A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer

Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Weinberg
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引用次数: 220

Abstract

We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue. We suggest using the a priori better of two simple pricing methods: selling the items separately, each at its optimal price, and bundling together, in which the entire set of items is sold as one bundle at its optimal price. We show that for any distribution, this mechanism achieves a constant-factor approximation to the optimal revenue. Beyond its simplicity, this is the first computationally tractable mechanism to obtain a constant-factor approximation for this multi-parameter problem. We additionally discuss extensions to multiple buyers and to valuations that are correlated across items.
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一个简单的近似最优的增材购买者机制
我们考虑一个拥有n个异质商品的垄断性卖家,面对一个单一的买家。买方根据(不相同的)分布独立绘制每个项目的价值,并且她对一组项目的价值是相加的。卖方的目标是使他的收入最大化。我们建议使用两种简单定价方法中的先验更好的方法:分别以最优价格出售商品,以及捆绑在一起以最优价格出售整套商品。我们证明,对于任何分布,该机制实现了最优收益的常因子近似。除了它的简单性,这是第一个计算易于处理的机制,以获得一个常数因子近似的多参数问题。我们还讨论了扩展到多个买家和跨项目相关的估值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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