{"title":"THE DEFENSE OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN NETWORK AND INFORMATION GOODS MARKETS","authors":"Ivan Soukal","doi":"10.15240/tul/001/2021-4-003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It is not uncommon that articles focused on consumer-price interaction in the network and information goods market swiftly condemn price discrimination as an obfuscation, on-purpose price complexity, or market failure. The reason is a general neoclassical rule of an efficient market where prices are set at marginal cost with no price discrimination. However, the matter is more complicated. This review provides authors an overview of why, where, and which type of price discrimination should be viewed by different optics. Goods such as software, cell carrier services, electronic newspapers subscription, electric energy supply, payment accounts, books, copyrighted content streaming, etc, cannot be treated like manufactured goods. The reasons are specific conditions – substantial and/or repeated fixed/sunk cost, economies of scale, and demand heterogeneity. Recognized economist W. J. Baumol described marginal cost set prices under these conditions as an ‘economic suicide’. Reviewed articles showed that firms are forced to adopt price discrimination in order to recover their costs and to serve more consumer segments. Reviewed authors provided facts to support the use of multipart tariffs, dynamic pricing, versioning, bundling, and Ramsey pricing. These conclusions are used for suggestions on how several studies of information and network goods should be modified. Modifications are related mostly to model assumptions and pricing conclusions. I argue that, in the case of information and network goods, there is justified price discrimination. Hence, there is a certain justified level of price complexity that has to be accepted and not taken as automated evidence of inefficiency, market power, and consumer exploitation.","PeriodicalId":46351,"journal":{"name":"E & M Ekonomie a Management","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"E & M Ekonomie a Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15240/tul/001/2021-4-003","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
It is not uncommon that articles focused on consumer-price interaction in the network and information goods market swiftly condemn price discrimination as an obfuscation, on-purpose price complexity, or market failure. The reason is a general neoclassical rule of an efficient market where prices are set at marginal cost with no price discrimination. However, the matter is more complicated. This review provides authors an overview of why, where, and which type of price discrimination should be viewed by different optics. Goods such as software, cell carrier services, electronic newspapers subscription, electric energy supply, payment accounts, books, copyrighted content streaming, etc, cannot be treated like manufactured goods. The reasons are specific conditions – substantial and/or repeated fixed/sunk cost, economies of scale, and demand heterogeneity. Recognized economist W. J. Baumol described marginal cost set prices under these conditions as an ‘economic suicide’. Reviewed articles showed that firms are forced to adopt price discrimination in order to recover their costs and to serve more consumer segments. Reviewed authors provided facts to support the use of multipart tariffs, dynamic pricing, versioning, bundling, and Ramsey pricing. These conclusions are used for suggestions on how several studies of information and network goods should be modified. Modifications are related mostly to model assumptions and pricing conclusions. I argue that, in the case of information and network goods, there is justified price discrimination. Hence, there is a certain justified level of price complexity that has to be accepted and not taken as automated evidence of inefficiency, market power, and consumer exploitation.
关注网络和信息产品市场中消费者价格相互作用的文章迅速谴责价格歧视是一种混淆,有目的的价格复杂性或市场失灵,这并不罕见。原因是有效市场的一般新古典主义规则,价格设定在边际成本,没有价格歧视。然而,事情要复杂得多。这篇综述为作者提供了一个概述,为什么,在哪里,以及哪种类型的价格歧视应该被不同的光学观察。软件、手机运营商服务、电子报纸订阅、电力供应、支付账户、书籍、版权内容流等商品不能被视为制成品。原因是特定的条件——大量和/或重复的固定/沉没成本、规模经济和需求异质性。知名经济学家鲍莫尔(W. J. Baumol)将这种情况下的边际成本定价描述为“经济自杀”。经过审查的文章表明,公司被迫采取价格歧视,以收回成本并服务于更多的消费者群体。审查的作者提供的事实,以支持使用多部分关税,动态定价,版本控制,捆绑和拉姆齐定价。这些结论被用来建议一些关于信息和网络产品的研究应该如何修改。修改主要与模型假设和定价结论有关。我认为,就信息和网络产品而言,存在合理的价格歧视。因此,有一定程度的合理的价格复杂性必须被接受,而不是被视为效率低下、市场力量和消费者剥削的自动证据。