Dynamic Amnesty Programs

IF 10.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20211428
Samuel Kapon
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

A regulator faces a stream of agents engaged in crimes with stochastic returns. The regulator designs an amnesty program, committing to a time path of punishments for criminals who report their crimes. In an optimal program, time variation in the returns from crime can generate time variation in the generosity of amnesty. I construct an optimal time path and show that it exhibits amnesty cycles. Amnesty becomes increasingly generous over time until it hits a bound, after which the cycle resets. Agents engaged in high return crime report at the end of each cycle, while agents engaged in low return crime report always. (JEL D82, D86, K42)
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动态大赦计划
监管者面对的是一系列从事随机收益犯罪的代理人。监管机构设计了一项大赦计划,承诺对举报犯罪的罪犯进行惩罚。在最优方案中,犯罪收益的时间变化会导致特赦慷慨度的时间变化。我构造了一个最优时间路径,并证明它具有特赦周期。随着时间的推移,大赦会变得越来越慷慨,直到达到一个界限,之后循环重新开始。在每个周期结束时,从事高回报犯罪的代理人报告犯罪,而从事低回报犯罪的代理人总是报告犯罪。(凝胶d82, d86, k42)
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来源期刊
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
2.80%
发文量
122
期刊介绍: The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.
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