously proposed Threshold Voltage Defined (TVD) camouflaged logic family.","PeriodicalId":6574,"journal":{"name":"2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","volume":"1 1","pages":"96-102"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2018 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/HST.2018.8383896","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

Abstract

Protecting hardware IP from reverse engineering threats is becoming increasingly challenging with advances in reverse engineering techniques. Different camouflaged logic families based on multi-Vt transistors have been recently proposed to combat reverse engineering threats. While multi-Vt based camouflaged logic gates offer cells that have an identical layout with multiple functionalities, they typically incur significant overheads in power, area, and delay. Moreover, amplifying the threshold voltage difference to logic levels while maintaining the noise margins needs careful analysis of PVT variations and mismatch. In this paper, a Pseudo-Static Camouflaged (PS-CAMO) logic family is proposed to improve the energy overheads of camouflaged logic gates while maintaining the reliability and yields of static CMOS logic gates. Post-layout simulations of a high-performance fully camouflaged S-box in a 65nm industrial CMOS process shows a 42% reduction in energy and a 26% reduction in area compared to a previously proposed Threshold Voltage Defined (TVD) camouflaged logic family.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
一个紧凑节能的伪静态伪装逻辑族
随着逆向工程技术的进步,保护硬件IP免受逆向工程威胁变得越来越具有挑战性。最近提出了基于多vt晶体管的不同伪装逻辑族来对抗逆向工程威胁。虽然基于多电压的伪装逻辑门提供具有多种功能的相同布局的单元,但它们通常会在功率,面积和延迟方面产生显着的开销。此外,在保持噪声裕度的同时,将阈值电压差放大到逻辑电平需要仔细分析PVT变化和失配。本文提出了一种伪静态伪装(PS-CAMO)逻辑族,以提高伪装逻辑门的能量开销,同时保持静态CMOS逻辑门的可靠性和成品率。在65nm工业CMOS工艺中对高性能全伪装s盒进行布局后仿真表明,与先前提出的阈值电压定义(TVD)伪装逻辑家族相比,能量降低42%,面积减少26%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Attack on a Microcomputer-Based Random Number Generator Using Auto-synchronization Comparison of cost of protection against differential power analysis of selected authenticated ciphers Large scale RO PUF analysis over slice type, evaluation time and temperature on 28nm Xilinx FPGAs CTCG: Charge-trap based camouflaged gates for reverse engineering prevention Value prediction for security (VPsec): Countering fault attacks in modern microprocessors
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1